Resituating the Local in Cohesion and Territorial Development

Deliverable 1.1
Conceptual Framework for the Project

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1.0: Introduction

This paper forms Deliverable 1.1 of the RELOCAL Horizon 2020 project. At this stage (March 2017) it is in the form of Work in Progress, in preparation for being discussed at the Volos workshop. All of the tasks in WP1 (except 1.9, the summary) have been addressed, mainly by staff at Newcastle University, who are leading this Work Package. The need for the conceptual framework, and all the tasks that contribute to it, to be available at the project meeting in Volos (8-9 March 2017) meant that our priority was to produce a working document rather than a polished piece of work. In particular, we see improvements being made in the light of comments to the Newcastle team from partners about where further work is needed, from substantive inputs from those partners also involved in the Work Package, and from policy and political updates that will occur during the project’s life. A final deliverable, 1.4 is required in month 46 by which time a final document will be produced.

The objective of WP1 is to undertake a critical review of the literature and develop a theoretical framework for the project. In particular, it should

- Develop a theoretical framework for the project through a critical review of the concepts and models of territorial cohesion, spatial justice and solidarity;
- Provide a critical review of the concepts of spatiality, spatial justice, territorial cohesion, sustainable development and solidarity;
- Provide a critical examination of the links and tensions between these concepts and models in Europe;
- Provide a critical examination of the links and tensions between these concepts and the concepts and models of regionalism and localism in Europe;
- Develop a conceptual framework for the project, directly supporting WP2 to 7.

The work was divided into 9 tasks in the proposal. Task 1.1 was to provide “a critical review of the concepts of spatiality, especially in different institutional contexts. The concepts of spatiality vary widely in different contexts, with direct implications about how policies are developed and implemented. These differences, therefore need to be well understood”. This is reported in Chapter 1.1: Space and Spatiality.

Task 1.2 was to provide a “Critical review of the concepts of social and spatial justice, particularly in relation to the European Social Model the European Social Model has been a central concept in the development of European Union and the recent call for its reform make it imperative that the impact of any reforms on social and spatial justice be examined”. This is reported in Chapter 1.2: Social and Spatial Justice.

Task 1.3 asked for a “critical review of the concepts and models of territorial cohesion and their relationship with the conditions of inequality in Europe. The recent economic crisis and longer term economic restructuring have led to growing inequality within and between regions. The links and tensions between territorial cohesion concepts and the growing inequality need to be analysed”. This is reported in Chapter 1.3: Territorial Cohesion.

Task 1.4 was to produce a “critical review of the concepts and models of sustainable development, especially when economic development concerns take central stage. The call specifically invites attention to sustainable development. In the context of the economic crisis, attention has been focused on economic recovery. What are the links and tensions between the economic emphasis and sustainable development?”. This is reported in Chapter 1.4: Sustainable Development.

Task 1.5 called for a “critical review of the concepts of solidarity, especially in the conditions of economic crisis that tests the limits of solidarity. European solidarity has been the glue with which the construction of the European project has been made possible. The economic and migration
crises, however, have challenged the existing patterns of solidarity. The conceptual foundations of solidarity, and the way it may be addressed in the context of these challenges will be critically studied”. This is reported in Chapter 1.5: Solidarity.

Task 1.6 examines “the relationship between the concepts of territorial cohesion, spatial justice, and sustainable development. This tasks brings together the key aspects of the first dimension of the call, drawing on tasks 1.1, 1.2, 1.3, 1.4 and 1.5”. This is reported in Chapter 1.6: Territorial Cohesion, Spatial Justice and Sustainable Development.

Task 1.7 asks for an examination of “the relationship between the concepts of territorial cohesion and spatial justice with the concepts and models of regionalism and localism. This task provides a conceptual link between the two dimensions of the call: territorial cohesion and regionalism. This task will be coordinated with WP4”. This is reported in 1.7: Territorial and spatial justice, regionalism and localism.

Task 1.8 brings all the earlier tasks together as a conceptual framework for the project. This will directly support all the other work packages. This takes the form of a proposal in Chapter 1.8: some proposals for a theoretical framework.

Figure 1.0.1. The tasks of Work Package 1.
1.1: Space and Spatiality

Introduction

The main aim of Task 1.1 is to undertake a critical review of the concepts of spatiality and explore how it is articulated in different institutional contexts. The concepts of spatiality vary widely in different contexts, with direct implications about how policies are developed and implemented. These differences, therefore, need to be well understood. The text is organised around the themes of the spatial turn in social sciences, the concepts of space, the dimensions of spatiality, and an exploration of spatial qualities, institutional arrangements and social justice.

In approaching spatial justice, an important first step is to clarify the concepts of space and spatiality that we use. The ontology, epistemology, and methodology of space are closely intertwined, as the definition of something would be tightly related to how it is understood and explained (Hollis, 2002), as well as how it is organised and managed. In other words, the knowledge of something is not separated from the way it is described or managed. These close links between ontology, epistemology and methodology may show a degree of coherence for the subject of space, but in fact it is far from settled. Space lies at the core of a range of spatial arts and sciences, but there is no consensus in defining it, even within any of these disciplines (Merriman et al, 2012).

The spatial turn

Spatiality has risen to become a key concept in social sciences and humanities, changing some of the established paradigms in the analysis of society (Tally, 2013). The Chicago School of Ecology had used spatial analysis as a core ingredient of its social research, but it was criticised for ignoring the political and economic forces at work. The Marxian political economy frameworks had explained society through these forces and provided instructions for its change through a clear temporal logic, charting an inevitable linear pathway for change. But political economic analysis had ignored the spatial dimension of social change, which was now adjusted to incorporate the spatial in the analysis of the social (Lefebvre, 1991).

The spatial turn was partly triggered by the emergence of poststructuralist theories, challenging the dominance of historicism in social analysis, which had persisted since the nineteenth century. The modernist perspective had envisaged and advocated linear historicism, in which temporality coincided with progressive change. The sceptical response of the later generations, however, was to question these certainties by emphasising spatiality. Michel Foucault, with his ‘spatialized thinking’ (Flynn, 1994), aimed at showing the significance of space in ‘any form of communal life’ and ‘any exercise of power’ (Foucault, 1993:168). The emphasis on the spatial would question the linear cause-effect relationships, opening the possibility of simultaneity and multiple outcomes. It also criticised the universalist assumptions about social processes, as society was to be envisaged as a realm of differences rather than homogeneities (Lefebvre, 1991).

In addition to spatial arts and sciences, such as architecture, planning and geography, other disciplines have also embraced a spatial perspective (Soja, 1989). This includes the anthropologists who ‘are rethinking and reconceptualising their understanding of culture in spatialized ways’ (Low & Lawrence-Zúñiga, 2003, 1). For them, the spatial turn has been interpreted as ‘a dialogic process that links the social production of space and nature and the social development of the built environment’ (Low, 2017:7). Interest in the spatial also includes the economists who, beyond the usual interest in urban economics (O’Sullivan 2012), use space to explain economic processes (Fainstein & Campbell, 2011; Fujita et al, 1999). It also includes research in literature and cultural studies, where attention to the spatial has found a prominent place (Tally, 2013). The balance between time and
space has therefore been largely changed, from a period in which time was given priority over space, to one in which space has found a central role in social analysis (Foucault, 1993).

The spatial turn has not been limited to academic disciplines, but has also been expressed in policy and practice, as they are both rooted in major structural changes in society. The postmodern critique of universalism runs parallel with the fragmentation and decline of the universalist welfare state, changing the relationship between the state and society. A reflection of this shift has been a move towards spatial differentiation in state intervention, acknowledging the limits to the ambitions of comprehensive solutions for all social problems. The spatial turn in social analysis and spatial policy, therefore, runs parallel to the neoliberal turn in politics and economics. The area-based initiatives, which started from the late 1960s and spread far and wide in all countries, heralded the end of modernist comprehensive planning and the emergence of selective and strategic planning (Couch et al, 2011; Albrechts, 2017). The concepts of place and placemaking have come to occupy a central place on the policy making agendas, as a means of bridging the sectoral divides between a fragmented range of stakeholders, facilitated through shared envisioning of the future around specific locations and issues (Madanipour et al, 2001).

The spatial turn in social analysis and practice, however, has not had a single concept of space and a shared format of how to approach it. It has been as wide-ranging as the shades of philosophical ideas, political opinions and cultural orientations. As a result, the implications of this turn for social justice cannot be simplified into narrow conclusions. At least three concepts of space and spatiality can be identified, with different implications for analysis and practice (Madanipour, 2013).

**Concepts of space: abstract, relative and relational**

The primary tension in defining space is between abstract concepts and relationships between phenomena. Space, as Lefebvre (1991, 12) argues, ‘in isolation, is an empty abstraction’. For much of the human history, space has been a common sense, relational idea, referring to the location that bodies occupy in the world (Gray, 1989; Čapek, 1976). The ancient Greek mathematicians, however, turned it into an abstract concept of a limitless void, which became the basis for deductive thinking and the emergence of philosophical thought (Algra, 1995; Faber, 1983). After the Renaissance, Descartes (1968, 58) embraced the Euclidean concept of abstract space: ‘a continuous body, or a space extended indefinitely in length, width and height or depth, divisible into various parts, which could have various figures and sizes and be moved or transposed in all sorts of ways’. With its application in Newtonian physics, this idea found a central place in modern science, but a series of challenges, culminating in Einstein’s theory of relativity, eventually dethroned it. Modernist architecture and planning embraced this abstract concept of space, which also came under attack from its critics. The assumptions about the neutrality of space, the benevolence of the technical experts, and the functional rationale of spatial transformation were all questioned, but they have remained inherently paramount to this day in many professional discourses.

The idea of abstract space was criticized from early on, starting with Leibniz (1979, 89), who believed ‘space to be something merely relative, as time is ...an order of coexistences, as time is an order of successions. For space denotes, in terms of possibility, an order of things which exist at the same time, considered as existing together’. Around the same time, John Locke (1979, 101) defines space as ‘the relation of distance between any two bodies or points’. Kant (1993, 61), in turn, transformed the basis of understanding space and time, further relativizing them by arguing that they did not exist independently, and they were only aspects of our perception, representations of appearances, which ‘cannot exist in themselves, but only in us’. With the rise of non-Euclidean geometry and Einstein’s relative physics, the idea of space as a distinctive entity almost disappeared from the research agenda, replaced by a relationship between phenomena, which is what geographers have called relative space (Gregory et al, 2009).
In geography, definitions of space referred both to the things in themselves, as well as to the relations between them as expressed in maps. Abstract space was defined as ‘a distinct, physical and eminently real or empirical entity in itself’ (Blaut, 1961), as something which is ‘clearly distinct, real, and objective’ (Mayhew & Penny, 1992). Relative space, on the other hand, focused on ‘the characteristics of things in terms of their concentration and dispersion’, as traced back to the early map-makers and their concern with precise measurement of locational relationships, continued in the contemporary spatial analysis (Goodall, 1987). Both the abstract and relative concepts, however, remained within the scope of positive science, without explicit reference to the social context of these spatial phenomena. The epistemology of space involved in measuring and mapping locations and distances, which were claimed to have factual neutrality. Spatial analysis, therefore, set out to capture a factual map of the world, now armed with information and communication technologies. The notion of space as an entity was replaced by the positive science of spatial analysis.

The abstract and relative concepts of space were subsequently challenged by a relational concept of space, which referred to ‘a relation between events or an aspect of events, and thus bound to time and process’ (Blaut, 1961), which was ‘perceived by a person or society’ (Mayhew & Penny, 1992). Rather than viewing space as ‘a container within which the world proceeds’, the relational concept of space sees it ‘as a co-product of those proceedings’ (Thrift, 2003, 96). Rather than being detached from any process, space is an integral part of social processes: ‘abstract spatial forms in itself can guarantee nothing about the social, political or ethical content of the relations which construct that form’ (Massey, 2005, 101). It was argued that space is ‘socially constructed’, but ‘the social is spatially constructed too’ and therefore ‘geography matters’ (Massey, 1992:70). Furthermore, Lefebvre (1991) argued, the processes that produce space are an integral part of the way social relations are reproduced. In embracing a relational notion of space, human geography has integrated time and space, focused on the co-production of time and space, and has accepted the unruliness and porosity of space and time. In other words, it has ‘abandoned the project of an autonomous science of the spatial’ (Gregory et al, 2009, 709), becoming largely integrated with other social sciences.

The implications of these concepts for social and spatial justice are significant. In the abstract notion, space is considered as a neutral entity, beyond social interpretations such as justice and fairness, a metaphysical concept that is outside human reach and meaning. From the relative perspective, the patterns of distribution of phenomena become a matter of concern, which can be observed and evaluated for being just or otherwise. The relative concept of space would therefore appear to fit well with the notions of distributive justice, capturing the patterns of distribution of resources across the territory. However, this concept appears to treat the relations between phenomena in a rather static way, as captured in maps. As Foucault argued, space had hitherto been treated as ‘the dead, the fixed, the undialectical, the immobile’ (Quoted in Soja, 1989:10). With the relational concept of space, the integration of space and society brings in the idea of social space and how it is produced (Lefebvre, 1991). This relational understanding of spatiality would not abandon its concern for the patterns of distribution of phenomena, but analyses these patterns as social phenomena. It combines space and time, opening the doors to the questions of both distributive and procedural justice.

**Spatiality: material and social**

The key challenge in these approaches to space is to combine both distributive and procedural elements of justice in spatial analysis and practice. This requires a definition of the spatial that would distinguish it from the social, without being reduced to the physical: being an integral part of the social and incorporating the material and the social aspects of spatial processes.

A problem is that the relationship between the physical and the social remains ambiguous. On the one hand, social analysis of physical space continues to be made through its functions. In planning,
definitions of space may be found in the descriptions of what planners do. The European Council of Spatial Planners defines the field and nature of town planners’ activities: ‘Town Planning embraces all forms of development and land use activities...It is concerned with the promotion, guidance, enhancement and control of development in the constantly changing physical environment’ (ECTP-CEU,2012). The UK government’s National Planning Framework identifies the aim of planning as sustainable development with its social, economic and environmental dimensions, with its main focus on the built environment (DCLG,2012, 2). The UK’s Royal Town Planning Institute is more explicit about ‘space’, using a subtitle in its logo: ‘mediation of space, making of place’. It describes what planning does, which expands on this subtitle: ‘Planning involves twin activities - the management of the competing uses for space, and the making of places that are valued and have identity’ (RTPI,2012). This is further clarified by the Urban Forum in its Handy Guide to Planning: ‘The planning system in the UK manages the use and development of land and buildings. The aim of the system is to create better places for people to live, work and play in’. Space, therefore, seems to equate with land and buildings. Place is distinguished from space, but indirectly explained in physical and functional terms, i.e., where people ‘live, work and play in’.

On the other hand, social analysis of space may emphasize social relations, without much attention to the physical objects and the material world that mediates between humans, seeing physical objects as unimportant or merely a social construct. The danger in this interpretation is that we might lose the material world of objects in an idealist interpretation, falling into the Cartesian dualism of body and mind. Interpretations such as Lefebvre’s (1991) try to restore this link with the material world. Space is indeed inclusive of the range of physical and social phenomena and their relationships with one another. As Bourdieu (2000: 134-5) argues, social space is ‘a structure of juxtaposition of social positions’, which tends to be translated into physical space, so space becomes ‘correspondence between a certain order of coexistence (or distribution) of agents and a certain order of coexistence (or distribution) of properties’.

A metaphysical concept of abstract space as an invisible substance is no longer tenable, but so is the idea of immaterial relations, decontextualized as if existing outside a material and social context. The focus on space as pure relations could be as metaphysical as the focus on space as a pure physical substance. To understand space, we cannot see it only as relations, but as a collection of phenomena and their relations. In this sense, space is a collection of people, life forms and inanimate objects and the variety of relations that can be identified between them, relations that can range from events and processes to perceptions and feelings, which can lead to the generation of new objects and relations (Madanipour,2013). This collection of objects and relations, however, is not fixed and unchanging, but constantly evolving (Massey,2005).

**Spatiality: territorial and relational**

A related debate has emerged between territorial and relational concepts of space, the latter emphasizing the regions’ specificities and differences, while the former locating regions within the network of global interdependencies. Originated in the context of regional disparities in the UK, a view had argued that these disparities cannot be merely attributed to the regions’ deficiencies, but were part of the broader national and international processes (Massey,1979). It has been argued, however, that the two sides of the debate have more in common than assumed, as both emphasise the empirical relations between and within regions (Varró & Lagendijk, 2013).

Rather than analysing the region through a dichotomy between territorial and relational, we should see how a region is neither closed and merely inward-oriented nor fully open and at the mercy of global flows. A region is a process of continuous determination through the interplay of intra- and inter-local forces. The dichotomy is not between substance and relations, but between seeing the region as a thing or a process. As a thing, it will become fixed, but as a process, it will be a multi-dimensional combination of different forces at work.
Emphasizing relationality does not inherently lead to an analysis of justice, as what is needed in an investigation of justice are particularly defined relations which are the subject of value judgement. In one reading of relationality, a region’s prosperity is the other side of the coin from another region’s poverty, as they belong to the same political economic system that distributes advantages and disadvantages. This view of relationality, which explicitly seeks to change this unbalanced relationship, however, is different from a more neutral philosophical and sociological idea of relationality, which analyses how phenomena find their meanings through their place in relations and networks. The political implications of these two views are also significant, as one may be closer to a critical outlook and the other to a pragmatist position.

Spatial qualities, institutional arrangements and social justice

The abstract and relative concepts of space were mobilized in the development of a positive science of space, by measuring dimensions, distances and locations. The relational concept of space, in contrast, paved the way for a phenomenological, interpretive approach, analysing spatiality as experienced, rather than from the detached viewpoint of a cartographer. It added the dimension of understanding to the dimension of explaining the phenomena and their relationships (Hollis, 2002; Madanipour, 2001). In the concept of social space, it was possible to analyse the qualities of space from a social perspective. Spatial qualities such as agglomeration, boundary, distance, scale, location and place would all be analysed as socially constructed and subject to social critique, interrogating them for their social meaning and their contribution to social justice. Spatial justice would become an expression of how these spatial qualities would be aligned with the requirements of social justice. Each element of spatiality would be exposed to a test of social justice: agglomeration, localization, institutional designation, boundary, scale, distance, location, place, linkage and transformation are all elements in the constitution of society and integral parts of social processes.

**Agglomeration:** The process of urbanization, and the accelerated processes of neoliberal globalization, have led to heightened levels of urban agglomeration. As the State of European Cities reports show, larger European metropolises are growing, while the medium sized cities are stable and smaller cities in many eastern and southern regions of Europe are shrinking (ECOTEC, 2007; RWI et al, 2010). In the balance between economic vitality and the equal distribution of resources, which considerations are at work? Is the agglomeration of resources and opportunities in particular areas furthering inequality (Madanipour, 2011b)? This is a key question in the context of the RELOCAL project, as it addresses the relationship between localization and inequality.

**Localization:** It has been widely argued that sustainable development requires reducing the global movement of goods and people, and localizing the production and consumption of goods and services. Localization has also been seen as a response to the problem of democratic deficit in the European Union, where the gap between the EU institutions and the local populations may be wide. How far is this process of localization a contributor to reducing or increasing the levels of inequality within and across regions (Davoudi and Madanipour, 2015)?

**Institutional designation:** Designating particular areas as administrative regions has been a long geopolitical process, with inevitable consequences for those who are inside and outside these regions and localities. In the European Union, the definition of new local and regional arrangements have gone hand in hand with policy choices for territorial cohesion. How are these regions constructed and how far do they address the problems of justice and inequality? How can the institutional arrangements and the governance of regions and localities encourage or hinder the justice agenda (Madanipour et al, 2001)?

**Boundaries:** The creation of boundaries shape the administrative and political relations between localities, and across the hierarchies of power at higher levels. Therefore, the processes of defining and maintaining these boundaries, and their impacts on the inter-local and intra-local processes, are
important subjects of inquiry. How are these boundaries set, and how democratic and inclusive has the process been? How are the boundaries between areas constructed and what is their role in social inclusion and exclusion (Madanipour, 2003b; 2017)?

**Scale:** Through the creation of boundaries and the processes of regional construction and designation, a new institutional landscape emerges that may be a result of the EU and national policy agendas rather than the realities on the ground. Concepts such as participation and subsidiarity have been used to regulate the relationship between hierarchies of power. How does the institutional organization of space and the management of spatial scales exert power and in what ways can its contribution to justice be ensured (Madanipour, 2017)?

**Place:** The concept of place and locality has long been used to criticize the impersonal and abstract idea of space. In parallel, there has been a longstanding dichotomy between households and places, between individual empowerment and neighbourhood improvement. A concern in social policy has been that empowered individuals may leave their area in search of better opportunities, while the improved areas may displace the weaker households and lead to gentrification. Which spatial focus and scale would be more sensitive to inequality and social justice? Can the focus on place be sufficient for ensuring spatial justice and territorial cohesion (Madanipour et al, 2001)?

**Distance:** In a relational analysis, distance finds a powerful social significance. Especially in the context of a continental perspective in the EU, distance plays a key role in relation to the dynamics of agglomeration and spatial economics. The distance from the centres of economic activity becomes a social concern, which has attracted attention to the need for new transport, information and communication infrastructures. In comparison with the large metropolitan centres, remote regions often suffer from isolation and the absence of necessary services. Can proximity and distance be a challenge for an equal distribution of resources and opportunities (Madanipour, Cars and Allen, 2003)?

**Location:** Closely related to, and overlapping with, the issues of place and distance, is the question of location. How far does the location of a person or group shape and limit their opportunities and life prospects? Is there a neighbourhood effect that can negatively or positively influence the life chances of individuals and households? Our previous research has shown that many individuals and households can suffer from association with a place of deprivation, which can block their life chances (Madanipour, Cars and Allen, 2003). Can emphasis on location be a way of overcoming such disadvantages?

**Linkages:** Attention to localities, and in particular to the areas that suffer from multiple deprivation, has been the driving force in many area-based urban projects. While this may address some of the extreme experiences of social exclusion, it may not pay sufficient attention to the linkages between localities. As noticed above in the discussions of place, scale and boundary, localities are not detached worlds but a part of a larger context. What are the linkages between places that can work to promote social justice (Madanipour, 2011b)?

**Transformation:** Various policies have been devised to combat social exclusion and facilitate a path towards social justice. How can these policies and initiatives be assessed and what lessons can be learnt from them? A vast range of case studies exist in various EU-funded projects, which show different pathways for and experiences of social and spatial transformation. What can we learn from these case studies? What forms of spatial change can be inclusive and just and what forms exclusionary and discriminatory (Madanipour, Cars and Allen, 2003)?

**Conclusions**

RELOCAL adopts spatiality as its central focus, taking a relational perspective, that is, an outlook in which the spatial dimensions are constructed through social relations. Substantive aspects of
spatiality, i.e. the ‘physical’ spatial distributions of resources and opportunities, however, will also be considered, especially in terms of their interactions and interfaces with the social processes of relational spatiality. The analysis will therefore focus on the interpretation of patterns of time-space distribution of social phenomena that manifest in key spatial qualities such as (both the process and outcome of) agglomeration, localisation, institutional designation, boundary-setting (inclusion and exclusion), scale-setting, location (neighbourhood effect), distance (proximity vs isolation), place-linking and transformation (spatial change driven by policy).

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<thead>
<tr>
<th>Relative/substantive spatiality</th>
<th>Relational spatiality</th>
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<td>Main concern:</td>
<td>‘physical’ distributions, patterns of resources and opportunities characterising space</td>
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<td>‘social’ processes, relation between events producing space</td>
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<td>Character/function:</td>
<td>static, illustrative</td>
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<td>dynamic, dialectical, causal-interpretive: acknowledging the co-production of time and space, porosity of space and time</td>
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<td>Implications for social and spatial justice:</td>
<td>Distribution of outcomes</td>
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<td>social phenomena behind procedural (in)justice, and their interactions with the patterns of distributive (in)justice</td>
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In analysing spatiality, therefore, it is evident that these spatial concepts, individually and in relation to one another, play an important role in the relationship between the actors, institutions and contexts in Europe. They are particularly important when seen in the context of the challenges of democratic deficit and social justice across an uneven landscape, characterized by differences in position and capacity. Three interrelated aspects of spatiality become significant for RELOCAL research, through which issues of spatial justice may be examined: how a locality is defined, how it is organized, and how it is related to other localities. The next important task is to discuss the concepts of social and spatial justice, and what they may mean in this context.
1.2: Social and Spatial Justice

Introduction

The main focus in Task 1.2 is undertaking a critical review of the concepts of social and spatial justice, particularly in relation to the European Social Model. The European Social Model has been a central concept in the development of European Union and the recent call for its reform makes it imperative that the impact of any reforms on social and spatial justice be examined. Chapter 1.2, therefore, is divided into three parts, examining social justice, spatial justice, and their relationship with the European Social Model.

Social Justice

Social justice is a particular form of the broader concept of justice, a concept which has been a cornerstone of claims to legitimacy for almost all forms of power in societies. Justice was the primary aim of Plato (1993) in his Republic, a utopian society in which achieving justice was the highest aim. Ever since, however, the meaning of justice and the ways of achieving it have been a subject of debate. Justice can be understood in a formal sense as law, and informally, as an “unwritten moral foundation of economic, social, and political exchanges and relations” (Pirie, 1983, p465). However, justice is not the only ‘moral foundation’ for such ‘exchanges and relations’ (other virtues such as friendliness or benevolence could be given prominence (p.468)), but there has been a “general acceptance of justice as the moral standard par excellence” (p.467). In placing social (and spatial) justice at the heart of its investigation, RELOCAL has also chosen to elevate it above other considerations. However, as Rawls (1971, p.9) argues, justice is ‘but one part of a social ideal’; Pirie’s sentence also serves to show that there are alternatives, to situate it amid other ‘moral foundations’, which provides a caveat to what follows.

Before investigating more detailed arguments about social justice, it is worth stressing that for Rawls, whose seminal 1971 work, A Theory of Justice forms the basis for many later works on the subject, it was an ‘ideal’ that he was addressing. Similarly, for Soja (2011a) the term ‘justice’ fosters “collective political consciousness and a sense of solidarity” (p.4). Smith (2000a) calls for the deployment of “the discourse of social justice in devising and creating a better world” (p.757). Such statements underline the normative nature of the concept, as something that we should be striving for. Associated with this is the notion that ‘society’, or more likely the ‘state’, should intervene to achieve social justice.

John Rawls’ work has dominated the debate over justice in its informal and moral sense. Rawls defines justice as fairness, and his aim is to develop a concept of justice based on the familiar theory of social contract as advocated by Locke, Rousseau and Kant (Rawls,1999, p.10). For him (Rawls, 1999, p.8), a conception of social justice provides ‘a standard whereby the distributive aspects of the basic structure of society are to be assessed’. This is assessment is based on two basic principles (Rawls,1999, p.53):

‘First: each person is to have an equal right to the most extensive scheme of equal basic liberties compatible with a similar scheme of liberties for others.

‘Second: social and economic inequalities are to be arranged so that they are both (a) reasonably expected to be to everyone’s advantage, and (b) attached to positions and offices open to all.’

For Rawls, these two principles are a special case of a more general conception of justice, which he expresses as,
‘All social values – liberty and opportunity, income and wealth, and the social bases of self-respect – are to be distributed equally unless an unequal distribution of any, or all, of these values is to everyone’s advantage.’ (p.54).

Rawls was characterised as “probably the most significant political philosopher in the second half of the 20th century” (Stein and Harper, 2005, p148), but his work was criticised from different points of view. He was a political liberal philosopher, but even within political liberalism there has been much debate about his work (Bell and Davoudi, 2016). For example, one argument has been around whether it is simply ‘resources’ that should be distributed justly. As Amartya Sen (2009) argues, in what has been hailed by Hilary Putnam as the most important contribution to the subject since Rawls, what is important is what people are able to do with resources. Sen moves away from Rawls’ emphasis on social contract and joins the alternative tradition of the Enlightenment, which he names as the comparative tradition. In this tradition, comparisons are made ‘between different ways in which people’s lives may be led, influenced by institutions but also by people’s actual behaviour, social interactions and other significant determinants’ (2009, p.xvi). He emphasises social choice and the importance of freedoms and capabilities to make, and to be responsible for, those choices. Sen’s Capabilities approach has become widely influential, providing philosophical underpinning for developing the human development agenda embraced by the United Nations.

Another critique is whether Rawls’ second principle ‘the greatest benefit of the least advantaged’ is the most just: why not strive for equality, or for sufficiency? Many commentators set up systems for justifying aspects of inequality: for Rawls (1971), inequality can be justified, “providing that society’s poorest benefit from this, and that there are equal opportunities to acquire the positions of advantage” (quoted in Smith, 2000a, p.755). Then there are different types of equality – elitist, egalitarian, and meritocratic (Rokicka and Warzywoda-Kruszynska, c2006) – and there are times when inequality can be justified. It is difficult to interpret the literature on the struggle for social justice as favouring elitist equality, but both egalitarian and meritocratic types feature, with the former being about the equality of outcome while the latter is about the equality of opportunity.

The right wing argument against social justice sees it as a preoccupation of the left and a licence for undue state intervention. As the current political shifts in Europe and the United States show, the idea of social justice is being entirely questioned. According to the conservative philosopher Roger Scruton (2016, p.4), social justice is not seeking equality before the law or equal rights of citizenship, but it aims at “a comprehensive rearrangement of society, so that privileges, hierarchies, and even the unequal distribution of goods are either overcome or challenged”. For these thinkers, the free market is a fair system for the distribution of resources and the state should not intervene in the name of ensuring social justice. The prophet of neoliberalism, Hayek, calls social justice “a dishonest insinuation ... intellectually disreputable, the mark of demagogy or cheap journalism” (1976, p.67, quoted in Pirie, 1983, p.468).

Another line of argument questions the supremacy given to social justice. For example, “an ecologically-informed conception of justice should conceive of the economy as embedded in the environment” (Bell and Davoudi, 2016, p.7). Harvey (1992) demonstrates with his discourse analysis of the discussions about a proposal to build a new road, how social justice arguments were only one grouping, alongside efficiency, economic growth, environmentalist/ecological arguments, and so on (p592).

Writing in 1983, Pirie argues that “work on the subject of justice has overwhelmingly revolved around the proposition that justice is a condition which can be encapsulated in one, or only a few more, principles” (p.466). Pirie suggests that less rigid, principled interpretations, or subjective justice judgements would be possible. Young claimed that “any definition of human nature is dangerous because it threatens to devalue or exclude some acceptable individual desires, cultural characteristics, or ways of life” (1990, p36, quoted in Smith, 2000b, p.1151). Harvey (1992) draws
attention to how the person/people defining social justice may be reflecting their own personal
interests, or the norms of society at a specific point in time, or a specific place: he uses Engels’
example that the Greeks and Romans thought slavery to be just to demonstrate this (P.595).
Many other commentators, though, have continued the search for the “sense of human sameness,
or close similarity, required to ground a broader egalitarian project” (Smith, 2000b, p.1151). This
sentiment has led some to strip away all the ‘difference’ claims to find a minimalist definition. For
example, Doyal and Gough’s focus (1991) on what is required for people to avoid serious harm (in
Smith, 2000b) and Geras’ exposition: “they are susceptible to pain and humiliation, have the
capacity for language and (in a large sense) poetry, have a sexual instinct, a sense of identity, integral
beliefs — and then some other things too” (1995, p 66, quoted in Smith, 2000b, p.1152). Articulating
what is needed to lead a ‘good life’ is a common, but difficult, approach to defining social justice.
The discussions call to mind Mazlot’s triangle of needs, with commentators agreeing over the ‘basic
needs’ but then struggling over what else would be common across all societies.

A further line of criticism is of the theorists’ focus on distribution. For democratic proceduralists,
what is needed to achieve social justice is a fair procedure, an inclusive deliberative process (Bell and
Davoudi, 2016). For others, injustices are the outcomes of more deep-routed, institutionalised
processes. Frequently cited as championing these institutionalised sources of social injustice is
Young: “I suggest that social justice means the elimination of institutionalized domination and
oppression” (1990, p15). She sees three main elements to this: decision-making power and
procedures, the division of labour, and culture. Although some other theorists do consider the
distribution of non-material goods (including power and rights), in their usage the “concept of
distribution represents them as though they are static things, instead of a function of social relations
and processes” (p16). The institutional context to social injustice needs to be understood broadly:

“It includes any structures or practices, the rules and norms that guide them, and the
language and symbols that mediate social interactions within them... These are relevant to
judgments of justice and injustice insofar as they condition people’s ability to participate in
determining their actions and their ability to develop and exercise their capacities.” (p.22)

More practically, examples include: structural issues that mean that people are not born equal, or
with equal opportunities (Goodlad, 2002, p.3); people might object to the way the state has denied
them the right to consultation over a local issue (Young, 1990, p19); the media’s negative portrayal
of certain ethnic groups might distort society’s view of their neighbours (ibid, p.20); assumptions
about the traditional sexual division of labour within families might cause injustice for women (ibid,
21); how the dynamic nature of social exclusion is not captured by the static ‘outcome’ approach of
addressing the distribution of resources (Goodlad, 2003) and how, for Marxists, it is the capitalist
distribution of ownership of the means of production (Bell and Davoudi, 2016).

In the light of the criticism (as well as acclaim) he received, Rawls regularly published papers revising
or clarifying his position, culminating in his definitive ‘last word’ (Stein and Harper, 2005) in Justice
as Fairness: A Restatement (Rawls, 2001). “What is the most acceptable political conception of
justice for specifying the fair terms of cooperation between citizens regarded as free and equal, and
as both reasonable and rational, and ... as normal and fully cooperating members of society over a
complete life, from one generation to the next? (Rawls, 2001:8)” (quoted in Stein and Harper, 2005,
p.152). The ‘most acceptable political conception of justice’ should be arrived at through a process
of public justification by all interested parties. Here he seems to be grappling with many of the
tensions that exist in conceptualising social justice: human essence vs the celebration of difference;
who should decide what is just; seeing injustice as a dynamic rather than static process; addressing
the ‘fair terms of cooperation’ rather than the just distribution among individuals, and so on.

The normative nature of this concept leads almost seamlessly to the moral imperative of the ‘right’
to social justice. ‘However, the notion of rights raises difficult issues, with respect to what they are,
how they should be prioritised, who bears them (and where), and who have the consequent obligations to ensure that the rights are fulfilled” (Smith, 2000b, p.1154). Some theorists and organisations representing people’s rights (see next paragraph for example), conceptualise these as non-material goods that can be distributed (and individualised). Young (1992) critiques this: “Rights are not fruitfully conceived as possessions. Rights are relationships, not things; they are institutionally defined rules specifying what people can do in relation to one another.” (p.25)

This serves as a caveat for the example that follows: the rights given to all European citizens by the Council of Europe’s ‘European Social Charter’ (chosen as the most appropriate set of rights for an EU Horizon 2020 project). There are 31 ‘rights’ listed. Almost half are rights for workers; there are two specific to children and young people, one for employed women, one for disabled people, and one for the elderly. The rights for ‘everyone’ include benefiting from social welfare services, protection against poverty and social exclusion and the right to housing.

While there are many ways of conceptualising ‘social justice’, it is the ‘distributional paradigm’ that is still most readily assumed in academic and policy circles. However, as Young (1992) points out, when protests by the general public occur, they often are not protesting about redistribution, but about institutionalised injustices (she provides several examples of such protests in America in the 1980s on p.19/20). This would also hold true now: in 2011, the London Occupy movement, attracting people from a wide range of backgrounds, announced initially that their purpose was to find alternatives to the ‘unjust and undemocratic system’, and later that they were seeking ‘real global democracy’, making no mention of distributive injustices.

This review shows the various tensions between two paradigms of social justice: distributive and procedural. For the distributive paradigm, an equal distribution of goods, services and opportunities is the basic premise of justice. For the procedural paradigm, what matters are just institutions and procedures that are necessary to have a just society. There are, however, important elements in both paradigms of justice: Just procedures are necessary, but not sufficient for the fairness of the outcome, while attention to the outcome may mask the injustices of the process. In other words, the dichotomy between a just process and a just outcome is a false one, as they are not, and should not be, mutually exclusive. The concept of social exclusion shows that injustice is not limited to poverty, but includes a range of other disadvantages that are compounded in the most vulnerable parts of society (Madanipour, Cars and Allen, 2003).

The review also shows another, related, tension between a universalist and a differential perspective into society (Barry, 2001). It is a tension between the ideals of the Enlightenment, in which universal equality is assumed and sought between all, and a politics of difference, which argues against the limitations of the universalist model for its failure to recognise social differences, including ethnicity, culture and gender. As will be discussed in the Chapter 1.7 below, this tension has had important implications for the planning and governance of places, which will be explored later.

**Spatial justice**

With the advent of the civil rights and other social movements in the United States and Europe, the radical atmosphere of the 1960s and 1970s paid sustained attention to social issues in planning and urban development. This was exemplified by the works of Paul Davidoff (1965) and Herbert Gans (1968), who argued that the postwar urban redevelopment efforts had reflected the interests and values of the middle class, and it was now important to take into consideration the needs and aspirations of the disadvantaged groups. It was argued that the nature of spatial planning needed to change to deliver a more just society (Fainstein and Faistein, 1971).

According to Smith (2000b), David Harvey’s 1971 conference paper on ‘social justice and spatial systems’ was a milestone in geographic engagement with social justice. Although Smith argued that the principles outlined in the paper needed development, he claimed that there were only isolated
references to the geography of social justice until the mid-1990s. However, another geographer, Edward Soja (2011a) suggested that Lefebvre and to an extent Foucault were both writing about this in the 1960s and 1970s, but their work did not come to prominence in geography until later. Institutional economists, meanwhile, point to the work of Myrdal and Kaldor in the middle of the 20th century and their circular and cumulative causation theories. Both “recognize the importance of history and time, as well as space and geography, since changes to the social and political economy condition the path of evolution and transformation; and there are regional difference to growth and development as well” (O’Hara, 2008, p.376). The first appearance of Myrdal’s theory of cumulative causation in 1944 was used to explain the “‘vicious circle’ between white people’s discrimination toward black people and black people’s low standard of living” (Fujita, 2007, p278).

For many, particularly earlier, commentators, spatial justice typically addressed the territorial distribution of social justice. This echoed the early preoccupation of writers on social justice with distribution of outcomes. As already discussed, Young (1990) introduced the need to address not only distribution, but also the institutionalised processes that led to domination and oppression in order to achieve social justice, which could also be applied to spatial justice. Drawing on Lefebvre, a further critique of work focused on territorial distribution is that it uses a fixed conception of space, seeing it as a ‘container in which things happen’ (Dabinett, 2000). Instead, “space should be conceptualised as something itself constructed, rather than given, and that certain aspects of space themselves sustain the production and reproduction of injustice” (ibid, p.2392)

The early works of Harvey, Castells and Soja were directly influenced by Lefebvre before the latter’s work becoming widely available in English. However, although Lefebvre’s work is now seen by many academics as a cornerstone of the development of the concept of spatial justice (for example, Soja, 2011b; Brown and Kristiansen, 2009) it was paid little attention when published in the 1960s and 1970s. His major work, The Production of Space, was translated and published in 1991, which introduced it to the English speaking readers (Lefebvre,1991). For Lefebvre (Brown and Kristiansen, 2009), following Marx, a key issue is that the ‘exchange value’ of cities (ie the economics) is overwhelming the ‘use value’ (ie, “the social and political life, wealth, knowledge and the arts” (p.14)). His ‘right to the city’ is for every inhabitant, giving them the right of participation and of appropriation, the latter including the “right to access, occupy and use space, and create new space that meets people’s needs” (p.15).

In promoting ‘spatial justice’, Soja (2011b) explains how Lefebvre’s concept is attractive because “it’s rooted in taking control over the social production of social space, in a kind of consciousness and awareness of how space can be used to oppress and exploit and dominate, to create forms of social control and discipline. This means that struggles over unregulated gentrification, or gated communities, or inequalities at the workplace, or in the distribution of income, all kinds of injustices need to be seen, partially at least, as causally related to the unjust geographies that have been socially created and in which we all live.” (p.4).

According to Soja (2009, p.2), ‘spatial (in)justice refers to an intentional and focused emphasis on the spatial or geographical aspects of justice and injustice. As a starting point, this involves the fair and equitable distribution in space of socially valued resources and the opportunities to use them.’ In this definition, the concept of justice is taken to include both the distribution of resources and the opportunity to use them. Soja encourages his readers to take a ‘critical spatial perspective’ that is as powerful as a ‘critical historical perspective’ to conceptualise (in)justice. Echoing the work of Lefebvre and Foucault, he urges a broad agenda of thinking about space and its causal power (2011b, p.5). This includes addressing the territorial distribution of resources, but also using a spatial lens to look at any processes that cause unjust geographies. These might be ‘locational discrimination’, the ‘political organisation of space’, the ‘normal workings of an urban system’, or ‘geographically uneven development and underdevelopment’ (2011a, p.3/4). For Soja, this
academic debate should be harnessed to activism: in his case this is focused on UCLA and its links to those living and working in Los Angeles. He claims that an understanding of unjust geographies has enabled “new ideas about community-based regionalism, locational discrimination, electoral redistricting, and environmental justice” (2011a, p5).

‘The Good City’ (Amin, 2006) does not claim to make an explicit development of the concept of spatial (or social) justice, but its exploration of a “pragmatism of the possible based on the continual effort to spin webs of social justice and human well-being and emancipation out of prevailing circumstances” (p.1010), “with the spatiality of the city playing a distinctive role in the negotiation of multiplicity and difference” (p.1012) is clearly relevant to the concept. For Amin, there are four ‘registers’ of ‘contemporary urban solidarity’: repair, relatedness, rights and re-enchantment.

‘Repair’ is about all the technologies that make cities run smoothly, often in a behind-the-scenes way, which need regular attention. Here there are clear spatial inequalities, with some areas being prioritised, for example, for the fastest broadband speeds, while others might be allocated the refuse landfill site. New technologies such as GIS are used to “re-engineer the social map of the city by demarcating desirable areas and taboo areas” (p.1014). The second register, ‘relatedness’, pertains to obligations to marginalised people and to the socially just city. “It is becoming unavoidable to address the consequences of unequal provision, which include class segregation, endless surveillance, civic disruption, urban violence, fear of the stranger, suspicion of youths, immigrants and asylum-seekers, and generalised anxiety and caution” (p.1016). The third ‘r’ is ‘rights to the city’, “the right of all citizens to shape urban life and to benefit from it” (p.1017). ‘Re-enchantment’ is the final ‘r’. For Amin, this is not about striving for a paradise of the future; rather “the good city celebrates aspects of urban life from which spring the hopes and rewards of association and sociality” (p.1019). The focus is on the maintenance of fairly mundane meeting spaces such as clubs, car-boot sales, libraries, and friendship circles.

The concept of spatial justice is also developed in many social action forums as the ‘right to the city’. There are many manifestations of this from the global (e.g., UN Habitat-II) to the individual city level, with many different interpretations. In 2005, UN-Habitat and UNESCO jointly sponsored research on how the concept was being used; this was published in 2009 (Brown and Kristiansen, 2009). This identified five main axes of the concept:

- Liberty, freedom and the benefits of city life
- Transparency, equity and efficiency in city administrations
- Participation and respect in local democratic decision-making
- Recognition of diversity in economic, social and cultural life
- Reducing poverty, social exclusion and urban violence.

They also emphasise that the right to the city is about “urban change, in which all urban dwellers are urban citizens; it creates space in which citizens can define their needs but, in order to appropriate substantive citizenship, citizens must claim rights of participation and allow others the same right” (p.17).

While the city is the focus for much theorising, empirical research and activism about spatial justice, all spatial scales need to be considered “from the space of the body and the household, through cities and regions and nation-states, to the global scale” (Soja, 2011a p.3). This consideration, though, needs to be cognisant of whether it is justice in a territory or justice of the space that is its focus. Bell and Davoudi (2016) explain how a focus on justice in a city uses a Euclidian (or abstract) conception of space whereas justice of the city recognises the injustices that spatiality itself can cause.

Notions of justice in a space conceive of space as a container in which justice/injustice occurs. But what size of ‘container’ is the most appropriate? The nation state has had a long history as the scale at which (in)justice is identified and addressed. In some countries, regions are an important scale,
and cities, or particularly global cities, are frequently investigated. For some, the focus of attention is on rural areas; for others on smaller scale ‘neighbourhoods’. The focus has not only moved to smaller scales than the nation state: increasingly there is interest in the supra state scale such as justice in the EU or the Nordic Countries. A number of studies demonstrate how the positive picture painted by regional or national data on distribution of resources can hide smaller areas of extreme injustice. Geographically disaggregating data would lead to a much more nuanced appreciation of the distribution of (in)justice. However, this may not be the optimal scale for analysis if the goal is to address this: higher geographic scales might have more powers and responsibilities.

This, though, is not the only conception of space: we need also to consider how spatiality itself constructs (in)justice. Certainly much of the discussion of scale in the paragraph above can be reconsidered through the lens of spatiality constructing (in)justice. Boundaries become all important. Bell and Davoudi (2016), for example, question where the urban ends and the rural begins, and how flows could be captured. Equally, studies demonstrate how changing the boundaries around the unit of analysis can change the outcome for an area.

A burgeoning area of research that raises issues of spatiality constructing (in)justice is on ‘neighbourhood effects’. While a geographically defined poor ‘neighbourhood’ could usefully be the unit of analysis as being the place where people most in need reside, many researchers and policymakers also believe that the neighbourhood itself has an effect (van Ham et al, 2012). However, much of the research lacks a clear theoretical framework (ibid). A useful list of potential factors that cause the effect is provided by Galster (2012), grouped into four categories: social-interactive mechanisms, environmental mechanisms, geographical mechanisms, and institutional mechanisms. He then reviews studies from the US and Western Europe that have addressed these mechanisms. Some mechanisms are clearly in evidence; for some the evidence is inconclusive or conflictual; for some there is a difference between US and European evidence. Andersson and Malmberg (2016) stress the need to look beyond narrowly defined ‘neighbourhoods’ for the wider geographic context in which people live and work. In their Swedish study of the poverty and income outcomes at age 28-32 for a cohort of 15 year olds, they found that “apart from family background effects on adolescents’ future poverty and income careers, the segregation in regions and cities helps to form the life course trajectories of Swedish youths” (p.15/16), although this effect differed between regions. However, for Wilson, who is responsible for the current popularity of the ‘neighbourhood effects’ concept (van Ham et al, 2012), such effects cannot be understood without reference to macro social and economic forces.

This is a useful reminder that ‘local’ (in)justice may be caused by ‘macro’ forces. Many of these more institutionalised factors do not fit well into neat bounded spaces. ‘Pervasive’ or ‘ubiquitous’ would describe forces like globalisation, capitalism, or patriarchy. Some might be applied at the very local, or even personal level, such as racial discrimination or the treatment of immigrants.

Governments, at many scales, have a role in both causing institutional injustices, and in ameliorating them. Organisations at many scales fight against injustice: global organisations such as the United Nations and UNESCO; NGOs at many scales; and local, or specific issue activists.

Earlier, we saw the relationship between the social and the spatial, which is where the questions of spatial justice fall. This was a mutual relationship: space is ‘socially constructed’, and ‘the social is spatially constructed too’ (Massey,1992:70), and, furthermore, spatial processes are an integral parts of the social processes (Lefebvre, 1991). The implications for spatial justice are that spatial justice becomes the spatial expression of social justice, that just spatial arrangements would contribute to social justice, and that social justice, as a social process, is inherently spatial.

We also discussed three interrelated aspects of spatiality: how a locality is defined, how it is organized, and how it is related to other localities. The implications of these aspects for spatial justice would involve questions about how just the definition/production of a locality is; how
equitable/inclusive its intra-local conditions/relations are; and how equitable its relations to other localities are.

Social and spatial justice and the European Social Model

This section examines the relationship between the concepts of social and spatial justice with one of the cornerstones of the European project. The section first defines the European Social Model, then reviews its links to social and spatial justice, followed by the evolution of the model, and finally the current anxieties about its future.

European Social Model

The European Social Model has been one of the key concepts in the development of the European Union. It has enabled the participants in this process to develop a sense of social responsibility and solidarity while developing their economies, keeping a group of competitive economies and historical adversaries together in the development of a close partnership driven by a set of common values. Its strength has been based on the interaction between ‘competitiveness, solidarity and mutual trust’ (Official Journal, 2006a, p.119), its ability to draw on both economic efficiency and social justice and cohesion. As the European Union developed and expanded, the idea of a particular European way of life was constructed as a glue to bind the existing and the new members of the club to a shared vision.

There is no official definition of the European Social Model (Vaughan-Williams, 2015), which is sometimes also referred to as the ‘Social Acquis’ or ‘Social Europe’. For some, it is a “conceptual abstraction” and as such the “question should be whether it is useful to invoke the model in conceptualising issues (Faludi, 2007, p.12) rather than asking whether there is a European model. In an abstract way it is described as ‘the soul of the European Union’ (Vaughan Whitehead 2015, p.9), as a ‘vision’ (Official Journal, 2006a, p 120), and ‘an aspiration’ (Delors, 2016). The European Economic and Social Committee suggest it is “based on overarching objectives, and on diversity in application” (Official Journal, 2006a, p.120).

The Model is sometimes invoked as incorporating the economic, social, and environmental objectives of the EU (e.g., Official Journal, 2006a, p.120), or as a ‘balance’ between individuals, the state and the market (Faludi, 2007, p.14). On other occasions it is more narrowly used as a ‘welfare area’ (Official journal, 2006a, p120), or as a means of “moderating the pursuit of economic growth with concerns for social welfare and equity, sustainability and good governance” (Faludi, 2007, p.2). The World Competitiveness Yearbook describes how the Model “relies heavily on social consensus, a more egalitarian approach to responsibilities and an extensive welfare system” (IMD, 2000, quoted in Vaughan-Williams (2015) in contrast to systems in other parts of the world which promote individual risk and responsibility. Some commentators link the Model to more operationalised policy areas: for example, Faludi (2007) and Davoudi (2005) link it to the development of Cohesion Policy; Vaughan-Williams (2015) ties it to the EU’s ‘social policy framework’. For him this framework has five ways of working: through legislation; through the structural funds (particularly the European Social Fund); through the social Open Method of Co-ordination, through the council of Europe’s Social Charter, and by providing a framework for dialogue.

The Model’s existence is often challenged on the grounds that there is not a single European Model, but many. Whether the EU should have a Social Model is also contested: it has no formal competency in social matters, and these should be left to individual Member States; it stifles growth (Bergstrom and Gidehag, 2004 in Faludi, 2007, p.3); and the Union is conceived of by some Member States as little more than a free trade area.
The European Social Model is fleshed out in more concrete terms by some commentators. For Vaughan-Williams (2015) the main pillars are: Increased Minimum Rights on Working Conditions; Universal and Sustainable Social Protection Systems; Inclusive Labour Markets; Strong and Well-Functioning Social Dialogue; Public Services and Services of General Interest; Social Inclusion and Social Cohesion. Similar priorities can be found in the list derived by Scharle and Szikra (2015) but with the addition of ‘social expenditure’, ‘taxation’, ‘equal opportunities/anti-discrimination’ and ‘regional cohesion/development’ (p.4). Busch et al (2013) list the six main objectives of the Model for the social democrats and trade unions which makes it difficult to make direct comparisons with the two earlier examples but seem to give more prominence to full employment, health care and family policy and the incorporation of a social progress clause into the EU Treaty. The EU, often without specifically mentioning the European Social Model, also provides some more concrete ideas of what this ‘social dimension’ might encompass through high level strategies, and the social Open Method of Co-ordination. For example, the Strategy ‘EU 2020: Smart, sustainable and inclusive growth’ (European Commission, 2010a) has ‘inclusive growth’ as one of its three priorities, with its main actions being about employment, skills and poverty. The headline social target is “to lift at least 20 million people out of poverty and social exclusion by 2020”. These examples suggest that the operationalisation of this vaguely-defined notion of a Model helps to flesh out its main thrusts but takes us no further forward in terms of a single definition.

Social and Spatial Justice

The main thrust of the European Social Model seems to resonate well with the ambiguities in the concept of social justice. Both can be seen as ‘visions’ of a better future for all EU citizens. Both aim to provide something of a moderating or balancing check on liberal economic activity. The more concrete examples above clearly aim to address the redistribution of resources aspects of social justice. Some also refer to the need for government systems to be changed or improved: for example, Vaughan-Williams’s reference to Universal and Sustainable Social Protection Systems (2015). The possible exploitation of workers is also addressed under the auspices of the Model, for example, action on working conditions. Such approaches suggest an appreciation of the broader scope of social justice, where the need to address the forces that cause oppression is emphasised.

The additional aspects that spatial justice emphasises are less overtly and consistently manifest in the various ways in which commentators talk about the European Social Model beyond the fact that it does encourage Member States with lower social standards to make improvements. For instance, during the accession process for Central and Eastern European countries, the Commission was “successful in driving steps forward in such important areas as occupational health and safety, social dialogue and works’ participation, and other aspects of labour law (Vaughan-Whitehead, 2015, p16). However, a further spatial element is provided by the lack of direct funding provided for implementing the Model’s aims, and the use of Cohesion Policy’s funding as a significant means of resourcing it, and this funding has a strong geographic redistribution component.

More theoretical arguments for linking the European Social Model to Cohesion Policy, and in particular Territorial Cohesion Policy, are made by some commentators. If the purpose of the Model is conceived as a ‘moderator’ to the EU’s economic growth agenda, or as a catch all for those areas where the EU has no formal competence but wants to apply ‘soft measures’ through ‘inter-governmental’ means then a raft of EU activities are invoked: the social OPM, its sustainability agenda, Territorial Cohesion Policy, and so on. In term of this paper’s focus on spatial justice, the most important link here is to the Territorial Cohesion Policy “about a just distribution of opportunities in space” (Faludi, 2007.p.4). For Davoudi (2005), territorial cohesion is about “spatializing the European Social Model” (p.435). Her argument is that territorial cohesion “adds a new dimension to the debate about social models [such that people’s life chances] are also shaped by where they live and work; in other words, by the location and quality of places and territories; by
typical spatial risks (such as inaccessibility, isolation, pollution, exposure to natural and technological hazard, place stigma)” (p.436).

**Evolution of the European Social Model**

The European Social Model has evolved over time, and, it has been argued, should never be regarded as ‘final’: it should be dynamic and responsive to new challenges (Official Journal, 2006a, p.119). Its changes can be seen in what is included in Treaties and high level strategies at different points in time, and in the relevant actions of Member States.

The social dimension of the European project was not itself a priority at the outset, but the Treaty of Rome did provide the EEC with legislative power over certain social fields, and enabled the creation of the European Social Fund (Fernandes and Rinaldi, 2016). In the 1980s and 1990s, the deepening of European economic integration was accompanied by several new social features. The Lisbon Strategy of 2000 gave the EU a more proactive role: “its interventions no longer seek solely to protect national social models against any downsides of economic integration; rather, they aim to act as a catalyst for national social reforms in order to ensure sustainability of national social models and enhance their efficiency” (Fernandes and Rinaldi, 2016, p.2). The Europe 2020 Strategy, with its third priority of ‘inclusive growth’ “put social policy at the core of the EU economic strategy for the first time” (European commission, 2013, p.2)

The progress made with embedding the social dimension into the European project has not been without problems. The six founding countries had relatively similar national models, with the national differences becoming more acute as the membership increased, and particular with the accession of the CEECs. The range of welfare regimes across the EU shows the diversity of the models of social protection across the continent (Esping-Andersen, 1989). At times the primacy of economic goals, and particularly the ‘asymmetry’ between the EU’s competence in economic and social policy (Davoudi, 2005), have threatened the development of the European Social Model. So, too, have the neoliberal ideologies that some Member States have brought to the table. The need for most Member States to restructure aspects of the welfare state, have added to arguments against the development of the Model.

While the high level rhetoric of the EU denotes progress with the prioritisation of the European Social Model, the story of what Member States have been doing in practice paints a somewhat different picture. Most European countries have been undertaking long term reforms to their social protection systems because of demographic change and to address future sustainability. For Busch et al (2013) reforms to the pensions, health service and unemployment benefits in many Member States were driven by neoliberal ideology. From the mid-1990s until the crisis in 2008/9, “states with an above average welfare state cut it back in relative terms via reforms ... Some states that have been catching up fast economically have expanded their welfare states relatively strongly ... other strongly expanding economies, by contrast, have reduced their welfare states in relative terms over the past 15 years” (Busch et al, 2013,p.6). Even before the crisis, ‘liberalisation’ of the European Social Model was underway, “based on labour market reforms, decentralisation of collective bargaining systems, wage moderation, a reduction in relative pension levels, cuts in public health services and privatisation of services of general interest” (ibid, p.6).

The initial effect of the economic crisis on ‘real public social expenditure’ was a massive rise in growth and “the existence of social protection mechanisms greatly contributed to minimizing the social costs of the crisis” (Vaughan-Williams, 2015, p.18). However, from 2010, “rising concerns over sovereign debt levels and fiscal deficits, led many countries to introduce fiscal consolidation policies” (Vaughan-Williams, 2014, p1). Public social expenditure fell by 1.5% between 2010 and 2011 in the EU27 (ibid). The cuts were most significant in those countries most affected by the crisis (eg, Greece, Ireland, Portugal and Spain) and subject to the adaptation programmes of the Troika (IMF,
European Central Bank and the European Commission). Vaughan-Williams (2015) provides a detailed empirical analysis of the negative changes to Member States’ social policies once the crisis deepened. He concludes that, with a few exceptions “trends show a general withdrawal of the state from social policy, first through massive cuts in social expenditure and reduced funding of education, health care and other public services, and second through radical reforms in a number of areas, such as social dialogue, social protection, pensions, labour market and social cohesion in general” (p.47/48). In terms of RELOCAL’s focus, he also points out that regional disparities increased, with the lack of funding at the regional level adding to the tensions.

**The European Social Model in Crisis?**

Busch et al (2013) conclude that “the social dimension of the European integration process has thus increasingly been sidelined in the EU” (p.26). And Vaughan-Williams asks “is Europe Losing its soul?” (2015, p.9). While the current evidence suggests that the European Social Model could be claimed to be in decline, there are a number of arguments put forward suggesting that it could/should still have a future. Resistance to the dismantling of the Model are expected from Trade Unions, and from various protest movements campaigning for social justice around Europe (Busch et al, 2013), although Busch et al do not expect much resistance from the socialist and social democrat parties in Europe. The fact that the ‘middle class’ have seen their incomes eroded by the changes during the economic crisis needs to be thought through in terms of the sustainability of the Model and the need to keep them ‘on board’ (Vaughan-Williams, 2015).

Some arguments are to do with the necessary reforms needed to turn Europe around after the crisis. Some see that the reforms to the EMU need to include social dimensions: “it is in the collective interest of the monetary union to ensure that structural reforms addressing employment and social challenges are properly implemented” (European Commission, 2013, p.3). Schmit’s argument (2016) is focused on the benefits of social policy per se. Without its strengthening, “overcoming challenges like those posed to us by the large influx of refugees, climate change, global terrorism but also technological change, will only become more difficult” (p.12). Delors (2016) links the revival of the ESM to the restoration of confidence in the European project. Similarly, Fernandes and Rinaldi (2016) argue that “in the current context of extreme scepticism and indifference towards Europe, to avoid losing further support from its citizens, the union has to appear to be a source of well-being” (p.1).

The European Commission is certainly convinced of the need to strengthen the European Social Model, particularly in the Eurozone. Juncker, as President of the European Commission, said he wanted Europe to have a ‘social triple-A rating’ (2014). The Commission produced an outline of a ‘European Pillar of Social Rights’ early in 2016. Juncker gave this his clear endorsement: “We have to work urgently on the European Pillar of Social Rights, And we will do so with energy and enthusiasm. Europe is not social enough. We must change that” (State of the union address, 14.9.2016). Initially this is linked to the euro area, although other Member States may join. It is “drawing on and supplementing the EU social acquis. According to the Commission, “The Pillar should become a reference framework to screen the employment and social performance of participating Member States, to drive reforms at national level and, more specifically, to serve as a compass for renewed convergence within the euro area”” (Fernandes and Rinaldi, 2016, p.3). This has been the subject of debate and consultation during 2016.

This all sounds very positive for the future of the European Social Model. However, according to Fernandes and Rinaldi (2016), Member States are not affording this initiative much priority. Further, they are concerned that it “runs the risk of being a mere compilation of social standards that already exist in European law or other international provisions” (p.3). A major problem they foresee is in its narrow focus on a ‘vertical’ social pillar. Rather, what is needed is a horizontal social policy, as specified in the Treaty of Lisbon: “that all EU policies and activities must be defined taking into
account requirements linked to the promotion of a high level of employment, the guarantee of adequate social protection, the fight against social exclusion and a high level of education, training and protection of human health” (p.3).

Some commentaries about the current decline in adherence to, or prioritisation of, the social dimension of the EU points towards its demise. From an evolutionary perspective, this could instead be seen as a temporary setback in achieving a long term ‘vision’ for Europe. Of relevance here would be Barosso’s “metaphor of his three children, each equally close to his heart: the economy, the environment and social Europe, but with the economy being in poor shape, his attention was focused on this, his ailing child” (Faludi, 2006, p.10). Again, envisaging the European Social Model as a long term and evolving ‘aspiration’, Judt suggests it is “What binds Europeans together, even when they are deeply critical of some aspect or other of its practical workings” (Judt, 2005, p.748, quoted in Faludi, 2007, p. 2).

What marks out the present hiatus in the development of social Europe, though, is that it is accompanying a hiatus in the European Monetary Union, and perhaps in the European project itself post-Brexit. Given the seriousness of these other problems, the social dimension is seen by some as a sideline or a diversion. For others, though, the social Model is seen as an integral part of the solution.

Conclusions

Social and spatial justice are complex and overlapping theoretical concepts, with a strong normative character and a wide variety of different interpretations. Both see the distribution of resources as a key factor in identifying (in)justice, with social justice focusing more on the distribution between social groups, and spatial justice more interested in the geography of distribution. In addition, though, many commentators understand both forms of (in)justice to be caused by institutionalised processes. For social justice, these would typically be the power and procedures that enable the domination and oppression of certain groups of people. Spatial justice commentators view the way that space itself is constructed and used as a further cause of domination and oppression.

The European Social Model is one of the ways in which the EU pursues its interest in social justice, but spatial justice is not well-addressed by this. Territorial Cohesion Policy, with its focus on just distributions across space, would seem to be more closely related to the concept of spatial justice. Both, to an extent, address the more institutionalised forms of social and spatial justice through their emphases on improving some of the systems that could mitigate against oppression, vulnerability and disadvantage.

Spatial justice (incorporating social justice) is a core theoretical concept for the RELOCAL project. It focuses on both the just geographic distribution of resources, and on the power mechanisms that cause (in)justice between social groups and between spaces. Both of these types of spatial justice will be empirically researched in the project. Spatial justice also relates strongly to cohesion and territorial development, the nub of the RELOCAL project.

Acknowledging the many tensions within the rich debate concerning social and spatial justice (and esp., ‘who and what defines what is just’), RELOCAL sets off with a normative approach. Justice is linked to “collective political consciousness and a sense of solidarity” (Soja 2011a:4) in terms of both just ‘procedures’ (institutions, power mechanisms) and fair ‘outcomes’ (resources and opportunities), something we should be striving for both among social groups and across regions/places. On the one hand, (unequal) distributions of resources (across social groups, space and time) are (at least partly) the outcome of deep-rooted institutionalised processes, the power and procedures enabling the domination and oppression of specific groups of people. On the other hand, as these resources have the potential to empower people, enhance their capabilities and freedoms of choice, their unjust distribution across society and space may result in the
reinforcement/generation of procedural injustices, especially political processes that reproduce existing and/or give rise to further unjust geographies.
1.3: Territorial Cohesion

Introduction

The role of Task 1.3 is undertaking a critical review of the concepts and models of territorial cohesion and their relationship with the conditions of inequality in Europe. The recent economic crisis and longer term economic restructuring have led to growing inequality within and between regions. The links and tensions between territorial cohesion concepts and the growing inequality need to be analysed. This Chapter starts by identifying territorial cohesion as a policy concept, and then examines the different interpretations of the concept in the literature. The impact of territorial cohesion on regional inequalities is then discussed followed, finally, by the impact of the economic crisis on territorial cohesion.

A policy concept

The concept of territorial cohesion is a European Union policy concept. As a policy concept in a subject area in which the EU has only shared competence, it had to be, and continues to need to be, negotiated with all Member States on a regular basis. For the 2014 – 2020 period, cohesion funding (for economic, social and territorial cohesion) accounts for a third of the EU’s budget and the need to address the interests of all Member States has become acute. Territorial cohesion is not only subject to the national interests and claims on funding from each MS, it is also subject to contrasting and competing ideological rationales, as discussed below.

Fundamental to the extent to which the EU can act is the different levels of commitment to the ‘European project’. In the Commission’s Green Paper (2008), for instance, framed as a question for debate: “Is there a role for the EU in promoting territorial cohesion? How could such a role be defined against the background of the principle of subsidiarity?” (p.11). These questions focus on the appropriate level of government – EU or nation state - but another aspect of tension in the European project is the extent to which the EU should be building cohesion and solidarity, which Cohesion Policy encourages. Interestingly, a major European project, the development of the Eurozone, went ahead with reference only to the “‘national convergence criteria’ (price stability, low interest rates, stable exchange rates, and limits on the size of budget deficits and national debts) and the total neglect of spatial or regional convergence” (Hadjimichalis and Hudson, 2014, p211), a key concern of territorial cohesion.

Another significant tension is over the appropriate role for the public sector in the economy. One group in the European Parliament would like the EU institutions’ interventions being restricted to policing the single market (Faludi, 2007). Others would see mitigating against inequalities (as Cohesion Policy does) as a means of stimulating effective demand (Harvey, 2011). Birdsall (2006) argues that there are both constructive aspects to inequality (such as giving people an incentive to try harder) and also destructive aspects: “the evidence is that it has a large ‘destructive’ component, that is, it is associated with unequal opportunities and contributes to lower growth than otherwise might be possible” (p.8). She argues that the constructive aspects are more evident in the more developed countries and the destructive more evident in the less developed ones.

Then there are different approaches to the extent to which Member States and key actors see social (and spatial) justice as legitimate pursuits: should there be interventionist policies addressing social issues in the EU? The Territorial Agenda (2007 – cited in Commission Green Paper Communication p.10), for example, talks of securing “better living conditions and quality of life with equal opportunities irrespective of where people live”. The current debate about the future of the European Social Model (as discussed in Chapter 1.2 before) provides an account of the arguments for and against the EU developing its social domain.
A further tension is over the relationship between aggregate efficiency and regional disparities/cohesion. Rumford (2000) argues that “regional disparities and economic backwardness are an integral part of the model of neoliberal economic growth” (p.62) of the EU and nation states, and that “the EU embraces a social market economy, not a redistributive one [and that] cohesion will be brought about via the mechanism of the market” (p.20). For some such commentators, “spatially-blind or place-neutral policies may represent the best option to promote economic growth and facilitate the catch-up of lagging areas”, but for others this would be best served by place-based development strategies (Barca et al, 2012, p.149). Relatedly, there is a debate over “whether efficiency should be concentrated in the core or there is potential for growth and development in every territory (Barca et al, 2012, p.149). Since 1999, the ESDP has steered EU countries towards ‘polycentric development’, but this is not uncontentious. It can be criticised in terms of spatial justice (e.g., Connelly and Bradley, 2004), while other commentators point to the fragmentation that may occur by adopting this approach rather than allowing a few large cities to dominate.

Although territorial cohesion is an EU policy concept, there is not a one to one correspondence with an EU policy domain. Superficially, Cohesion Policy appears to have this correspondence, having had a long history of intervention over territorial disparities, and its current responsibility for implementing Europe 2020’s economic, social and territorial cohesion goal through its funds. However, many sectoral policy domains (agriculture, transport, energy, or trade policy) can have a negative impact on territorial cohesion. Furthermore, cohesion policy cannot act in isolation: “not only is the cohesion policy incapable on its own of reducing all territorial disparities, but it will never manage to compensate for all of the imbalances caused by other sectoral policies” (Jouen, 2008, citing OECD, 2003). Territorial cohesion has appeared in many EU (and EEC) high level Treaties and Agendas and activities. The Single Market receives attention in this respect: “Although the overall impact of the single market is generally agreed to have been positive it was acknowledged from its inception, that it would have a differentiated impact across EU regions” (LSE Enterprise, 2011, p.7). Therefore, “actions are needed to counteract the negative side-effects of the Single European Market, by ensuring a fair access to infrastructure and services” (Medeiros, (c2014 citing Bohme et al, 2008, no page nos).

This introduction suggests that the concept of territorial cohesion is in tension over the levels of governance, the role of the state, territory and sectoral policies. The next section goes on to elaborate the ways in which academic and policy makers have, in spite of this, attempted to corral the concept and make it workable. What all seem to agree upon is that it is a worthwhile concept.

The concept of Territorial Cohesion

The Amsterdam Treaty of 1997 was the first time the notion of ‘territorial cohesion’ was formally made explicit in the EU (as the European Community in 1997), although tackling regional disparities in the EU can be traced back to the Treaty of Rome (European Commission, 2014b, p179). Over the next few years the concept developed and became more central in the EU policy discourse. A key milestone was its inclusion as a policy objective in the Lisbon Treaty of 2009 with its most recent prominent manifestation being in the high level strategy, Europe 2020 (European Commission, 2010a) which has three priorities: smart growth, sustainable growth and inclusive growth. The last of these describes the delivery of economic, social and territorial cohesion.

As the concept increased in importance to EU policy, it was thought that “the pursuit of territorial cohesion would benefit from a clarification of the many issues it raises” (European Commission, 2008, p.4). This suggested ambiguity and confusion about its components and consequences. First, however, the difficult concept of ‘cohesion’ itself demanded clarification (Rumford, 2000). For Rumford, there are two conflicting ‘narratives’ about cohesion. The ‘current orthodoxy’ narrative is that “EU policies can ‘solve’ the problem of national and regional disparities ... [and that] from this perspective, competition is a tool of cohesion and vice versa” (p.7). The contrasting narrative “tells
us that EU policies will not necessarily lead to greater cohesion. On the contrary, the type of growth that the EU is experiencing (and promoting) actually creates the disparities that cohesion policy aims to solve” (p.7).

Turning back to the concept of territorial cohesion, the ESPON programme, which in the 2007–2013 period identified territorial cohesion as its principal objective in its mission statement (Abrahams 2014), commissioned a number of studies to grapple with understanding, defining and/or evaluating this concept. Abrahams reviews eight ESPON projects which attempt to define territorial cohesion, providing an in-depth analysis of two of them. The starting point for all these projects is that a definition of territorial cohesion can be found.

Almost all these projects use the essentialist ‘tree’ model as set out in the OECD/JRC methodology guidelines for constructing composite indicators. This ‘tree’ starts with the single concept (the trunk) and branches into subsets or dimensions of the concept and then branches into a further subsets of indicators. Abrahams (2014) describes the subsets of territorial cohesion that the TEQUILA project derived as: territorial efficiency, territorial quality and territorial identity. These three are then broken down further into more detailed indicators. A later project, INTERCO, builds on the TEQUILA model, but in the final report provides a different tree as their starting point, with the first subset of themes being: territorial structure, connection, competitiveness, innovation, inclusion, quality of environment, energy and co-operation/governance. Table 2 in Abrahams’s review (ibid) provides a list of the ‘essential components’ that each of the eight projects under investigation provide as their first subset of ‘territorial cohesion’. While some of these are similar, there are many which provide additional dimensions to those provided by the TEQUILA and INTERCO trees (e.g., balanced distribution of population, access to services, adaptive capacity, educational attainment).

According to Abrahams, a second essentialist approach to defining policy concepts like territorial cohesion is the ‘storyline’ model developed in particular by Hajer. This approach is reviewed by van Well (2012), using:

- Waterhout’s 2007 analysis of the ESDP
- ESPON INTERCO project’s study of stakeholder workshops to discuss the concept in 2010
- The results of a questionnaire survey, a follow up to the Green Paper on Territorial Cohesion, as synthesized by DG Regio in 2009
- Luukkonen’s 2010 analysis of the same responses but focusing on national definitions in relation to aspects of peripherality
- Mirwaldt’s 2009 analysis of the same responses but focusing on the Territorial Cooperation Objective of Cohesion Policy

Her synthesis, shown in Table 1.3.1, emphasises the ‘multiple conceptualisations’ (p.1564) of territorial cohesion. Some commentators, though, can see patterns in this ever growing list of attributes.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th><strong>Normative storylines</strong></th>
<th><strong>European Policy (ESDP) (Waterhout 2007)</strong></th>
<th><strong>ESPON/ Indicators (Europe 2020) (ESPON INTERCO 2010)</strong></th>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• Europe in Balance</td>
<td>• Smart Growth, competiveness</td>
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<td></td>
<td>• Coherent European Policy</td>
<td>• Inclusive Growth, balanced development</td>
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<td></td>
<td>• Competitive Europe</td>
<td>• Local conditions, geographic specificities</td>
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<td></td>
<td>• Green, Clean Europe</td>
<td>• Environmental Growth, sustainable development</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>Territorially-focused storylines</strong></td>
<td><strong>Territorial Agenda /Kiruna (CEC 2009)</strong></td>
<td><strong>Green Paper / Peripherality (Luukkonen 2010)</strong></td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• Cooperation among territories</td>
<td>• Promotion of cooperation</td>
</tr>
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<td></td>
<td>• Liveable urban and rural communities</td>
<td>• Exploiting territorial potentials, territorial capital</td>
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<td></td>
<td>• Coordination of policies, policy coherence</td>
<td>• Region-based development</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• Evidence-based policy-making</td>
<td>• Participatory processes</td>
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<td>• Territorial dimension</td>
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<td>• Harmonisation of policies with territorial impact</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>Cohesion Policy Instruments storylines</strong></td>
<td><strong>Territorial Cooperation (Mirwaldt et al 2009)</strong></td>
<td><strong>RCE and Convergence Operational Programmes (Nordregio 2009)</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• Polycentric development and growth poles</td>
<td>• Reduction of regional imbalances</td>
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<td></td>
<td>• Sustainable development and energy</td>
<td>• Regional cooperation</td>
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<td></td>
<td>• Addressing territorial imbalances</td>
<td>• Exploiting regional potentials</td>
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<td></td>
<td>• Accessibility”</td>
<td>• Coherence of policy (horizontal and vertical coordination)</td>
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<td></td>
<td>• Equitable living conditions</td>
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</tbody>
</table>

Table 1.3.1. Synthesis of the various discourses and storylines on territorial cohesion (van Well, 2012, p.1561)

One line of argument points to the changes through time in key EU documents/policies/agendas as an explanation for the number of competing conceptualisations, and a means of seeing beyond the muddle. Copus and van Well (2015) provide a well-argued sequence to the early stages: in its earliest manifestation (Amsterdam Treaty of 1997) territorial cohesion is associated with the provision of services of general interest; the third Cohesion report of 2004 makes the link with the Lisbon Agenda goal of knowledge-intensive competitive growth; the Kok report of 2005 and the relaunched Lisbon Strategy extend the concept of territorial cohesion: “In addition to balancing European territorial development to help make Europe the most competitive knowledge-based economy in the world, it was to build on the endogenous competitive potential of each territory” (p60); and the Green Paper on Territorial Cohesion (European Commission, 2008) emphasises the need to ‘turn diversity into strength’, and focuses on the governance arrangements of regions. For the period 2007 – 13, they identify a shift: “from a strong emphasis at the beginning of the period on what was to be achieved – endogenous growth of regions and boosted territorial capital and the knowledge-based economy – to discussions of territorial cohesion and how cohesion should be approached – with a focus on coordination, concentration and cooperation” (p.62). They see
patterns of outcomes and of processes influencing the concept of territorial cohesion at different points in time.

Camagni and Capello (2015) also recognise changes in conceptualisations through time. In particular, they identify a ‘paradigm shift’ over the last decade of cohesion policy, from a “mainly redistributive logic … to development logic” (p27), with the latter premised on the notion of ‘unleashing territorial potential’ (COPTA 2011) and no longer based simply on tackling regional disparities. Again, Farago and Varro (2016) recognise developments in the conceptualisation through time, but for them what is prominent is a ‘neoliberal restructuring’ in all of the EU.

Davoudi (2005) provides a different argument. She explains some of the different conceptualisations as based on the contrasting French and German schools of thought as regards spatial planning, identifiable in the third Cohesion Report as “a more balanced development by reducing existing disparities” on the one hand and “making both sectoral policies which have a spatial impact and regional policy more coherent” on the other (p435).

The multiplicity of conceptualisations and its tendency to multiply with every study mean that some commentators see the search for a common definition of the concept as futile. Some go further, seeing the notion of a clearly stated conceptualisation as not only futile, but also misplaced. Some see it as a straightjacket, imposing “a set of rules for planners to follow rather than encouraging innovative responses to unique contextual factors” (Abrahams 2014, p.2135, referencing the liberal pragmatist arguments of Stein and Harper 2012). Others celebrate its ‘fuzziness’ as ‘purposefully vague’, the purpose being that it “allows governments and EU institutions to define it in accordance with their own interests, preferences and development challenges” (Copus and van Well, 2015, p60).

For Davoudi, “ambiguity becomes an advantage because people of different convictions can sign up to them without committing themselves to any particular interpretation or any particular application” (2005 p433). Faludi is the most lyrical: “like beauty, territorial cohesion is in the eye of the beholder” (2005, p.3). These examples not only explain the fuzziness, but also stress how this should be seen as a positive attribute of the concept.

Abrahams (2014) suggests that rather than focusing on what the concept of territorial cohesion is, we should look instead at what it can do: how has this concept affected place-making policy in each of the Member States. He is echoing here the sentiments of a number of ‘pragmatist planning theorists (e.g Healey, Stein and Harper, do Roo and Porter) who call for the concepts to be kept ‘fluid’, ‘fuzzy’ and adaptable. Abrahams goes on to suggest that the concept should also allow speculation about what it might do (aka Hillier, 2007, 2011). Similarly, Faludi claims that it “needs to convey what territories might look like by articulating spatial visions …as more than places of production” (Faludi 2007, p.28). These emphases on fuzziness and pragmatism, however, might be seen to sit uncomfortably with the demands of social and spatial justice. Fuzziness might be an accurate description of the conditions and processes, which might be taken for granted by the entrepreneurial risk-takers, but intensifying the problems of the disadvantaged.

**Territorial Cohesion and inequality**

Although, as explained above, there are many conceptualisations of territorial cohesion, the fact that not all territories in the EU are equal is a fundamental premise: “the ambition to reduce the development gaps between regions dates back to the foundation of the European Economic Community in 1957” (European Commission, 2014b, p.193). Cohesion Policy has long had responsibility for addressing ‘regional disparities’ (ibid), and funded programmes of Cohesion Policy have always favoured the ‘less developed regions’ (ibid), albeit under different names in earlier programming periods.

But inequality of what? For Cohesion Policy, “the nature of regional disparities being tackled ... has changed over the years” and the initial focus on unemployment, industrial reconversion and the
modernisation of agriculture has broadened to include disparities in innovation, education levels, environmental quality and poverty” (European Commission, 2014b, p.200). This would suggest a wide range of inequalities, ranging from the social and economic to the institutional, technological and environmental. However, the means by which funding allocations are made under the Structural and Investments Funds are still dependent on calculating GDP per capita in each NUTS2 region, and as Medeiros (c2014) points out, most analyses continue to focus on socio-economic analysis.

Another way of conceptualising the inequalities that matter is to stress the importance of opportunity rather than of more tangible entities. “In an equal opportunity society, there would be high lifetime mobility (up and down) for individuals, and high intergenerational mobility: children’s place in the distribution of lifetime income would be independent of their parents’ place” (Birdsall, 2006, p7). A more territorial twist to this equal opportunity argument is given in the literature on ‘neighbourhood effects’ on an individual’s outcomes. Children and adolescents who have extensive exposure to ‘poverty neighbourhoods’ have poorer outcomes in terms of a number of indicators (e.g, education, health), and even when they leave the parental neighbourhood are very likely to end up in similarly impoverished neighbourhoods later in life (Hedman et al, 2015).

There are two ways of conceptualising inequality between territories: that certain of them contain more impoverished entities, or that the territories themselves are in some ways impoverished. Both of these are addressed under Cohesion Policy, with different periods emphasising different types of need. For example, in the 1960s, the focus was on training and mobility (of people in places); enlargement from the 1980s onwards brought in many Member States with low per capita GDP, and policy was oriented towards developing their key infrastructure, so emphasising the development of territories (European Commission, 2014b).

Some commentators stress socio-spatial inequalities. Here we see people from similar socio-economic backgrounds congregating in particular areas, typically of a city, which in themselves are exclusive. There are areas of gentrification, there are gated communities, there are immigrant enclaves, and areas with poor quality housing stock, for example (e.g, Cassiers and Kesteloot, 2012), which lead to segregation of the population. Quite how this geography plays out “varies widely in European cities. Basically, many southern and northern European cities have a rich centre and poorer peripheries, while western European cities tend to display a poor centre and rich suburbs” (p.1910).

‘Territorial capital’ has been an important indicator for territorial inequality. This includes a range of ‘capitals’, from the “geographical (accessibility, agglomeration economies, natural resources), economic (factor endowments, competences), cognitive (knowledge, human capital, co-operation networks), social (solidarity, trust, associationism) and cultural assets (“understandings, customs and informal rules that enable economic agents to work together under conditions of uncertainty”: OECD 2011, p.15)” (quoted in Camagni and Capello, 2015 p.13).

Analysing a territory’s capital could be seen as a useful tool in helping to identify which territories are weak in terms of a range of assets. However, it also has links with political trends in the EU: it emphasises the strengths of a territory, and rejects a ‘deficit’ regeneration model where weaknesses are identified and funded. Over time, the language (and focus) of the EU is changing, with the ‘diverse’ nature of territories becoming a prominent rhetoric, rather than the more negative ‘less developed’ and ‘disadvantaged’ nomenclatures. The differences are now imbued with positivity: ‘territorial cohesion: turning diversity into strength’ (European Commission, 2008), and ‘unleashing territorial potential’ (COPTA 2011), for example. Assets and potentials are something all territories have and might want to improve upon, not just those that are ‘less developed’.

In parallel to this shift towards capitals and potentials, there has been a shift in the territories eligible for funding under Cohesion Policy’s Structure Funds (and later, Structural and Investment Funds). Funding before the millennium was available only to those NUTS2 regions below a certain
threshold, with some Member States only receiving funding for a few regions. More regions became eligible in the 2000 – 2006 programming period, with all regions receiving some funding after 2007 (European Commission, 2014b). This ‘paradigm shift’ from the ‘deficit’ regeneration model was caused by: its high costs, the evidence of only limited success, and the new global context (Camagni and Capello, 2015).

The priorities for funding under Cohesion Policy 2014–2020 demonstrate the range of assets that might need development: Innovation and R&D; Information communication technology; SME support; Low carbon economy; Climate change adaptation; Environment; Network infrastructure; Employment; Social inclusion; Education; Good governance. These priorities must be aligned with the Europe 2020 agenda in line with the Community Strategic Framework. This Framework, though, does not include any territorial cohesion objectives (Farago and Varro, 2016).

Addressing inequalities between territories also begs the question of the scale of the inequalities (and the investment). Much of the analysis of inequalities in the 6th Cohesion Report (European Commission, 2014b) is at the MS level. Funding is calculated at the NUTS2 regional level, but allocated to the MS. NUTS2 regions map well to ‘real’ regions in some MS, but are artificial constructs in others, formed using mainly demographic criteria (Pazos-Vidal, 2016). Some of the analysis at the NUTS2 scale groups certain types of region: metropolitan regions, predominantly urban, intermediate, and predominantly rural regions, border regions, for example. They are also classified by the level of their development. Some researchers stress the need to analyse the data at a micro level so that spatial segregation within standard categories of analysis (a city, for example) can be identified (e.g., van Ham et al, 2016; Marcinczak et al, date?). Over time, local and place-based development has become more prominent in the Cohesion Policy rhetoric but “in reality cohesion programmes are hardly bottom-up, but the result of strategic choices made by regional and national authorities” (Pazos-Vidal, 2016, p.296).

Different economic schools of thought come to different conclusions over the mechanisms causing regional disparities, and how these will be resolved. Contrasting views from two ends of the spectrum are provided by the neo-classical school of thought, and the cumulative causation school. The “neoclassical school of thought argues that .... spatial inequalities are bound to decrease with growth” (Petrakos et al, 2015, p.700). As a region goes into decline, the labour, land and capital become cheaper, and the market equilibrium model evens out the inequalities (for example, people move or a place becomes an attractively cheap location for business or industry). In stark contrast, the cumulative causation school argue that spatial imbalances will accumulate and become accentuated as prosperity breeds further growth and declining areas spiral further downwards: workers migrate out of the place, populations dwindle, local services decline and lead to further job losses. The neo-classical economics’ solution is to rely on the market, with the state simply having the role of ensuring perfect market conditions. The cumulative causation school views the market as the cause of spirals of decline in certain areas and calls for government intervention to halt the spirals.

How best to overcome inequalities between regions is also subject to fierce debate. The New Economic Geography school, favoured among others by the World bank, emphasises the “superior efficiency of large metropolitan areas and the need to support them for the sake of aggregate wellbeing ...with favour openly expressed for the efficiency goal and “space-blind” policies” (Camagni and Capello, 2015, p26). The opposite strategy, place-based regional policy, supported by such organisations as OECD and the Barca Report (2009) is based on “place specificities and territorial assets, designed in a transparent and inclusive way by local actors” (Camagni and Capello, 2015, p.26/27) with the support from multi-level governance. The aggregate efficiency approach calls for “a national and mainly institutional intervention with no concern for territorial specificities” while the place-based approach calls for “a regionalized, bottom-up intervention concerned with local institutions and providing both a method for devising good and shared projects and financial support” (p.27). For Camagni and Capello, a renewed cohesion policy “addressing the development
potential of almost all “places” with new awareness and a new institutional sensitivity” (ibid) could achieve both goals (efficiency and equity) at the same time. While these alternative policy approaches appear to confront each other, widening the debate beyond strict economic arguments to address more sustainable development can reduce the tension between them, such as the arguments put forward in the Green Paper on Territorial Cohesion (European Commission, 2008).

Has EU level policy affected territorial disparities through time? A very positive response to this question comes from LSE Enterprise (2011): “There is ample evidence in the literature that cohesion policy has helped to reduce regional disparities over the last two decades” (p.9). However it goes on to point out that only GDP levels are used in such studies, and that these improvements do not necessarily correspond with increased growth rates. Analysing more recent trends, the Commission Staff Working Document’s ex post evaluation of the ERDF and Cohesion Fund 2007 – 13 shows that the impact averages 4.2% in the Cohesion Countries “and it is small but always positive in non-cohesion countries” (European Commission, 2016c, p4). In terms of regional convergence, it reports that this was very small, but “with strong suggestion from econometric work that there would have been divergence without Cohesion Policy” (p4). Farago and Varro (2016) recognise that the gap has been closing in terms of GDP per capita between western European and Central and Eastern European (CEE) countries at the state level, but that this “has been coupled with the aggravation of sub-national patterns of uneven development” (p.10). There are three main trends to these sub-national patterns: western parts of the CEE countries outperforming eastern parts; a divergence between well-performing urban regions and remoter rural regions; and between the main metropolitan areas/capital cities and the ‘rest’. Petrokos et al (2016) see a shift in the literature from a euphoria about convergence models in the 1990s to divergence or very slow convergence since the millennium.

This section has been focused on the notion of inequality between territories. However, Medeiros (c2014) interestingly suggests that territorial cohesion should not be judged in terms of such disparities. Rather it should be identified as a ‘territorial convergence process’: if, in a given territory, the majority of indicators follow a convergence path over time, then this would mean cohesion.

The Barca report: place-based territorial cohesion and social inclusion

The Barca report argues that, ‘there is a strong case, rooted in economic theory and in a political interpretation of the present state of the European Union, for the Union to allocate a large share of its budget to the provision of European public goods through a place-based development strategy aimed at both core economic and social objectives’ (Barca, 2009:vii). It defines a place-based policy as ‘a long-term strategy aimed at tackling persistent underutilisation of potential and reducing persistent social exclusion in specific places through external interventions and multilevel governance.’ (2009:vii).

The report explicitly targets social exclusion and inequality. A key aim of the place-based policy is the reduction of social exclusion (p.vii). Social exclusion and inequality are defined in almost the same way: ‘persistent social exclusion (primarily, an excessive number of people below a given standard in terms of income and other features of well-being) in specific places’ Inequality is also defined in almost identical way: ‘inequality (share of people below a given standard of well-being and/or extent of interpersonal disparities) in specific places’ (p.5). The emphasis of the report is on finding ways of addressing social exclusion and inequality. ‘The question relevant for this Report is not “whether” but rather “how” governments should pursue equity objectives. In particular, the issue is whether there is a rationale for inequality to be tackled by a place-based development policy rather than by financial transfers to people independently of where they live.’ (p.28).
Social inclusion is to be achieved through essential standards and socially acceptable disparity. The report offers ‘an operational definition of social inclusion... the extent to which, with reference to multidimensional outcomes, all individuals (and groups) can enjoy essential standards and the disparities between individuals (and groups) are socially acceptable, the process through which these results are achieved being participatory and fair.’ (pp.29-30). The emphasis on place-based social inclusion would therefore lead to a “place-based policy aimed at social inclusion”: ‘a territorial strategy for improving social inclusion, in its various dimensions, through the provision of public goods and services, by guaranteeing socially agreed essential standards to all and by improving the well-being of the least advantaged.’ (p.30).

The twin aims of efficiency and equity are stressed. Addressing inequality is taken for granted as a responsibility of governments: ‘It is uncontested that achieving an equitable distribution of well-being is one of the objectives of governments. There is also increasing agreement that development is about both efficiency and equity, and that public action, at whatever stage of development of an economy, should address social problems’ (p.28). The balance between efficiency and equity, therefore, is a key focus of the report. ‘Inefficiency and social exclusion traps’ are, therefore, repeatedly listed together as the key problem (pp.xii, xiii,xiv), which should be broken through cohesion policy. It is argued that ‘the main purpose of cohesion policy is not redistribution but to trigger institutional change and to break inefficiencies and social exclusion traps through the provision of public goods and services.’ (p.xiii). There is a degree of contradiction in this remark, as the provision of public goods and services to deprived areas is a form of redistribution.

The place-based policy is advocated because, ‘Unless inefficiency and social exclusion traps are tackled through a policy for development, the very objectives for which market and currency unification were introduced cannot be achieved.’ (p.xii). This can be read as advocating institutional reform and targeted provision of goods and services to break the social exclusion trap. In UK New Labour’s parlance, institutional reforms often had a neoliberal character, driven by managerial approaches of setting quantifiable targets and collaboration with the private sector. This can also be read as the concern for the European Social Model and the democratic legitimacy of the neoliberal overemphasis on market unification.

Social exclusion is clearly linked to territoriality. ‘Economic theory shows that a place might require an intervention from outside in response to two sets of market and government failures. First, a place can be trapped in a vicious circle of inefficiency or social exclusion because the appropriate economic institutions intentionally fail to be chosen by local elites (that being against their interests), or because the less a place has effective institutions, the less likely it is to have them in the future (path dependency). Social exclusion can also be perpetuated because individual circumstances are hereditary and persistent. The intervention needed to tackle these problems should take the form of the provision of integrated bundles of public goods and services aimed at triggering institutional change, improving the well-being of people and the productivity of businesses and promoting innovation. The goods and services concerned need to be tailored to places by eliciting and aggregating local preferences and knowledge and by taking account of linkages with other places. This is where the territorial dimension of cohesion is particularly relevant’ (xi).

The emphasis of the report, however, is limited to social inclusion within regions, rather than equity across regions: ‘European citizens demanded a Community effort, on the one hand, to give all regions (or places) the opportunity to fully utilise their potential and achieve competitiveness (efficiency), on the other, to pursue more similar standards of living for all individuals “in each region” (equity’). (p.14). The emphasis on individuals as the target of the policy is clear in the following: ‘the efficiency or the equity objective of place-based policies, which are aimed at fuller capacity utilisation and a reduction of inequalities between individuals rather than between regions’ (p.39). This clearly suggests the aim is promoting equity within regions but not across them, with direct implications for the way spatial justice is envisaged. The place is the context in which individuals are targeted, rather than the unit of analysis and comparison. ‘It would be a strategy...
focused on individuals but aware that their well-being and the effectiveness of any intervention depend on the place where they live.’ (p.xiii). At the same time, the report appears to justify external intervention on a paternalist basis: ‘The ultimate purpose of exogenous intervention is to induce private agents, individually and through “voluntary institutions”, and local governments to do what they fail to do by themselves, which is investing time and effort in revealing knowledge and preferences and aggregating them so as to provide public goods and services’ (p.45).

The effects of the economic crisis

Many commentators point to the fact that there were a number of economic crises, and that the effects have been mitigated or exacerbated to different degrees in each MS. Simplifying, there was a private debt crisis, followed by a sovereign debt crisis (e.g. Milio, 2014). In the first stage of the crisis, the effects were generally mitigated by an increase in public social expenditure in 2009 (Vaughan-Williams, 2015). From 2010 there was a reversal of this approach in most European countries, even though unemployment and poverty were increasing. This ‘austerity’ approach was most severe in countries where the public and budget deficits were highest (ibid), and especially in those Member States that came under the direct influence of the Troika (European Commission, IMF and the European Central Bank): Greece, Portugal, Ireland and Spain.

The economic crisis of 2008 had an immediate and substantial effect on EU economies: “in 2009 the EU GDP fell by 4.1% and industrial production by 20%” (Milio, 2014, p.11), and “The economic crisis reversed a long trend of converging GDP and unemployment rates within the EU, affecting in particular regions in Southern Europe” (p.xvi). Within these aggregate statistics there is much variety with some Member States being far more affected than others in the short term, and with some far more able than others to return to growth. Some commentators refer to a broad North-South divide between MSs in the EU; Milio (2014), though, suggests that the outcomes resemble an EU core-periphery spatial pattern.

References to which MSs have been the most affected are somewhat dependent on which indicator is used, although some MSs score highly under all measures. For example, the Sixth Cohesion Report (European commission, 2014b) states that the decline in public investment has been particularly marked in Greece, Spain and Ireland; that the risk of poverty and social exclusion increased, particularly in Greece, Spain, Italy and UK; that increasing divergence in GDP and unemployment rates are particularly acute in some regions of Southern Europe; and that “In the EU as a whole, public investment declined by 20% in real terms between 2008 and 2013 … In Greece, Spain and Ireland, the decline was around 60%” (ibid, p.xvi).

Analysis in the Sixth Cohesion report (European commission, 2014b) by type of region showed that following the economic crisis “The risk of poverty tends to be much lower in cities than in the rest of the country in less developed Member States, while in cities in the more developed Member states, the reverse is true” (pxxxii). They also found that “capital metropolitan regions performed well until the crisis led to above average employment losses” (p.17) and that “GDP growth in rural regions was lower prior to the crisis, but proved more resilient during the crisis years” (p.18). This ‘resilience’, though, could simply reflect the fact that CAP payments remained unaffected during the crisis, while other funding was cut.

Milio (2014) is interested in not only which regions have been badly affected but also what aspects of the crisis provided the pressure. She explains how in most countries ‘the crisis’ was a private debt crisis which later became a sovereign debt crisis and she then subdivides the former into a manufacturing crisis, a construction crisis and a financial crisis. Where each of these would most likely impact can be mapped onto certain regions of the EU. When hit with the effects of these crises, some regions had more resilience than others and were able to recover. Some of this was specific to the type of crisis. For example, the manufacturing regions where the impact has been
sustained are those where the industrial mix is more in need of structural reform. More generally, though, strong resilience factors were “administrative capacities, as well as the sectoral composition of income, expenditure in innovation, human capital skills and employment” (ibid, p.116).

In the light of the economic crisis, the EU felt a need to act to ameliorate its effects and Cohesion Policy formed part of the response (LSE Enterprise, 2011). “A number of innovative measures, both regulatory and at the programme level, were implemented to accelerate the disbursement of the Structural funds and to make them more flexible and responsive” (European Commission, 2014b, p.207). One aspect of this was that almost 13% of the total funds have been shifted from one policy area to another since 2009; another was that the more affected MSs reduced their co-financing commitments (in the cases of Ireland, Latvia and Portugal the reduction was over 40%) (ibid). This reflects how national public expenditure has been significantly reduced in some MSs as a response to the crisis. The fact that across the EU these cuts have been effected mainly at the sub-national scale of government is of particular concern to regional policy. In the light of this, Cohesion Policy is seen as having a ‘crucial’ role in “helping the Member States to pursue a dynamic way out of the economic crisis. [However] the tendency for public investment in Member States to be reduced is equally a concern because it calls into question their ability to respect the principle of additionality and to co-finance Cohesion Policy programmes in the future” (ibid, p.160).

Looking to the future, the ESPON MASST simulations “demonstrate that the 15 post-crisis years (2016-2030) are not sufficient fully to counterbalance the negative trend experienced in the years of crisis (2008-2015)” (Camagni and Capello, 2015, p8-9). The simulation shows a ‘striking persistence’ of the impact for Mediterranean countries relative to Central and Northern countries, and for some peripheral areas in Spain and Greece. The exercise shows that “in the absence of policies able to correct the current imbalances, the growth engine appears unable to overcome the damage caused by a long period of downturn” (p9). For them, this finding overcomes the long-running dichotomies of competitiveness vs cohesion or equity vs efficiency and “renewed cohesion policy – addressing the development potential of almost all “places’” with new awareness and a new institutional sensitivity – could claim to achieve both goals at the same time” (p5).

In the 2014-2020 period, Cohesion Policy clearly has a significant role in EU policy: the budget is one third of the overall EU budget and its funding was able to ameliorate the effects of the crisis. However, the Regional Policy Commissioner has already flagged in speeches in 2015 and 2016 that there will be a fundamental review of Cohesion Policy. Using a series of roundtable discussions and interviews with 16 representatives of national associations of local/regional authorities, Pazos-Vidal (2016) found a surprising appetite for reform: “all realised that the current CP paradigm has run most of its course and it needs to confront the alternative, critical narratives from the EU institutions and governments” (p.293). However, it appears that not all representatives of European Regions are so sanguine about the reforms. In an article entitled ‘Is cohesion policy under threat’, Molica and Lampropoulos (2016) talk of resisting its ‘dismantling’ and launching a political initiative to make the case for the preservation of Cohesion Policy after 2020. The Commission is expected to publish its proposal for the reform of the Cohesion Policy in November 2017.

And what of the focus on territorial cohesion? The socio-economic redistribution aspects of this, rather than the broader suite of goals, seem prominent now, certainly in terms of the revisions to cohesion funding to address the effects of the economic crisis. Whether this is simply a short term shift in emphasis or a longer term trend only time will tell.

Conclusions

Territorial cohesion is a European policy concept and as such it is subject to politics and politicking. It is a very fuzzy concept. For some commentators what is needed is greater effort to arrive at a consensual conceptualisation; for others, though, its fuzziness is a positive, enabling feature which
allows all member states to buy in to its purposes. It has a relationship with Cohesion Policy, but if territorial cohesion across Europe is to be achieved, all sector policies also need to address its aims. One school of thought about the concept is that it is little more than a recent rebadging of cohesion policy which has always had a focus on the geographic distribution of socio-economic resources across European space. Many other commentators point to the much greater breadth of the concept: to the range of distributional factors beyond socio-economic that it encompasses; to its interest in the distribution of territorial capital and potential as well as resources; and to its aspects that go beyond simply distribution (co-operation, for example). For some commentators, the lengthy menu of possibilities is part of the enabling fuzziness.

Identifying (and addressing) inequalities between different parts of Europe ostensibly seems a simpler notion than territorial cohesion. However, such exercises tend to reduce the differences to socio-economic inequalities (or sometimes to simply differences in GDP per capita) rather than addressing the suite of inequalities that might exist in different places. Work on territorial capital emphasises the range of assets that a place might have. It also contributes to the current switch in EU thinking from seeing the differences as ‘deficits’ in weaker regions/countries to conceptualising them as ‘potentials’ that exist in all regions/countries. Disparities between member states and between regions have increased since the economic crisis, with some member states, particularly in the south, being particularly badly affected.

Territorial cohesion is a core concept for RELOCAL, yet we need to bear in mind that it is a construct for the purposes of policy. Its consequent ‘fuzziness’ (which may be taken as a positive, enabling feature for rather than an obstacle to, its operationalisation) will have to be recognised when applying it to the different settings in the project’s Case Studies. In RELOCAL the territorial cohesion concept will be used in its greater breadth: we need to go beyond an exclusive interest in spatial disparities and distributional factors in socio-economic terms, and hence include in the analyses spatial differentiation in opportunities and factors for resilience (besides simply ‘resources’; also linked to our ambition to integrate the idea of sustainability and inter-generational solidarity into our framework). Most importantly, the project has to consider place-specific territorial capital and positive potential (i.e. seeing diversity, where possible, as a strength), and investigate other than distributive aspects, such as (territorial) cooperation, that may also serve the enhancement of territorial cohesion.
1.4: Sustainable Development

Introduction

The aim of Task 1.4 is to present a critical review of the concepts and models of sustainable development, especially when economic development concerns take centre stage. The call specifically invites attention to sustainable development. In the context of the economic crisis, attention has been focused on economic recovery. What are the links and tensions between the economic emphasis and sustainable development? This Chapter starts by a historical overview of the concepts of sustainable development, followed by a discussion of the green economy and the problems of ongoing decline in environmental sustainability. The relationship between social equity and sustainable development is examined, before reviewing the emerging models of sustainable development.

This literature review is designed to form the basis of an overview of current debates around the concept of sustainable development. A key starting point in its preparation was the collection of historical and conceptual perspectives as collated and reviewed in Johnson et al (2007), Bolis et al (2014), Blewitt (2015), Gomez-Baggethun & Naredo (2015) and Missimer et al (2017 a,b). All of these reviews highlight fundamental conflicts in defining sustainable development and sustainability. Not least of these revolve around the link between sustainable development, sustainability and limits to economic growth, as currently defined. This Chapter outlines key aspects of current policy frameworks, including the United Nations Sustainable Development Goals and Europe 2020. It highlights their emphasis on creating a “green economy” and the range of frameworks that have been developed to evaluate sustainability. Its description of the surrounding debate is based on a broad range of academic literature, from environmental sociology, environmental and sustainability sciences and engineering, environmental politics, planning and management, as well as ecological economics.

Historical overview of sustainable development concept

Over the last 5 decades, discourses of sustainability and sustainable development have become embedded in political rhetoric concerning both social and economic objectives. What underlies these discourses? What do they imply for strategies of economic recovery and for related objectives of territorial cohesion, resilience and spatial justice? Sustainability is a systemic property, suggesting long-term ecological capacity to support life, while sustainable development is human activity that both meets human social and individual needs and lifestyle aspirations and maintains this systemic capacity (Adger, 2007; Blewitt, 2015). What does this mean in terms of actual policy development and implementation? And what are the implications of the seemingly related terms of “sustainable growth” or “sustainable economic growth” which have risen to ascendency in this policy arena? Do they simply mean maintaining economic growth without regard to any other social or economic consequences? Certainly, the last five decades have seen unprecedented levels of human modification and degradation of ecosystems (MEA, 2005). The dominant discourse of economic recovery appears to be based on an inescapable requirement for a particular form of economic growth. Are there alternative framings of economic growth, however, that might reclaim integral requirements for sustainability in its ecological sense?

Some of the key publications illustrating the development of international policy discourses around sustainable development are summarised in Table 1.4.1. In their 2007 review article, Johnston et al identify the hundreds of variations of definitions of ‘sustainable development’ published in the aftermath of the Brundtland Report (WCED, 1987). The latter defined sustainable development as "...development that meets the needs of the present without compromising the ability of future generations to meet their own needs" (para.27).
In doing so, it underlined the interdependency of economic, environmental and social well-being, highlighted by earlier reports such as IUCN (1980), Brandt (1980) and IFDA (1980).

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Event</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1972</td>
<td>UN Conference on the Human Environment, Stockholm</td>
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<td></td>
<td>UN Environment Programme (UNEP) established</td>
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<tr>
<td>1980</td>
<td><em>World Conservation Strategy</em> published by IUCN</td>
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<td></td>
<td>Brandt Commission Report <em>North-South: A Programme for Survival</em></td>
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<td>1987</td>
<td>Brundtland Commission Report <em>Our Common Future</em></td>
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<td></td>
<td>Amsterdam Treaty incorporates sustainable development as a fundamental objective of the EU</td>
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<td>1992</td>
<td>Rio Earth Summit: <em>Agenda 21</em> and <em>Local Agenda 21</em></td>
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<td></td>
<td><em>Towards Sustainability: A European Community Programme of Policy and Action in Relation to the Environment and Sustainable Development</em> (Fifth Environment Action Plan) published by EC</td>
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<tr>
<td>2001</td>
<td>European Directive on <em>Strategic Environmental Assessment</em></td>
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<td></td>
<td>Millennium Development Goals</td>
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<td></td>
<td><em>EU Sustainable Development Strategy</em></td>
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<td>2005</td>
<td><em>Stern Review on the Economics of Climate Change</em></td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>EU <em>Strategy for the Urban Environment</em> [identifies four themes of sustainable urban management, sustainable construction, sustainable urban design and sustainable transport]</td>
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<tr>
<td>2010</td>
<td><em>Europe 2020: A Strategy for Smart, Sustainable and Inclusive Growth</em></td>
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<tr>
<td>2011</td>
<td>EU <em>Roadmap to a Resource Efficient Europe</em></td>
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<td>UNEP <em>Towards a green economy</em></td>
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<tr>
<td>2012</td>
<td>“Rio+20” Conference on Sustainable Development</td>
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<tr>
<td>2014</td>
<td><em>Living Well, within the Limits of our Planet: The Seventh Environment Action Plan</em>, published by EC</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2015</td>
<td>UN <em>Transforming our World: the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development and Addis Ababa Action Agenda</em></td>
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Table 1.4.1. Indicative Timeline of International Policy for Sustainable Development

While the Brundtland Commission acknowledged that both the “state of technology” and social organization impose limitations on the environment’s ability to meet present and future needs, it appeared to suggest that there are not however inherent ecological limits on human development which cannot or should not be addressed through technological or social development (Cullingworth et al 2015). The case for growth and trade liberalization advanced in the Brundtland report was backed in the United Nation Conference on Environment and Development in 1992 in Rio de Janeiro. Principle 12 of the final declaration makes the case for an “open international economic system that
would lead to economic growth and sustainable development in all countries, to better address the problems of environmental degradation”, while it also warns that policy measures for environmental purposes should not constitute unjustifiable “restrictions on international trade” (UNCED 1992, Principle 12). Principle 16 recalls that the polluter pay principle should be enforced “without distorting international trade”.

This is a discourse of ecological modernization, which, as Blühdorn and Welsh (2007) describe, has led to the hegemony of “the reassuring belief in the compatibility of democratic consumer capitalism and ecological sustainability”, so that “faith in technological innovation, market instruments and managerial perfection is asserted as the most appropriate means for achieving sustainability” (p186). Gomez-Baggethun and Naredo (2015) trace three major changes in international sustainability discourses: 1) a shift in definitions of sustainable development from a notion of growth versus the environment to a notion of growth for the environment; 2) a shift in focus from direct public regulation to market-based instruments and 3) a shift from a political to a technocratic discourse (p.385). This framing gives greater room for “weak” interpretations of sustainability, based on the ability of human society to accumulate overall capital (whether natural or manmade), as opposed to “strong” interpretations which argue that without critical levels of natural capital, human capital cannot be appropriated or accumulated (Hopwood et al, 2005, Luke, 2013).

Between 2000 and 2015, it can be argued that the focus of the UN in relation to sustainable development was on addressing the most extreme and urgent poverty through the eight Millennium Development Goals. The Millennium Development Goals were replaced at the end of 2015 by Transforming our World: the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development, containing 17 Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs) and 169 targets was adopted in September 2015 at a special UN summit (Table 1.4.2). The 2030 Agenda seeks to combine the UN’s focus on poverty eradication with the broader sustainability issues facing the world as a whole. As Kroll (2015) emphasises, the Sustainable Development Goals are intended to reflect global sustainability performance. The relative performance of rich nations in this context are summarised in Figure 1.4.1, demonstrating wide divergence between outcomes, even within the current European Union.

Article 3(3) of the Treaty on European Union state that the Union

“shall work for the sustainable development of Europe based on balanced economic growth and price stability, a highly competitive social market economy, aiming at full employment and social progress, and a high level of protection and improvement of the quality of the environment” (HM Govt, 2008)

The EU Sustainable Development Strategy was adopted in 2001 and renewed in 2006. Since 2005, Eurostat has produced biennial monitoring reports, based on the EU set of Sustainable Development Indicators, of both the EU Sustainable Development Strategy, and the Europe 2020 Strategy.

| Goal 1. | End poverty in all its forms everywhere. |
| Goal 2. | End hunger, achieve food security and improved nutrition and promote sustainable agriculture. |
| Goal 3. | Ensure healthy lives and promote well-being for all at all ages. |
| Goal 4. | Ensure inclusive and equitable quality education and promote lifelong learning opportunities for all. |
| Goal 5. | Achieve gender equality and empower all women and girls. |
| Goal 6. | Ensure availability and sustainable management of water and sanitation for all. |
| Goal 7. | Ensure access to affordable, reliable, sustainable and modern energy for all. |
| Goal 8. | Promote sustained, inclusive and sustainable economic growth, full and productive employment and decent work for all. |
| Goal 9. | Build resilient infrastructure, promote inclusive and sustainable industrialization and foster innovation. |
| Goal 10. | Reduce inequality within and among countries. |
| Goal 11. | Make cities and human settlements inclusive, safe, resilient and sustainable. |
| Goal 12. | Ensure sustainable consumption and production patterns. |
| Goal 13. | Take urgent action to combat climate change and its impacts. |
| Goal 14. | Conserve and sustainably use the oceans, seas and marine resources for sustainable development. |
| Goal 15. | Protect, restore and promote sustainable use of terrestrial ecosystems, sustainably manage forests, combat desertification, and halt and reverse land degradation and halt biodiversity loss. |
| Goal 16. | Promote peaceful and inclusive societies for sustainable development, provide access to justice for all and build effective, accountable and inclusive institutions at all levels. |
| Goal 17. | Strengthen the means of implementation and revitalise the Global Partnership for Sustainable Development |

Table 1.4.2. United Nations 2030 Agenda - Sustainable Development Goals.

The European Commission has signalled the central importance of the 2030 Agenda goals to the development of EU sustainable development policy (EC, 2016a and b). In this context, it emphasises its commitment to the promotion of resource efficiency and sustainable consumption and production with a view to decoupling economic growth from environmental degradation. This approach is based on the transition to a “circular economy”, natural capital accounting and the involvement of stakeholders at all levels (EC, 2016a, pp12-13). In particular, environment and climate are to be integrated into all aspects of development policy (ibid).
Figure 1.4.1. Sustainable Development Goals Index Performance of OECD Nations (Kroll, 2015, p.6)

However, an independent, multidisciplinary review of Agenda 2030, coordinated by the International Council for Science and International Council for Social Science noted the policy’s lack of articulation of a narrative or theory of change outlining links between the underlying causes of environmental and social degradation, and the ultimate aims of the SDG process. It criticized the
framework for the vagueness of its targets, timescales and responsibilities for implementation (Lockie, 2016).

**Green economy**

The internationally dominant discourse of ecological modernization has been encapsulated in the notion of a Green Economy, which emerges as the practical focus of policy frameworks for sustainable development. The UNEP (2011) report *Towards a Green Economy* defines the green economy not only as an economy-environment nexus but also as an economy that results in improved human well-being and social equity, while significantly reducing environmental risks (p.16). ESPON (2013) describes how the green economy has gained momentum as a policy concept in the context of the economic crisis.

The TNS (The Natural Step) System described by Robèrt (2000), aimed at economic decision-making at the level of the individual business, states four conditions for a sustainable society in which the global system is not subjected to 1) increasing concentrations of substances extracted from the Earth’s crust; 2) increasing concentrations of substances produced by society; 3) degradation by physical means and that 4) people are not subject to conditions that systematically undermine their capacity to meet their needs. (ibid, p.245). This links to precautionary approaches to environmental protection. Implicit within the application of TNS sustainability principles is the concept that restoration of natural and social capital enhances the overall ‘carrying capacity’ for people, communities and for sustainable business enterprises. This turns the model of economic growth for the environment on its head – instead implying that environmental restoration and capacity-building is essential for economic sustainability.

The Economics of Ecosystems and Biodiversity (TEEB) initiative has been jointly developed by the German Federal Ministry for the Environment and the European Commission, and led by international banker Pavan Sukhdev, to mainstream “the values of biodiversity and ecosystem services” into decision-making at all levels (TEEB, 2012). Its approach is based on systematic appraisal of their economic contribution, as set out in Figure 1.4.2. TEEB details the tools that it claims can solve the undervaluation of biodiversity. These include changes in subsidies and fiscal incentives, charging for access and use, direct payments for ecosystem services, targeting biodiversity in poverty reduction and climate adaptation/mitigation strategies, creation and strengthening of property rights and liability, voluntary eco-labelling and certification. They also relate to the development of the concept of “green infrastructure” or “ecological infrastructure”. These ideas are further developed by Sukhdev (2012) in *Corporation 2020* which seeks to develop a vision for business that “will increase human well-being and social equity; decrease environmental risks and ecological losses, and still generate profit ([www.corp2020.net](http://www.corp2020.net)) accessed on 04/01/17). The approach is also adopted in the European Commission’s *Corporate Social Responsibility Strategy*. 
Europe 2020 argues for a transition to a “green economy”, based on the efficient use of natural resources and the maintenance of ecosystems. The “circular economy” is described as offering “a transformative agenda with significant new jobs and growth potential and stimulating sustainable consumption and production patterns (EC 2016b, 8). Resource efficiency and associated innovation are expected to give the EU competitive advantage. Along with the 7th Environment Action Programme (EAP), Europe 2020 proposes “resource productivity” as a headline indicator. This is defined as gross domestic product (GDP) divided by DMC (domestic material consumption). The United Nations Environment Program also uses GDP/DMC as an indicator of their green growth strategies. Trends show that resource productivity measured in this way has increased in most European and OECD countries in the 21st century, suggesting that decoupling of economic growth and resource use has been achieved. However, the scope of DMC is limited to the amount of materials directly used by an economy (raw materials extracted from the domestic territory plus all physical imports minus all physical exports). It does not include the upstream raw materials related to imports and exports originating from outside of the focal economy. The work of Weidman et al (2013) points to the challenge inherent in such a vision. Using the material footprint, a consumption-based indicator of resource use, across 186 countries, they show that with every 10% increase in GDP, the average national MF increases by 6%, undermining claims for increasing decoupling of economic growth and resource use, resulting in ongoing increases in resource use at a global level (Figure 1.4.3).
As Dittrich et al (2012) note, while improvements in technologies have resulted in great progress in resource efficiency, the overall dynamics of economic growth have outstripped these achievements in efficiency, (the ‘rebound effect’ or ‘Jevon’s paradox’) with the financial savings resulting from reduced material and pollutions costs being reinvested to expand operations and increase consumption (p10). For Dittrich et al “a truly green economy at the global level will only be realised if an absolute dematerialisation of production and consumption can be achieved” (p.10) and this will involve a radical reduction in scale, volume and rate of human resource use. Similarly, ESPON (2013) cautions that “an economy with high rates of green growth is not necessarily a green(er) economy” and that “progress in resource efficient innovations has to be accompanied by other measures to guide consumption in other directions than more unsustainable resource use in order to avoid the rebound effects and territorial externalities” (p8). [See also Kopnina, 2016]

**Ongoing decline in environmental sustainability**

Dematerialization with GDP growth has been experienced only in developed countries that outsourced industrial activity to developing countries with cheaper labour force and softer environmental regulation standards (Jackson 2014). At the same time, measures of biodiversity and ecosystem degradation show inexorable declines (Biermann et al, 2012; Gomez-Baggethun and Naredo, 2015, EEA, 2009, Rockstrom et al, 2009; Global Biodiversity Outlook, 2014, MEA, 2005, Steffen et al, 2015a and b). As Ehrlich et al (2012) document, “humanity has never been moving faster nor further from sustainability than it is now” (p.68).

Between 2001 and 2005, the United Nations coordinated the Millennium Ecosystem Assessment (MEA) in order to establish the scientific basis for actions towards sustainable development. This sought to address:

- How have ecosystems and their services changed?
- What has caused these changes?
- How have these changes affected human well-being?
- How might ecosystems change in the future and what are the implications for human well-being?
- What options exist to enhance the conservation of ecosystems and their contributions to human well-being?
Given the emphasis on the link between ecosystems and human well-being, the MEA focused on “ecosystem services”: the benefits that humans obtain from ecosystems. These are described as provisioning, regulating, cultural and supporting services (Figure 1.4.4).

![MEA Conceptual Framework of Interactions between Biodiversity, Ecosystem Services, Human Well-being and Drivers of Change](chart)

Figure 1.4.4. MEA Conceptual Framework of Interactions between Biodiversity, Ecosystem Services, Human Well-being and Drivers of Change.

It estimated that around 60% of the ecosystem services examined are being degraded and eroded, often as a consequence of actions to increase the supply of other services, such as food. In particular, the trade-offs between such services involve shifting the costs of degradation form one group of people to another, especially the poor, or to future generations. It identified the degradation of ecosystem services as a “significant barrier” to achieving the Millennium Development Goals (pp 1-2).

In looking to future trends, all four MEA scenarios (Figure 1.4.5) including those involving considerably renewed policy shifts towards sustainable development, pointed to ongoing significant growth in the consumption of ecosystem services, continued loss of biodiversity and further degradation of some ecosystem services. However three of the four scenarios developed suggest...
that “significant changes in policies, institutions, and practices can mitigate many of the negative consequences of growing pressures on ecosystems although the changes required are large and are not currently under way” (p.18) However, the report notes that “even in scenarios where one or more categories of ecosystem services improve, biodiversity continues to be lost and thus the long-term sustainability of actions to mitigate degradation of ecosystem services is uncertain” (ibid).

In May 2013, the concentration of carbon dioxide in the atmosphere reached 400ppm. The Stern Review (2005) estimated the ongoing costs of climate change at 5% of GDP annually, with the prospect of rising to as much as 20%, compared with the costs of action of 1% per annum. The latter was promoted as the basis of a pro-growth strategy as action would open up new markets for low carbon energy, goods and services. The EU has set an ambitious economy-wide domestic target of a reduction of greenhouse gas emissions of at least 40% for 2030. The target is based on global projections that are in line with the medium term ambition of the Paris Agreement. Such a context appears to underpin Pelletier’s argument that environmental sustainability is prerequisite to sustainability in any other sphere and that, within the biophysical limits to sustainable economic activity, a combination of market and non-market instruments would be necessary to allocate rights to resources. Pelletier advances proposals for scale-based environmental governance, involving the establishment of a World Environment Organisation, constitutionally comparable to the World Trade and World Health Organisations, to regulate those biophysical limits. Arias-Maldonado (2016) disputes that biophysical limits can be conceptually separated from socio-ecological framings as the “plasticity of socio-natural relations, made possible by scientific and technological intervention, should be taken into consideration when reflecting upon sustainability”.

**Social equity and sustainable development**

All models of sustainable development have insisted on the integration of social, economic and environmental objectives (Hopwood et al, 2005). The Brundtland Report emphasised the unsustainability of inequalities between North and South, which it described as undermining both environmental and economic prospects for the global community (Campbell, 1996). It also focused explicit attention on the rights of future generations (inter-generational equity) as well as socially
marginalised groups within otherwise affluent states (intra-generational equity). Haughton (1999) suggests three additional principles of social equity underpinning sustainability: geographical equity, procedural equity and inter-species equity. Dempsey et al (2011) define “an equitable society” as “one in which there are no ‘exclusionary’ or discriminatory practices hindering individuals from participating economically, socially and politically in society” (p292).

Oden (2010) argues, however, that a meaningful or pragmatic concept of social equity has not been achieved but, rather, social equity “is at best a subsidiary concern in the sustainable development discourse and at worst a politically correct totem to be bowed to when advancing the main agenda” (p.31). It is in this context that he stresses the following key principles for sustainable development (SD):

1. SD is based on the activating premise that future growth cannot occur at the expense of the environment.
2. SD requires the reversal of growing inequality of resource access in order to sustain social solidarity, inclusive democratic decision-making and environmental balances
3. SD strives for forms of economic growth that support greater equity and lower levels of natural capital consumption
4. SD presumes that basic individual rights of property must intrinsically be negotiated in the context of the externalities and problems of the commons. (ibid, p.46, emphasis added)

A key tension within the operationalization of sustainable development revolves around whether a focus on reductions in resource use, in order to achieve ecological sustainability, will affect poorer citizens and populations disproportionately. At the same time, poorer citizens and populations already suffer disproportionately from the effects of environmental pollution and degradation resulting from industrialised production (Ehrlich et al, 2012; Caniglia et al, 2017). Brulle and Pellow (2006) argue that, as environmental inequalities result from social processes, analytical attention must focus on the combination of social production of inequality (e.g. market forces or institutionalised racism) and environmental degradation (e.g. economic growth based on increasing use of material resources or deregulation of controls on externalities). These are the dynamics that create what Beck (1986, p.23) describes as the “risk positions” in which different localities and regions find themselves: those with the least socio-economic power are positioned to be most exposed to environmental risks. At the same time, within all regions, minorities and the poor are inherently vulnerable as they lack the economic and social resources to avoid, mitigate and adapt to environmental threats (Caniglia et al, 2017)

Discourses around health risks, in particular, have opened up alternative connections between social and ecological measures of sustainability. Concerns about health effects of environmental factors have long underpinned some of the most broadly supported regulation of business and private property rights (Harvey, 1996). International commitments to upholding rights to “health” have paralleled the sustainable development movement. A report to the UN and WHO (UNEP, 2016) states that “the air we breathe, the food we eat, the water we drink, and the ecosystems which sustain us are estimated to be responsible for 23 per cent of all deaths worldwide”(p4). At the same time the World Health Organisation (WHO) definition of health as “the state of complete physical, mental and social well-being and not merely the absence of disease” points to a whole system conception. The Rockefeller Foundation- Lancet Commission Report (Whitmee et al, 2015) argues that economic and social gains in the current generation are “mortgaging the health of future generations”(p1973). It proposes that prosperity must be redefined “to focus on the enhancement of quality of life and delivery of improved health for all, together with respect for the integrity of natural systems” (p.1974).
Equal access and opportunity | Accessibility of employment, amenity and services  
Connectivity and transportation  
Education  
Procedural fairness  

Environmental justice and health risks | Local environmental quality  
Location of sources of risk  
Health and well-being  

Community and value of place (assets) | Social capital  
Social cohesion  

Basic human needs | Affordable housing  
Safety and security  
Fair distribution of resources/income  

Table 1.4.3. Dimensions of Social Sustainability (Amended from Opp, 2016, pp294-295)

The broad dimensions of social sustainability described in the recent review by Opp (2016) are summarised in Table 1.4.3. Similarly sustainable development from a social perspective has been discussed in the literature on “sustainable communities” (reviewed by Dempsey et al. 2011). Missimer et al (2017a, 2017b) attempt what they describe as “a science-based, operational definition of social sustainability” (p.32) This focuses on identifying the attributes of social “systems” that must be maintained in order for both current and future generations to meet their needs, namely “trust, common meaning, diversity, capacity for learning and capacity for self-organisation” (ibid). These are related to five principles of social sustainability, as outlined in Table 1.4.4.

| Social Sustainability Principle 1: Health |  
What practices contribute to structural obstacles to people’s health?  
e.g. Excessive working hours, wages that do not support basic needs  

| Social Sustainability Principle 2: Influence |  
What practices contribute to structural obstacles to peoples’ influence on systems they are part of?  
e.g. Lack of employment rights, exclusion from decision-making  

| Social Sustainability Principle 3: Competence |  
What practices contribute to structural obstacles to peoples’ competence?  
e.g. Educational opportunities; false information  

| Social Sustainability Principle 4: Impartiality |  
What practices contribute to structural obstacles to peoples’ impartial treatment?  
e.g. Discrimination, corruption  

| Social Sustainability Principle 5: Meaning-making |  

What practices contribute to structural obstacles to peoples’ meaning-making?

| e.g. Lack of clear roles in the workplace; exclusion of cultural expression |

Table 1.4.4. Five principles of social sustainability proposed by Missimer et al 2017b

Such an approach treats social processes as complex adaptive systems, with an emphasis on co-evolution of systems, as opposed to earlier mechanistic conceptualisations of system interactions tending towards equilibrium (Davoudi et al, 2013). It emphasises networks of relationships and the continual emergence of individual and collective identities and behaviours. In the context of socio-ecological transitions towards sustainability, Barr and Devine-Wright (2012) stress the significance of the concept of “resilience”, which has assumed pre-eminence in recent policy lexicons. Resilient systems can absorb, adapt and reorganise in response to stressors sufficiently to maintain key social and ecological functions. Loss of resilience increases vulnerabilities, which, in turn, are unevenly distributed, leading to growing inequity between different parts of society. It is argued that maintaining resilience fulfils requirements for intergenerational equity as it seeks to maintain a wide range of options for future generations. Barr and Devine-Wright, 2012, however, point out the tendency of policy definitions of resilience to re-define space “through the guarding and celebration of the local “commons” (p.527) either as part of, or in preference to, acceptance of local responsibilities towards the global commons, as it stresses local social vulnerabilities and the production of strategies for reducing those vulnerabilities. This highlights issues of multiple scales in analysing social sustainability (see Dempsey et al, 2011, p292)

Adger (2007) argues that the social aspects of resilience depend on degrees of inclusivity and trust within the social system in question, as it is within systems with high levels of these attributes that relevant knowledge, learning and effective action can be maximised through processes of adaptive management. At the same time, high dependence on particular resources, such as fossil fuels, undermines the resilience of a social system and a core objective of adaptive management is diversification and reduction of societal dependence on finite resource bases. Thus a collaborative approach to adaptive resource management is promoted as essential to the resilience of socio-ecological systems and therefore to institutions for sustainable development. Davoudi et al (2013) suggest a four-dimensional framework (Figure 1.4.6) for resilience building that incorporates the transformations required to transition towards greater sustainability (Missimer et al, 2017b).

![Four-dimensional framework for resilience building](image)

Figure 1.4.6. Four-dimensional framework for resilience building (Davoudi et al 2013, p311)
In the Context of the UN Sustainable Development Goals, Costanza et al (2016) call for “aggregate metrics of human and ecosystem well-being to replace growth in GDP as the primary development goal for nations”, as opposed to individual target metrics. The links between social inequity and economic performance (Wilkinson & Pickett, 2009), the EU index of social justice (Schraad-Tischler and Kroll, 2014), and Social Life Cycle Assessment, evaluating social impacts of industrial production (Arcese et al, 2013; Benya, 2013) are among the sources that are relevant to this discussion.

Emerging models of sustainable development

The Millennium Ecosystem Assessment (MEA, 2005) detailed a range of potential interventions with potential to contribute to enhanced sustainability. These included significant investments in environmentally sound technology, active adaptive management, major investments in public goods (such as education and health), strong action to reduce socioeconomic disparities and eliminate poverty, and expanded capacity of people to manage ecosystems adaptively. However, in all the scenarios explored, the uncertainties surrounding sustainability outcomes were highlighted. In the context of understanding human society as a complex adaptive system embedded in another complex adaptive system – the natural environment – on which it depends for support, Bender and Judith (2015) urge “a mind shift towards accepting more uncertainty, along with social and individual values that promote relationships of nourishment” in moving towards sustainability. Growth as a narrative is being both reframed and challenged. Transition towns are an example of the growth narrative shifting towards self-sufficiency and new social and urban imaginaries (Jackson, 2014).

Other recent related policy instruments focus upon ecological or human health measures as integrators of environmental impact. Sustainability evaluation approaches include the Human-Scale and Capabilities Approaches, UN-Habitat Principles, Green City Criteria and Circles of Sustainability (Figure 1.4.7) (Blewitt, 2015; James, 2015).

![Circles of Sustainability Analysis](image-url)

Figure 1.4.7. Circles of Sustainability Analysis (James, 2015, p.48)
The European Commission’s 6th Report on Territorial Cohesion (EC, 2014b) seeks to emphasise both “sustainable growth” and reducing “the environmental impact of economic activity” (p99). The ESPON GREECO (ESPON, 2013) project looked into the territorial potentials for a greener economy and concluded that “a systemic and transitional approach to the issue of the green economy also requires the merging of a territorial dimension into conventional economic thinking” (p.8). It points out that potentials for economic greening based on energy and resource efficiency differ widely between regions, even within the same nation. However, all regions are subject to similar drivers for place-based transition to greener economic activity, with capacity to capitalise on their natural assets strongly linked to localised (regional) governance and strategic planning. In particular, the diversity of regional institutions, the synergies among them and between them and the private sector, as well as the quality of the human resources within institutions are critical to such a transition (p9). In this context, it is interesting to note that definition of territory is conceived as being dynamic, with territorial change creating “new spatial realities which are fed back into the political and decision making processes” (p11).

As Swyngedouw (2014) highlights, all attempts to fix the meaning of sustainable development are political. While the concept of sustainable development was first introduced in response to environmental concerns and issues of global poverty and north-south inequity, it has been subsequently defined primarily by the mainstream tradition of economic analysis and the assumptions about socio-ecological relationships upon which this tradition has been based. The literature points to on-going challenges to these assumptions both within political and academic spheres. These call for alternative framings of economic development based on socio-ecological parameters. It is in this context that authors such as Blewitt (2015) and James (2015) argue for the implementation of transitional practices of sustainable development, within multidisciplinary contexts, in which processes of reflexive learning are fundamental to the projection of sustainable futures.

Conclusions

The concept of sustainable development has been interpreted in widely different ways, and has been subject to shifts in political and economic conditions of the recent decades. The central feature of its definition by the seminal Brundtland Report points to the necessity of ensuring equity across generations. Commentators and policy makers have since puzzled over how to achieve a balance between economic development, environmental care, and social protection, especially challenged by the economic crisis. The notion of green economy has been adopted by the European Union as the way forward, although it has been criticised for not necessarily delivering a greener future. While deindustrialisation appears to have decoupled resource use from economic growth in Europe, at the global scale the current trends show unprecedented rates of moving away from sustainability.

While the concept of sustainable development inherently includes a reference to social justice across generations, social equity and spatial justice have not often been placed at its centre. Nevertheless, the concepts of social and spatial justice cannot be separated from environmental justice. As the problems of environmental degradation and climate change are global problems, it has been argued that local, place-based solutions are not sufficient or able to deal with the gigantic task (Rees, 2015; 2017). This argument, however, does not take away the significance of the local and the processes of localisation for environmental sustainability. The challenge for the RELocal project in its place-based investigations, therefore, is to maintain a central place for the role of environmental concerns. The project’s focus on the social and spatial justice, and on the political and economic processes that help or hinder justice, should always keep environmental considerations as an integral part of the investigation. The case for the environmental benefits of the localisation of production and consumption, therefore, should be an integral part of the examination of the feasibility of place-based processes in securing spatial justice and territorial cohesion. This means
that, in such localisation, the task is to look for social equity and spatial justice, and lower levels of natural capital consumption in any future economic and political rearrangement.

‘Sustainable development’ is also a highly politicised concept. What are common to various discourses in its evolution is a claim for the integration of social, economic and environmental objectives, and the need expressed to ensure equity across generations. It has become obvious by now that comprehensive changes in policies, institutions and practices are required in order to achieve such integration, and to be able to mitigate at least some of the negative consequences of global environmental degradation.

The pressure is high as both the spatial and time dimensions of social injustice are expected to increase due to the continued unsustainable use of ecosystem services (which include only as one component, the provisioning of material resources and consumables): the costs of degradation of ecosystem services has been shifted from one group of people (the affluent, the developed countries, the global North, etc.) to another (to the poor, the developing countries, to the global South, etc.) as well as to future generations. Furthermore, the biophysical limits to the sustainable growth of economic activity cannot be separated from socio-ecological framings also because of the elasticity of the relationship between society and nature due to scientific and technological intervention. To develop integrated instruments for sustainable production and consumption, biodiversity and ecosystem services have to be socio-economically weighed in decision-making at all levels; and besides further promotion of technologies that enhance resource efficiency in production, policies should aim at an absolute and radical reduction in the volume and rate of natural capital consumption. All of these necessary measures crucially require the involvement of stakeholders at all levels in order to avoid the instigation of further social-spatial injustices by setting off dynamics that would reinforce ‘risk positions’ for already vulnerable regions, localities or social groups with these interventions. Finding the adequate scale(s) at and across which various (though interlinking) measures of the socio-ecological transformation are the most relevant and feasible to initiate, develop and implement is a challenge that relates especially to RELOCAL’s questions related to (multi-level) governance structures and mechanisms and the position and power of localities/communities to influence political discourse and action – acknowledging that place-based solutions alone are not sufficient or able to deal with this grand global challenge.
1.5: Solidarity

Introduction

Task 1.5 critically reviews the concept of solidarity. The recent refugee and economic crises have severely tested the idea of solidarity, which has been a foundational concept in the European Union. Although solidarity as a political agenda emerged as an important underlying principle in modern liberal democracies, the concept itself and how it was understood in social sciences and by public policies underwent tremendous changes during the past decades and centuries. Thus, the research plan narrowed down the time-span of the history of the concept and suggested to focus on first, how the recent economic crisis challenged the issue of solidarity and second, how this change relates back to the construction of the European project.

This review has the following structure. After reviewing solidarity as a concept in social sciences and public policies, the relationship between solidarity and European cohesion policies is outlined. The review in the end offers some recommendations for both Task 1.6 which brings together the concepts of Tasks 1.1 through 1.5, and Task 1.8 which establishes a solid conceptual foundation for other Work Packages throughout the project.

Solidarity and social sciences

Solidarity has been an important analytical category in contemporary social sciences, a concept which describes the cohesion of individuals within social groups (Calhoun 2002). Although the meaning and use of the term in social sciences has been historically changing, it is possible to use four overarching analytical questions to understand these conceptual shifts:

- what is seen as the foundation of solidarity,
- what is the objective of solidarity,
- who is included and who is excluded,
- to what extent does the understanding allow for individuality (Stjernø 2005).

Social science research identified different foundations and sources of solidarity (Table 1.5.1). Their formulations changed during the past decades in social theories, and in many conceptualizations the four sources overlap with each other. For our research project it is evident that all four sources of solidarity can play a part in social and territorial justice. Oosterlynck et al. (2016) underline that in many cases the concept of solidarity has been equated with social and territorial justice.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Source of solidarity</th>
<th>Definition</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Interdependence</td>
<td>Specialization and social differentiation leads to interdependence and therefore, solidarity between social groups.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Shared norms and values</td>
<td>A common belief system is essential in nurturing solidarity within societies.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Struggle</td>
<td>Unequal power relations lead to solidarity and collective action within groups.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Encounter</td>
<td>Informal interactions and everyday encounters are the bases of solidarity.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 1.5.1. Sources of solidarity in the social sciences literature (Source: Oosterlynck et al, (2016, 766) with modifications).
The second question revolves around the **objective or function of solidarity**. According to Stjernø (2005) solidarity means a preparedness to share resources with others. Normally it is practiced either by individuals or by the state and is established by different interactions of the members of the society (see for example the works of Parsons or Luhmann). Classics of sociology mostly focused on the individual, as it is the case by Durkheim who argued that modern societies have been held together by organic solidarity in which occupational differences, the division of labour establish interdependence among different people (Stjernø 2005). Sociologists, since the end of the 19th century in general, argued that solidarity is one of the mechanisms that unites societies, and the basis of solidarity lies either in the interests of different parts of the society (e.g. Weber) or is a basic ethical principle meaning reciprocal concern for one another (e.g. Habermas). As both Oosterlynck et al. (2016) and Stjernø (2005) argue, the emergence of this understanding cannot be separated from the rapid social changes of European societies and states in the 19th century under emerging capitalism.

Who is included and who is excluded in accounts of solidarity is a key aspect to consider in social theories. A solidarity within a group might entail exclusion of others outside the group. Different scholars in the history of the concept have had different assumptions about this question, the visions have ranged from the inclusion of the entire society to classes or social groups with particular functions in a society (e.g. working-class solidarity in different forms from Marx to anarchist conceptualizations) and to a very restricted understanding of who is regarded to be in solidarity with (Stjernø 2005). To give another example, social exclusion as a political term emerging in the 1960s France was also a reaction to the complex socio-economic restructuring, including the decline of class solidarity (Ottmann 2010).

The concept of solidarity **allows for individuality** to different extent in different theoretical takes. Some authors have emphasised that solidarity does not mean that the individual autonomy shall not be preserved, whereas others called for a balance between the collective and the individual, or showed how the individual shall be subsumed under the collective — such as in Lukács’s idea of solidarity. Another school of thought is that of rational choice theorists who argue that personal interest leads to certain forms of solidarity (Stjernø 2005). Several authors see solidarity as a concept which might navigate between the collective and the individual dimensions of solidarity (Ross 2010).

After reviewing the four analytical questions outlined earlier, it is also required to draw a distinction between the **use of the term in social sciences and in political projects**. Although several theories have put the concept of solidarity in the centre of their analysis, it is not a necessity that certain actors formulate their politics in the language of solidarity. Nevertheless, several schools of thought in social sciences emphasise the interrelatedness of social theories about solidarity and the political struggle to reach solidarity in societies, as for example in Marxist theory (Stjernø 2005). To give an example, several scholars, politicians and opinion leaders speak about the end-of-solidarity in contemporary Europe, others however call for investigating new forms of emerging solidarities within societies (Davoudi and Atkinson 1999; Oosterlynck et al. 2016). In the following, social theories and policy discourses are juxtaposed by looking at how solidarity and state formations interrelate with each other.

**Solidarity and the state**

Solidarity is understood by classics of sociology as some moral framework shared by individuals which moral framework leads to some sort of order in today’s societies (Crow 2010). Although mainstream sociological research studied how individuals or classes embraced solidarity as a key idea organising social relations, Stjernø (2005) argues that the state also performs solidarity through its public policies.
How the state has related to solidarity has also been in the focus of social theorists, but largely only during the 20th century. This historical period (and primarily the past decades) has also been crucial for our research project to understand the role of the local in social cohesion and cohesion policy. In political theory, Gramsci’s ideas about the solidarity-state-relations are important because they emphasise how solidarity is based on and hegemony depends on allies the working class establishes with other classes. How political ideas about solidarity were performed depended on several factors: first, which country we are speaking of (the United Kingdom, France, Germany, Southern or Eastern European states showed distinct trajectories throughout the 20th century); second, which was the ruling party at a given time in that country (socialist, social-democratic and Christian democratic parties embraced the idea of solidarity to a larger extent than others); third, in the case of socialist and social democratic parties which stage they were on the road from the classical Marxist to a current social-democratic concept of solidarity (the Christian democratic concept of solidarity remained more stable in the 20th century). The contemporary social-democratic understanding has showed a more inclusive (i.e. not solely working-class) and more general (i.e. solidarity and gender emancipation, nature/environment, ethnic minorities, immigrants) approach, and focused on social policies through which solidarity within the society are exercised. The institutionalised association of welfare and solidarity is a recent phenomenon, appearing only in the last decades of the 20th century in Western Europe (Stjernø 2005).

The welfare state is a well-known institutional answer of institutionalising solidarity across a nation state’s citizens, the analysis of which has been in the forefront of social sciences as well. The welfare state – at least implicitly – is grounded in the concepts of solidarity and social justice (Ottmann 2010). Esping-Andersen (1989) however maintains that solidarity is not necessarily among the defining characteristics of the welfare state; the welfare state is based on three other principles: first, social rights with decommodification of individuals’ welfare; second, social stratification (how the welfare state itself produces inequalities and orders social relations); third, how the interrelations of market, family and the state are negotiated. Solidarity aspects may inform these three principles, but not axiomatically.

After the collapse of the classic welfare state following the crisis of the 1970s and the roll-out neoliberalism of the 1990s (Peck and Tickell 2002) solidarity has remained one of the vantage points from which changes of the form of the state were looked at. First, solidarity has been used as an effective discursive weapon with which social-democratic parties could argue for both a reform of the welfare state and a preservation of it in times of crisis (Stjernø 2005). Second, with the reforms of the welfare state the perception of solidarity in the society has also changed to a large extent; and in many current forms solidarity discourse converted to a workfare understanding, narrowing down the discussion to labour market inclusion (Drahokoupil 2007; Ottmann 2010).

How citizens perceive solidarity by the state also matters to a large extent. One can distinguish between perceptions of first, which level or dimension of solidarity is assumed by the general public, and second whether the state institutions are functioning with a fundamental solidarity idea. The first aspect is grasped for example by European level social surveys, such as the European Social Survey (ESS) and Eurobarometer polls. Solidarity is not appearing as a general theme of ESS survey rounds. However, several themes and several questions of the survey might be interpreted as proxies for solidarity, such as welfare attitudes (Svallfors 2012). Eurobarometer surveys has touched on the issue of solidarity either indirectly (EU citizenship, public support for European policies), or some dimensions directly: in the past years intergenerational solidarity (European Commission DG COMM 2009) and global development aid as a form of global solidarity (European Commission DG COMM 2012) was surveyed. The second aspect is also important in the functioning of the state: Frödin (2013, 68) argues that ‘public officials who implement various social policies are not necessarily doing so on the basis of feelings of solidarity’; and Andrews et al. (2016) analyse with the help of a large-scale survey how public management reforms were perceived and acted upon by
public servants. These two aspects therefore are key considerations for the empirical work of RELOCAL, such as for the case study methodology.

**Solidarity, space and scale**

The question might be asked how the concept of solidarity (which is fundamentally a category of sociology and describes relationships within societies) might be understood in spatial terms. Although the concept of solidarity is shared by different social sciences, geography is rarely mentioned among those. This is the state-of-the-art of the literature in spite of reviews of the concept of solidarity throughout the history of sociology and human geography (Crow 2010; McDowell et al. 2015). Crow (2010) underlines that different authors focused on different ‘levels’ within societies on which solidarity might be analysed. These include relationships between individuals, within classes or between classes, and the nation state has also been an important framing in conceptualizations. These different conceptualizations also lead to different spaces and geographical scales in which solidarity might be understood.

Traditionally, the concept of solidarity is – if not analysed between individuals – largely focused on the nation state (Oosterlynck et al. 2016). Nation states are fundamental territorial categories within which certain social groups articulate themselves and their relationship to other social groups; and the formation of modern nation states is very much a story of upscaling local forms of solidarity to normative and institutionalized forms at the scale of the nation state – such as in the case of the welfare state, or the focus on national solidarity in fascist states of Europe in the 1930s (Stjernø 2005). The nation state also remains important in some transnational surveys, such as European Social Survey’s modules. Here, the role of the state is largely conceived at the national level, and it is asked from respondents which kind of welfare should be offered by nation states (Svallfors 2012).

For our research project it is also crucial to understand how the realisation of solidarity has been present at the trans-regional and transnational scale. We can trace the history of the international level of solidarity largely in Marxist theory up until the political realisation of the international working-class solidarity collapsed during World War I (Stjernø 2005). However, most scholars today emphasise how the international scale regained importance after the economic crisis of the 1970s, with demise of the welfare state, under rolling-out neoliberalism. Examples include Third World solidarity of social-democratic parties across Western Europe, the rescaling of workers’ struggle (Gialis and Herod 2014; Wills 2001b), or the more characteristic internationalism of Christian democratic ideologies. Several scholars argue that with the growing importance of the global scale in market forces, solidarity also has to gain momentum at the international level in a form of cosmopolitan or post-national solidarity (Frödin 2013), or working class solidarity reframed as more general calls for social security (Wills 2001a).

The structural changes in the economy also resulted in the emergence of new state spatial projects at the transnational scale, such as the European Union (Ross 2010; Stjernø 2005; Wissel and Wolff 2017). One should mention, however, that even the European Union as one of the most integrated supranational political entities has significantly less responsibilities in terms of welfare than national governments traditionally have, which means that they might not be seen as important actors in providing solidarity across the society (Ross 2010). Even in policies which are coordinated at the European scale, a ‘proper’ transnational state formation hampers their functioning (Giannakourou 1996). This will be discussed later on.
The local scale has also regained importance in conceptualisations of solidarity. Oosterlynck et al. (2016) argue that because of the crisis of the welfare state the focus of the analysis of solidarity needs to be shifted back to the interpersonal practices in relationally constituted places. This understanding has had some precursors, for example in the revival of communitarian approach in social sciences in past decades (Stjernø 2005), or the influence of structuration theory on the understanding of localism in the British case after the crisis of the 1970s (Gregory and Urry 1985). With this downscaling move, the political basis of solidarity is refocused on places different people share, and a methodological shift takes place to ethnographic studies rather than large-scale surveys.

For example, in the current H2020 research project SOLIDUS, the spatial dimension of solidarity is reduced to top-down and bottom-up initiatives which 'have reduced inequalities between territories (countries, regions, districts) in relation to employment, housing, education, health and civic participation' (McDowell et al. 2015, 5). This understanding narrows down the possible range of the project’s field work also by linking social movements to different scales, but it contradicts slightly the theoretical take which emphasises that spatial dimensions of solidarity ‘draw on and construct sets of interconnected socio-spatial relations across different scales. Even the most local of actions typically affect and reflect national or even international systems of regulation, power and control and yet, this should not mean that there are no hierarchies and power relations at play at a local level’ (McDowell et al. 2015, 10). It is important furthermore that local social movements do not necessarily aim to reduce inequalities between territories per se, but focus on other ‘dimensions’ of social inequalities, be it gender, race, ethnicity or else. On the other hand, in their actual political work which are not focused on spatial issues these movements might exert tremendous influence on spatial inequalities, largely in a positive way.

**Solidarity and the European Union as a political project**

The European Union is an important political project in the second half of the 20th century. Its formation and its shifting foci may also be analysed through the lens of solidarity as a crucial building block.

In the formation of the European Union in the early 1950s a Christian democratic understanding of solidarity was formative, based on Christian religion, peace and democracy (Stjernø 2005). In line with this argument the foundation for solidarity across the European Union has largely been put under the heading of accepting difference which constitutes the EU (Ross 2010). Ross (2010) extends this list of European political visions which are linked to solidarity, for example with cosmopolitanism (i.e. solidarity may give shape of a new form of Europeanized cosmopolitanism).

The concept of solidarity has also been related to the emergence of the ‘social exclusion’ discourse at the level of European Communities since the end of the 1980s. This political agenda is largely based on the corporatist welfare (nation) state ‘in which there is a common moral and social order which transcends particular individual, class, ethnic and regional interest’ (Davoudi and Atkinson 1999, 226). It is clear that combating social exclusion might be equated with arguments for more solidarity. Davoudi and Atkinson (1999) emphasise that social exclusion was used as a substitute for poverty in political discourse at the European level in a context when social cohesion and solidarity was seemingly diminishing, and new alliances between groups and interests of people were sought by social policies. Nevertheless, there exists a paradox between the welfarist past of the European Union (with regional policy and combating social exclusion, inter alia, which is conceptually redistributive) and the very logic of the integration which is market orientation (Giannakourou 1996). Recent scientific accounts have aimed to overcome this controversy by applying a territorial lens: analysing the spatial patterns of social exclusion (Madanipour, Cars and Allen,1998; Tagai 2016), using the word spatial exclusion (Ottmann 2010) or socio-spatial exclusion.
Solidarity was also a substantial motive beyond the Eastern enlargement of the European Union, starting in the early 1990s (Stjernø 2005). Political-economic accounts argue that it was mainly an economic project, pulling new states under the auspices of the transnational EU law and order with the help of the *acquis communautaire*, in order to establish new markets for companies of ‘old’ member states (Böröcz and Sarkar 2005). One can see how for example the four freedoms have been adapted to the Eastern European enlargement: solidarity was overwritten by fear from large-scale labour movements, thereby free movement of labour was postponed by derogations in many EU-15 countries (Böröcz 2001). Inclusion and exclusion to the European space – interwoven by ideas of being in solidarity with Eastern Europe – has also been present in multi-scalar state rescaling processes going hand in hand with the Eastern enlargement of the Union (Varró 2008).

Recent conceptual shifts in the preoccupation with solidarity at the European level have already started before the 2008 economic crisis hit in. Ross (2010) attributes this to the road towards the Lisbon Treaty which showed that solidarity is of central relevance in the European integration. He claims furthermore that solidarity has emerged as a constitutional value in the Lisbon Treaty, and will shape considerably how European institutions are thinking about and acting upon citizenship and fundamental rights. For example, solidarity might be called upon in debates about provision of basic services across European states and localities and serve as an effective instrument for keeping difference within Europe within manageable limits.

The recent shift of EU policy with the Juncker Commission towards a more competitive environment also moved the solidarity aspect to the background. The Commission’s communication about the Juncker Plan for example does not feature the word solidarity (European Commission 2014a). The 1017/2015 regulation on the European Structural and Investment Fund, the main financial means of the Juncker Plan only marginally uses the word solidarity economy in two technical points.

The following section will analyse in detail how the European Union aims to enhance solidarity across its member states with the help of cohesion policies.

**Solidarity and post-crisis European cohesion policies**

**Territorial cohesion and solidarity**

Besides different other aspects of solidarity discussed above, territorial cohesion is also featured in current and historical EU legislative documents (Holder and Layard 2010). The Lisbon Treaty mentions solidarity in connection with territorial cohesion in different places. Many of these text appearances are referring to solidarity across member states, i.e. the national scale, such as that the EU shall ‘promote economic, social and territorial cohesion, and solidarity among Member States’ (Article 2). The following paragraphs will first describe the historical development of regional policy, with regard to the interrelationship of solidarity and territorial cohesion. Second, a critical legal and critical political economic summary will be offered.

Regional policy, as one of the key arenas of EU public policy interventions also pulled together the idea of solidarity and territorial cohesion. The cohesion aspect of regional policy took its shape in the late 1980s – early 1990s with the reform of the Structural Funds. At that time the integration was deepening (more and more competences, also of redistributive manner, were upscaled to the intergovernmental level) and geographically widening (with the subsequent enlargements). Parallel to that, the international economic restructuring resulted in growing regional and inter-urban inequalities. Therefore, a shift took place from a liberal (common) market economy approach to an interventionist spatial planning principle aiming at reducing regional inequalities (Giannakourou 1996). The first major strategic policy document was the European Spatial Development Perspective which aimed at integrating the spatial ‘aspects’ into common policies. The main vision of the document was to establish a more even spatial pattern of growth throughout the European Communities (Holder and Layard 2010; Sarmiento-Mirwaldt 2015). Territorial cohesion first
appeared in the Amsterdam Treaty in 1997, focusing mainly on economic disparities across regions in the early history of the concept (Holder and Layard 2010). Territorial cohesion at that time was not connected to the idea of solidarity in a well-thought conceptual frame: the Second Report on economic and social cohesion in the European Union of 2001 for example was entitled ‘Unity, solidarity, diversity for Europe, its people and its territory’, though the word solidarity does not appear in the main text of the report. This is most possibly due to the fact that solidarity and cohesion are treated as synonyms by the document (European Commission 2001). Competition and cohesion were regarded as conflicting concepts in the early-2000s policy environment. In a 2004 document the Commission argued that ‘the conflict between solidarity and efficiency in cohesion policy can be overcome using a notion of territorial capital, or “place-based” policy’ which was taken-up later also by the Barca Report in 2009 (Sarmiento-Mirwaldt 2015).

The next key document shaping regional policy of the European Union was the Territorial Agenda, agreed during the German Presidency in 2007. This document mentions solidarity twice, but remains rather unclear about the relationship between solidarity and territorial cohesion: ‘Through the Territorial Agenda we will help – in terms of territorial solidarity – to secure better living conditions and quality of life with equal opportunities, oriented towards regional and local potentials, irrespective of where people live – whether in the European core area or in the periphery’ (German Presidency 2007, 1); and ‘territorial cohesion of the EU is prerequisite for achieving sustainable economic growth and implementing social and economic cohesion – a European social model. In this context, we regard it as an essential task and act of solidarity to develop preconditions in all regions to enable equal opportunities for its citizens and development perspectives for entrepreneurship’ (German Presidency 2007, 2). The revision of the document during the Hungarian Presidency in 2011 slightly changed the relationship of the two concepts, inasmuch as they are complementing each other: ‘Territorial cohesion reinforces the principle of solidarity to promote convergence between the economies of better-off territories and those whose development is lagging behind.’; as well as ‘Territorial cohesion complements solidarity mechanisms with a qualitative approach and clarifies that development opportunities are best tailored to the specificities of an area’ (Hungarian Presidency 2011, 3). What a qualitative approach exactly means in the context of regional policy in which hundreds of millions of euros are distributed with the help of quantified indicators remains blurred.


Territorial cohesion has been a more important analytical category than solidarity. This also means that measuring territorial cohesion has been mushrooming in the previous decades, both at EU institutions (see the cohesion reports) and in scientific circles (see for example Berger-Schmitt 2002) – which is not the case with solidarity, as shown above.

The short summary above outlined how territorial cohesion and solidarity is interrelated in regional policies of the EU. One can summarise the current state-of-the-art from several perspectives. Based on the literature, a critical legal and a critical political economic approach is used here.
From a critical legal perspective ‘the linking of territorial cohesion and solidarity – the joining of social and spatial protection – is capable of masking the ‘bads’ [...] by a focus on the ‘goods’, as conceived by the EU’ (Holder and Layard 2010, 264). The authors of this paper argue furthermore that territorial cohesion means that the distribution of negative effects of the economy, society and environment across space shall be mitigated with the background idea of spatial justice. In summarizing their argument Holder and Layard identify four policy directions being pursued by the concept of territorial cohesion with regard to the relationship with solidarity:

- territorial cohesion serving the needs of competitiveness (rather than balanced development across space);
- solidarity being an inherent part of cohesion (solidarity meaning primarily a balanced provision of services across territories and freedom of movement, and not including social redistribution);
- territorial cohesion is rooted in the European Social Model, also by incorporating spatial protection;
- the principle of sustainable development is also present in the ideas about territorial cohesion.

From the critical political economic perspective it is important to stress that territorial cohesion and its financial instruments cannot fulfil the cohesion as an ultimate goal. Giannakourou (1996, 603) argues that ‘a non-regulatory direct-expenditure spatial policy is constrained by the EC’s limited budgetary appropriations as well as by the structural and legal incapacity of the EC/EU to implement the policies decided in Brussels’ – and this fundamental paradox have not been solved either in the two decades which passed since the writing of that article.

**The impact of the economic crisis on cohesion policies and solidarity**

The economic crisis of 2008 shook some of the foundations of the cohesion policies and solidarity within the European Union. This part will go through some of the aspects in which combating the economic crisis resulted in new conceptualisations and new challenges.

First, the economic crisis meant an end to some of the financial or monetary solidarity within the European Union. The euro, perhaps the most important financial instrument offering stability across Europe was struggling. Shore (2012) refers to the symbolic role of money in instrumentalising social solidarity under capitalism, and vice versa, Ross (2010) emphasises how solidarity as a concept helps formulating certain social and market values. What the European Commission and the European Central Bank (backed by the IMF) have been aiming at was retaining the power of the transnational state and the German financial hegemony by large-scale bailouts in different countries. These policies have worked contrary to the solidarity and cohesion ideas of the European Union (Bulmer 2014; Greer 2014), indeed they have institutionalised mistrust regarding monetary policies of the member states (De Angelis 2016). Debt and monetary issues were falsely framed as the cause of the crisis and not a manifestation of it (Hadjimichalis 2011). Distrust and resurgence of nationalism, hostility between nation states and their citizens have accompanied the shattering of the monetary union (Shore 2012).

In the case of financing territorial cohesion, the current 2014–2020 programming period introduced tougher monetary regulations (such as macro-economic and ex ante conditionality) at the EU level in approving cohesion funds and in the impact monitoring of ‘balanced development’ (Sarmiento-Mirwaldt 2015; Faragó and Varró 2016). The background idea has been that there are endogenous factors on the national and subnational scales because of which territorial cohesion was not successful, and these bottlenecks might be combatted with tougher regulations. This shift put effectiveness in front of the cohesion-cum-solidarity discourse; at a time ‘when a frontal attack against neoliberalism’ and its diverse policy formulations (including ‘new regionalism’) was needed...
Hadjimichalis further argues that the dominant discourse in the field ‘first proved itself unable to understand the geographical/regional foundation of the crisis, and, second, helped to direct regional development questions into inoffensive paths by de-politicizing them’ (Hadjimichalis 2011, 266). He finds that this also led to an erasure of the socio-spatial justice and solidarity discourse from European regional development discussions.

Second, it is not only the economic crisis which results in changing attitudes towards solidarity. Oosterlynck et al. (2016) refer to the role of migration which challenges existing forms of solidarity, because of changing economic interdependence in the labour market, changing shared norms and values, changing aims of social struggles within the society, or even changing everyday interactions (cf. Table 1).

Currently what sparks large debates in the European Union is the ‘migration crisis’, i.e. people seeking asylum from countries outside the EU. In a recent paper Cantat (2016) finds that one of the preconditions of the migration crisis at the European scale was the Europeanization of bordering practices with the formation of the Schengen policies (see also Hadjimichalis 2004). Exclusion from Fortress Europe was supposed to ensure solidarity and security inside. Ross (2010) claims that security has recently become more important in European political discourses, that security now serves as an antidote of solidarity and that politics of security changed by mobilising the concept of solidarity. Apart from this, the migration crisis has unfolded geographically unevenly, as ethnographies undertaken in places of repression and resistance have shown, both at the borders (such as in the Mediterranean) and inside EU (such as Calais). In these places borders are constantly reproduced as means of inclusion/exclusion, and these are also the places and spaces in which migrant solidarity activism is active (Cantat 2016).

Another aspect of the refugee crisis is discussed by Apostolova (2016) who analyses the distinction between ‘economic migrants’ and ‘genuine refugees’: the former group is excluded from protection within the European Union whereas the latter group is seen as victim of certain political regimes. From the solidarity perspective there exists an interesting parallel between the changing state formation from welfare to workfare (exclusion/inclusion on the basis of economic/labour relations) and the migration crisis with its discursive separation of the economic from the non-economic (the political). This ideological change finds its echoes in the general public: existential solidarities are undermined by instrumentalising general fears about migration (Ross 2010).

The 2008 economic crisis and its aftermath also resulted in significant changes in anti-systemic movements across Europe. Many of these movements have contested supranational governance and the relationship of private and public in different national and local contexts, and many of them have been linked to the crisis of the European project (Frödin 2013; Gagyi 2015). What is however important from a geographical political economy (Sheppard 2011) perspective is that they generalize core countries’ stories of postwar welfare turning into financialization and later, neoliberal austerity, as the story of a general decline of democratic capitalism. That story is unable to cover the historical path of other positions in the same global process, including that of the Eastern European semi-periphery.

Following this, the formulation of a vocabulary that could address the interest of local social groups versus both ‘local’ elite blocs and their transnational allies is systematically blocked (Gagyi 2015). What might look as lack of solidarity towards classes being the losers of current development (perceived more in Southern and Eastern Europe than in Western European core countries) is a consequence of the dependent development and the transnational character of class relations, not something like an imperfect democratisation. In order to understand solidarity reflected by different social movements at different spatial scales across Europe is therefore a project which takes into account the global character of current political economies.
Socio-economic justice and solidarity has been at the forefront of some anti-austerity and counter-hegemonic movements across Europe, and many of them call for new forms of sociability and solidarity as well (Flesher Fominaya 2017; Hayes 2017).

Conclusions
Solidarity in its current form as political agenda stems from a more general, post-World-War-II Western European understanding which mixes values of equality, social justice, social security, standard of living with the concept of solidarity, recognising the conflicting nature of the collective and the individual in solidarity struggles (Stjernø 2005).

The history of the idea of solidarity in social sciences is similarly a contested field. Solidarity is a flexible concept in both social sciences and politics (Ross 2010), it is also ideologically extremely diverse. In spite of the ideological diversity one can see a long-term shift of the use of the concept to an understanding in which concepts such as freedom, democracy, equality and (social) justice are found side by side with solidarity. According to Stjernø (2005, 257) this is one characteristic which ‘makes it difficult to define and interpret what political actions should be deduced from the concept [of solidarity]’.

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<td>The eastern enlargement (from early 1990s)</td>
<td>‘solidarity’ referred to as the motivation for enlargement, which in fact has been more of an economic project (eventually biased towards core-EU interests)</td>
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<tr>
<td>2004-2008, towards the Lisbon Treaty, before the crisis</td>
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From the perspective of RELOCAL it is important that even scientific texts written about the relationship of solidarity and territorial cohesion are often unclear about this fundamental conceptual relation (see for example Holder and Layard 2010). Political discourses are varied and have changed in time, and thorough scientific analyses of the policy field at the EU level which locate the relationship of the two terms are rare.

The most important conceptual and methodological findings and recommendations regarding the role of solidarity in RELOCAL are the following.

- Solidarity is a fuzzy concept which is used by different scholars, theoretical approaches, disciplines and scholarly traditions in different countries a very different way. RELOCAL may not aim at finding a common definition which cuts across these divides existing also among RELOCAL partners, and it is also not essential for the proper implementation of the project to find an ultimate definition.
- Conceptually, solidarity is of marginal importance in the project proposal and the complex matrix of the Work Packages. In the majority of the project implementation the term solidarity might be substituted for social, economic and territorial cohesion or spatial justice. Although these terms are not identical, making a fine differentiation among them is not necessary for a solid theoretical basis of the research.
- An understanding of solidarity must take uneven development at different scales seriously. This is also what critical social sciences cry for following the 2008 crisis. The local might only
be understood vis-à-vis the individual, the household, the regional, the national, or the transnational.

- Nevertheless, in the case studies, depending on the methodology, solidarity might be a useful concept. For example, 'everyday people' have perhaps a more solid understanding of what solidarity means compared to their understanding of the term social cohesion (although take into account differences of languages), whereas social or territorial cohesion would resonate more with people in the public policy field. Inter-generational solidarity will be dealt with in terms of the comprehensive understanding of sustainable development.
1.6: The Relationship between Territorial Cohesion, Spatial Justice and Sustainable Development

Earlier chapters of this working paper have reviewed many of the core concepts on which we will now build the conceptual framework for the RELOCAL project, including space and spatiality; social justice; spatial justice; territorial cohesion; solidarity; and sustainable development. In Task 1.6 we begin this building process by considering the relationship between territorial cohesion, spatial justice and sustainable development in the context of the objectives of the RELOCAL project.

Territorial cohesion is an EU policy concept, negotiated by member states on an ongoing basis and subject to contrasting and competing ideologies (broadly Keynesian and neoliberal). Its fluidity enables its meaning to change through time and to be understood in different ways by different member states according to their own priorities and changing contexts. It enables tensions to be managed between competitiveness and solidarity; between efficiency and equity; between a redistributive logic (needs, outcomes) and a development logic (territorial potential, inclusive growth); and especially between spatially blind policies for growth (and trickle down?) as against place-based policies unlocking endogenous potential (Barca et al, 2012). The fuzziness of the concept is central to its ability to manage these tensions and to enable political buy-in.

Spatial justice, in contrast, is a theoretically derived concept even though it is also contested. Over and above debates about the meaning of ‘justice’ itself (i.e. social justice), spatial justice may be conceptualised within distributional or relational paradigms. A distributional approach, highlighting the distribution of outcomes across discrete and bounded territories, lends itself to quantitative spatial analysis. Its focus is on outcomes but this analysis may suggest underlying processes for further investigation. A relational approach (e.g. Soja) focuses directly on the processes that cause ‘unjust geographies’ across relational space at multiple scales, lending itself more to case studies at various scales, for example. A mixed methods approach might include case studies focused on underlying relational processes complemented by spatial analysis of distributional outcomes to suggest or corroborate a relational understanding.

The concept of spatial justice can in turn be related to other concepts, such as solidarity, power, governance, social exclusion and ‘welfare mix’, which may be helpful (see below).

Sustainable development is a hybrid concept, part theoretical and part political. In terms of theory it can be understood in terms of inter-generational and intra-generational justice (Brundtland 1987), whether anthropocentric or across species. Inevitably, how this is interpreted is contested, notably in debates between advocates of ‘weak’ and ‘strong’ sustainability and between ecocentric and anthropocentric perspectives. As a political construct, like territorial cohesion it has to be fuzzy enough to be negotiated between nations and interests, incorporating tensions between growth, poverty eradication, environmentalism, sustainability and other objectives (cf. the SDGs).

Whether theoretically or politically derived, in these competing constructions of sustainable development a crucial issue is the treatment of growth. Are there ‘limits to growth’ which render growth and sustainability incompatible? Must growth be reversed or eschewed to achieve sustainability (cf. transition towns) and how can this be compatible with intra-generational justice? Or can growth be reconciled with sustainable development (cf. ecological modernisation theories, green economy models)? It is important to recognise the exercise of discursive power in the framing and deployment of these social constructions, for example in preservationist lobbies’ framing of rural settlements as unsustainable communities (Sturzaker and Shucksmith 2011) or in the concept of ‘food miles’ as a proxy for sustainable food production (Saunders and Barber 2008).

Of particular relevance to the RELOCAL project, is whether the pursuit of inter-generational justice (because of environmental degradation, for example) must necessarily be at the expense of intra-
generational justice, in that poorer citizens and places will be affected disproportionately? Might it be possible to pursue both inter-generational justice and intra-generational justice through focusing simultaneously on the processes which lead to injustice and the processes which lead to environmental degradation? By extension, are the same social processes (such as market capitalism, or colonialism) responsible for both?

The relationship between territorial cohesion, spatial justice and sustainable development might therefore be conceived in terms of processes underlying inter-generational and intra-generational spatial injustice and their coupled relationship to development, growth and competitiveness (reflected in the concept of territorial cohesion), and acknowledging the diverse conceptions of social justice (and solidarity).

The approach proposed would adopt a relational paradigm with the central focus being on the processes underlying spatial injustice within and between generations at multiple scales and how these relate to models of development, growth and competitiveness. Investigation would proceed both directly by studying these underlying processes and indirectly by spatial analysis of outcomes which suggest these relational processes and/or corroborate the relational analysis.

**Operationalising this approach**

A number of means of operationalising this approach suggest themselves. Among them, the relational concept of social exclusion, focusing specifically on the dynamic, multidimensional processes underlying injustice and inequality (Room 1995, Madanipour et al 2015), seems particularly pertinent.

The literature (eg. Silver, 1994) emphasises a number of features of the concept of social exclusion which suggest it may be helpful for our purposes. First, it is relational, with asymmetrical power in the relationship; the relationships exist at a number of societal levels (such as with society, with institutions, with powerful groups, with individuals); and social and cultural factors are at least as important as economic ones (Atkinson, 1998; Samers, 1998). Second, it emphasises the dynamics of the process by which people/groups become excluded, rather than simply describing outcomes (Room, 1999; Einasto, 2002; Havasi, 2002). Third, the multifaceted and cumulative nature of social exclusion is another dominant theme (Room, 1999; Beland, 2007; Trbanc, 2001; Szalai, 2002).

Commins (1993), working in the Irish Poverty 3 programme and the Observatory on National Policies to Combat Social Exclusion, proposed four systems through which processes of exclusion operate: exclusion from the democratic and legal system; exclusion from the labour market; exclusion from the welfare system; exclusion from the family and community system. Building on this work, Reimer (2004) and Philip and Shucksmith (2003) proposed that processes of social inclusion/exclusion might be better understood in terms of four systems through which resources are allocated in societies, each with their own logic: market relations (private systems); bureaucratic relations (state administrative systems); associative relations (collective action processes based on shared interests); and communal relations (based on shared identity among family and friends networks). These “represent four relatively coherent ways in which people organise their relationships to accomplish tasks, legitimise their actions, allocate resources, and structure their interactions. Exclusion and inclusion can occur with respect to any or all of these types of relationships, simultaneously creating both distributional and relational manifestations of the problem” (ibid, p.78). Critiques of the concept of social exclusion are numerous, with the most serious issues being “the implicit notion that all but a few are included in a cohesive society undifferentiated by class or social division” (Shucksmith 2012, 4).

Access to resources, whether understood in terms of the operation of these four systems or otherwise, is central to the concept. “It is access to decision-making, access to resources, and access to common narratives, which enable social integration. Many of these forms of access have clear
spatial manifestations, as space is the site in which these different forms of access are made possible or denied” (Madanipour, 2011a, p. 191).

It is widely accepted that there is a spatial dimension to the distribution of poverty and social exclusion within Europe. Not only are there significant differences between member states but between East and West, North and South (ESPON 2013 Programme, 2010). Concentrations of poverty and social exclusion are also to be found within Member States, both in urban centres and in rural and isolated communities. The Fifth Cohesion Report (European Commission, 2010b) maps the regional variations in incidence of various social indicators, including material deprivation, across EU Member States. These document the spatial distributions of such outcome indicators, but they can only suggest the underlying relational processes and it is here that further work is necessary if we are to understand the relationship between territorial cohesion, spatial justice and sustainable development. What do we know about the multiscalar processes underlying inter-generational and intra-generational spatial injustice across Europe and their coupled relationship to development, growth and competitiveness?

Another recent ESPON project on the Territorial Dimension of Poverty and Social Exclusion in Europe (TIPSE) began to uncover these processes through combining case studies and Europe-wide spatial analysis. It identified four domains of social exclusion for analysis, namely: earning a living; access to services; social environment; and political participation. A cross thematic analysis of the ten case studies led to the following conclusions about some of the spatial processes uncovered (Copus, 2014):

- Space plays a role in reproducing and intensifying individual experiences of social exclusion or poverty, for example by making it more difficult to access services or to participate in community activities. On the other hand geographical isolation may act as a “bonding” factor, strengthening community cohesion. Similarly concentration and segregation of poor, excluded or immigrant groups in an urban context may both provide a sense of solidarity and support, whilst at the same time reinforcing marginalisation if association with a particular environment becomes a social stigma.
- Immobility; the inability to relocate, either in terms of residence, or in terms of travel to work or other daily activities, may in itself lead to a degree of exclusion, by limiting an individual or a household’s ability to obtain a sufficient income or to participate in social activities. However, migration (both into and within Europe) has in recent years played a very major role in determining the shifting geography of poverty and social exclusion.
- Concentrations of poverty and social exclusion exist at a number of different scales, from that of a few streets to the broad continental contrasts identified by Eurostat’s NUTS 1/2 data. Each of these scales is valid for analysis, revealing aspects of multi-level processes.
- Comparisons between the case study regions suggest that perceived exclusion varies between cultural and policy contexts, so that risk factors, such as unemployment, or old age, do not carry the same meaning everywhere in Europe. This is at least in part due to differences in support, associated (for example) with trust placed in the family in the Mediterranean countries or in the Welfare State in the Nordic area. These are important aspects of “territorial capital”, which play a role in subjective quality of life, and have an influence (positive or negative) upon the effectiveness of policies to support inclusion. They merit further analysis and consideration during policy formulation in different contexts.

The TIPSE project reiterated the value of case studies which allow lower scale analysis of outcomes than currently is possible from quantitative data across Europe but can also provide explanations by studying the complex, multi-dimensional processes directly (Talbot et al 2015).
Conclusions

We propose that the relationship between territorial cohesion, spatial justice and sustainable development be conceived in terms of relational processes underlying inter-generational and intra-generational spatial injustice and their coupled relationship to development, growth and competitiveness (reflected in the concept of territorial cohesion), and acknowledging the diverse conceptions of social justice (and solidarity).

The approach proposed would adopt a relational paradigm with the central focus being on the processes underlying spatial injustice within and between generations at multiple scales and how these relate to models of development, growth and competitiveness. Investigation would proceed both directly by studying these underlying processes and indirectly by spatial analysis of outcomes which suggest these relational processes and/or corroborate the relational analysis.

In operationalising this approach it will be helpful to make use of the relational concept of social exclusion, which focuses specifically on the dynamic, multidimensional, multi-scalar processes underlying injustice and inequality. Our work can build upon previous EU project findings, notably those of the TIPSE project which identified four domains of social exclusion - earning a living; access to services; social environment; and political participation – and which emphasised the value of case studies and mixed methods.
1.7: Territorial and Spatial Justice, Regionalism and Localism

Task 1.7 undertakes to examine the relationship between the concepts of territorial cohesion and spatial justice and the concepts and models of regionalism and localism. This task aims to provide a conceptual link between the two dimensions of the call: territorial cohesion and regionalism.

Regionalism and localism are forms of governance, in which the distribution of power, roles and responsibilities is rearranged with a view to favouring the local (Madanipour, 2017). It is a decentralisation of power to lower levels, so as to benefit from local knowledge of the local problems and capacities, to mobilise and draw on the local assets and resources, to ensure higher levels of efficiency, and to have better democratic accountability to the local population. It is considered to be a counterweight to the centralising processes at national and EU levels, as well to the global economic and cultural forces.

The processes that lead to social exclusion and injustice, as discussed in Chapter 1.6, are wide ranging. The increasingly globalised economy, and the integrating European economies, have direct impacts on the local economic conditions, which are well beyond the control of the local, or even national, institutions. The shocks and crises of the global market, caused by far away events, may have devastating impacts on the local conditions. Meanwhile, the neoliberal and ordoliberal ideologies have redefined the role of the state in addressing these extra-local pressures, limiting the role of the state to setting the legal framework, with the role of an umpire in a game (Foucault, 2008). The market is seen to be the best mechanism to provide knowledge about the local conditions and the distribution of resources (Hayek, 1945). Under these conditions, a growing number of people live in precarious conditions. A report by the Joseph Rowntree Foundations (2017) announces that since the economic crisis of 2008, the number of people who live below a level of minimum income standards has grown from a quarter to a third of the UK population.

Social exclusion, as the combination of various forms of vulnerability, is generated and exacerbated by a combination of these political and economic processes. If territorial cohesion and spatial justice require a fight against social exclusion, what forms of governance are best suited to this fight? The EU level raises the alarm about the levels of poverty and social exclusion, and encourages the member states to produce action plans to combat these vulnerabilities. But the competence to do so is left to the national level of government. Meanwhile, the local government complains that it is not well equipped to deal with the problems generated at the structural economic levels. This is one of the key arguments of Eurocities, that the local administrations, especially the larger cities where major concentrations of social exclusion and poverty are found, are not sufficiently empowered to address these problems (Madanipour, 2003a). There is therefore a gap between the structural nature of the forces at play and the capacity of the institutions to address them. Some have argued in favour of the local as a bulwark against these forces (Castells, 1997). The question, therefore, is whether such localisation can ensure territorial cohesion and spatial justice. Can this gap between structural forces and local capacities be filled by a process of localisation?

This analysis requires paying attention to local capacities and the relations of governance at the local level. Two important questions stand out:

1) What are the existing local capacities and how can they be enhanced? And
2) In what ways can local empowerment be balanced with the need for inter-local equity and spatial justice?

There is a rich literature on the questions of local empowerment and institutional capacity at the local level. The reorganisation of local governance arrangements has been recommended as a pathway towards developing local capacities (Madanipour, Hull and Healey, 2001). However, the problem of equity across different localities needs to be addressed. How can the diversity of
capacities in different regions be addressed, as it means completely different starting points? The range and complexity of actors and resources in a rich metropolitan region would be widely different from a remote rural region. Research into Latin American participatory budgeting has shown that the neighbourhoods with an existing level of social capital are better able to use existing and forthcoming resources. How can localities be empowered to mobilize the existing and new resources, and, at the same time, differences across localities not be considered as unjust? If the inter-local equalization through vertical coordination and horizontal transfers does not take place, how far can the higher levels of political authority justify their legitimacy? Can there be a crisis of legitimacy if spatial justice is not sought?

One of the central concepts of governance in the European Union has been subsidiarity. It is a model of decentralization, which has been embedded in the organization of the Catholic church and embraced by the European Union in its Maastricht treaty (Cass, 1992). It is seen as opening up space for manoeuvre for the lower levels of authority. According to the principle of subsidiarity, ‘a larger and higher ranking body should not exercise functions which could be efficiently carried out by a smaller and lesser body’ (Melé, 2005: 293). Subsidiarity paves the way for a system of governance in which different levels of power can work together on a functional basis, each playing a role in a hierarchical organization. A degree of autonomy is therefore offered to the lower levels of authority while maintaining the control exerted by the higher levels. The concept is developed as an alternative to an authoritarian and bureaucratic mode of organization in which people are treated as cogs in a machine rather than intelligent actors with the ability to make decisions based on their own judgement.

Subsidiarity offers a form of decentralization based on the belief that the devolution of power and decision making may contribute to higher productivity, better working practices and political relations. The principle has been used both in functional organization of multi-national entities such as the EU, the restructuring of the nation states into a federal or quasi-federal arrangements, and in the development of regional and sub-regional forms of political institutions. It has also been used in restructuring private corporations and changing them from a highly integrated hierarchy to a network of semi-independent units, in which the workers find a degree of control over their working practices (Melé, 2005). In all these forms, from the functional subdivision to decentralized structures, the urge for localism is often generated from the top, in which the centre reshapes the complex organization and its workings for improved efficiency. It is a technical interpretation of political control, a spectrum of localism as seen from the perspective of a higher ranking authority (Madanipour and Davoudi, 2015).

A key question that will emerge is whether decentralization, in whatever form, can address the twin concerns of democratic deficit and territorial justice. As the workings of the European Union have so far combined subsidiarity with EU-level transfers, it is important to have a clear analysis of this model in relation to spatial justice and territorial cohesion. What are the successes and failures of this model so far? In what ways has this relationship changed with the shift of attitudes from a social democratic to a neoliberal model? What are the likely outcomes if one of the two sides of the model, subsidiarity and inter-regional transfers, is enhanced or weakened in the future? This analysis would have major implications for the future of spatial justice and territorial cohesion in the European Union.

Regionalism and localism entail paying extra attention to the specificities that are embedded in each place. As noted in Chapter 1.1, the concept of place is a key concept in the approach to localities, standing in contrast to the universalist concept of space. It acknowledges the differences, rather than trying to ignore or eradicate them. At the same time, any emphasis on difference and singularity would pose a challenge to the concepts of justice and equity. This tension has been one of the central areas of debate in political theory, especially in the context of the politics of difference and multiculturalism. John Rawls, for example, in his later works tried to reconcile these two sides in terms of social and cultural differences within liberal societies (Rawls, 2005). The advocates of the
Enlightenment and egalitarian concept of citizenship, however, argue against the notion of difference as an organising principle in the political community (Barry, 2001). As an ardent egalitarian liberal, Barry (2001:3) argued that, ‘The spectre that now haunts Europe is one of strident nationalism, ethnic self-assertion and the exaltation of what divides people at the expense of what unites them’.

In spatial governance, planning and development, this tension has been played out between comprehensive and strategic planning. While comprehensive planning attempted to determine the future of an entire area for a long time, strategic planning focused on some issues and places (Albrechts, 2017). Equally, the social policies of combating social exclusion have tended to focus on particular areas, where the level of social exclusion and poverty has been at its highest (Madanipour, Cars and Allen, 2003). This shift has been justified for higher levels of effectiveness and efficiency. It has, however, also been questioned for the loss of ambitions for addressing a city or a region as a whole, making compromises on delivering spatial justice (Gunder, Madanipour and Watson, 2017).

**Conclusions**

Regionalism and localism have been advocated as the pathways in which the diversity and the particular strengths of the localities may be recognised and mobilised, both for local economic development and for bridging the democratic deficit. Localism is seen as a counterweight to globalisation, developing a locality’s capacity to decide for itself on the basis of its own knowledge and resources. Two challenges, however, remain: how can localism and regionalism address the problems of social exclusion within a locality? Localisation is not necessarily a guarantee for a fairer local arrangement, and therefore the challenges of social justice remain to be addressed at the local level. The second challenge is: how can localism and regionalism deal with regional inequalities? If territorial cohesion and spatial justice require equity across the diverse European regions, how can this inter-regional imbalance be addressed through an inward focus on the locality? Some of the concepts of place-based development, such as smart localisation, see localism as a functional division of labour between the regions, but would this compensate for the vastly different levels of social exclusion in these regions? In the current model of territorial cohesion, subsidiarity and inter-regional transfers are the two sides of an equation. What would be the implications for territorial cohesion and spatial justice if this balance is changing in favour of subsidiarity/localism?
1.8. A theoretical framework for RELOCAL

As the Tasks 1.1 to 1.7 have shown, the concepts of social justice, sustainable development, social inclusion and solidarity are overlapping, normative concepts with a wide range of interpretations, which share in their call for a more equitable future, in which the living conditions of the more disadvantaged and vulnerable populations will have been considerably improved. The concepts of territorial cohesion and spatial justice emphasise the spatial dimensions of these visions: identifying how social, economic and environmental disadvantage are socially produced and spatially expressed, and how spatial processes in turn produce and reproduce these conditions of disadvantage and vulnerability.

This Chapter draws on the previous chapters of this report to introduce the two key concepts of spatial justice and locality, and the research project’s framework of ontology, epistemology and methodology. They form the constituent elements of a theoretical framework for the RELOCAL project.

Testing a hypothesis

A tension appears to lie between the economic (higher productivity and growth) and social (social justice and democratic) aims of public policy in Europe. An important question would therefore revolve around the extent to which the concept of spatial justice is able to accommodate economic, political and social goals. The economic agenda of growth would need to be tested through a perspective of spatial justice.

A major tension in European public policy is between a spatially-blind, social market economy, and a place-based, strategic approach. Spatially-blind processes, nevertheless, tend to find clear spatial expression in the economies of agglomeration, rewarding the core regions and sectors, at the expense of the peripheries and less marketable skills and sectors. They are also reflected in the concentration of multiple disadvantage in particular spaces. The influential Barca (2009) report argued in favour of a place-based approach. The RELOCAL project will test the place-based approach through the lens of spatial justice, investigating whether a focus on localities would be better able to deliver the demands of spatial justice.

In the same vein as Barca’s recommendations, McCann (2015), a special advisor to the EU commissioner for regional policy, argues for smart specialisation, which relies on recognising the diversity of the European regions, and finding ways of mobilising each region’s specific assets and capacities. It can be used to create scale advantages by building on regional assets and capacities, enabling different EU regions to develop their own different strategies. It is an element used to contribute to the reform of cohesion policy. It is place-based, drawing on partnership and multi-level governance, bottom-up initiatives and community-based schemes, and a host of other initiatives, all aimed at empowering the regions. Could this emphasis on the economic function of places be compatible with spatial justice?

The place-based focus draws attention to institutions and governance, and recommends institutional reform in support of economic development. This approach should be examined from a socio-spatial perspective, in a Europe-wide context. The basis of the reforms of the cohesion agenda are place-based and governance driven. But they tend to revolve around an economic agenda for growth, in response to the global economic crisis. However, RELOCAL examines this agenda from a critical social perspective, that of spatial justice. Therefore, it can be argued that RELOCAL uses a social lens, particularly sharpened through a spatial focus, to test an economic concept.

Emphasis on place-based policies, furthermore, could work in two different directions: a redistributive logic that would ensure a better balance in access to resources and opportunities
across the continent, or an emphasis on localities, as the Lisbon Strategy does, for building on the “endogenous competitive potential of each territory” (p.60). They reflect the competing visions of how European societies ought to be linked to each other: through networks of solidarity and cooperation, or through market mechanisms of asset building and competition; a primarily social or an economic vision of the future. Smart specialisation in a place-based approach follows an economic logic, in which each region is encouraged to think what it can bring to the marketplace. It is the products and services that can be exchanged in the market that are the basis for its specialisation. It is not clear what goods and services, and what other types of activities, can be undermined and ruled out if they are not marketable. The EU has advocated a balance between subsidiarity and inter-regional transfers; with emphasis on place-based approaches, would the balance changes in favour of the former, and if so with what outcomes? RELOCAL investigates whether a place-based approach to development can accomplish solidarity and spatial justice at the European level.

The RELOCAL hypothesis is that the processes of localisation and place-based public policy can make a positive contribution to spatial justice and democratic empowerment. The key questions that need to be explored are

\[ a) \text{ Can spatial justice, as a fair and equitable distribution in space of socially valued resources and the opportunities to use them, be achieved through place-based strategies? and } \]

\[ b) \text{ Are these achievements place-bound or can they be also achieved across places and times? } \]

In other words, it is about the relationships within a locality, across localities, and relationships between a locality and higher level European institutions, now and in the future, i.e., relationships that are essential in ensuring spatial justice and democratic enhancement. We will investigate whether place-based strategies can contribute to spatial justice and democratisation across the EU, or they would it be at odds with them. Through empirical investigations, we will test the implications of the strategic character of place-based approaches, and whether being selective in the choice of targets may be at odds with being inclusive and just.

This would require unpacking two key concepts: spatial justice and locality.

Figure 1.8.1. The two key concepts of RELOCAL as the basis of hypothesis
The concept of spatial justice

The concept of spatial justice is one of the two key concepts of RELOCAL. Spatial justice closely relates to, and overlaps with, the concepts of territorial cohesion, sustainable development, and the European Social Model. The European Social Model is one of the ways in which the EU pursues its interest in social justice, but the Model does not engage with spatial justice. Territorial Cohesion Policy, with its focus on just distribution across space, would seem to be more closely related to the concept of spatial justice. Both, to an extent, address the more institutionalised forms of social and spatial justice through their emphases on improving some of the systems that could mitigate against oppression, vulnerability and disadvantage.

The concept of spatial justice indicates equity in social space, integrating five dimensions of justice: social, procedural, distributive, spatial and temporal, which distinguish it from these related concepts.

1. Social: Spatial justice as an integral part of social justice

Social justice indicates equity among the members of society. A society is seen to be unjust if it is characterised by deep and persistent inequality among its members. Such levels of inequality undermine any claims to democratic legitimacy and social cohesion. A call to social justice, therefore, means a demand for reducing, and eradicating, these inequalities in wealth, opportunities and privileges.

The social is inherently spatial, and so spatial processes are an integral part of social processes, contributing to the creation of just or unjust social conditions. The social and the spatial processes are mutually interdependent: social processes find spatial expression and spatial processes influence the social processes. Spatial justice is the term that is used to capture this dialectical relationship. As indicated in Chapter 1.1, elements of spatiality, such as the processes of agglomeration and dispersion, centralisation and decentralisation, centre-periphery relations, polarisation, domination, boundary setting, rescaling, and spatial transformation are among the processes that play a significant role in social arrangements.

Spatial justice is the spatial dimension of social justice. In parallel to social justice, therefore, spatial justice indicates the equitable formation of social space. Social conditions and processes are inherently spatial, so spatial justice is the geographical aspect of social justice. Social inequality and exclusion can be present in all areas of social life, where access to resources, rights, decision making and cultural expression is not available to some groups. These forms of inequality and exclusion often find spatial expression, as exemplified in the privatisation of public goods, services and spaces. The patterns of disadvantage tend to be concentrated in particular areas, and in turn spatial concentrations and transformations can cause further inequality and marginality. Spatial justice, therefore, means an equitable spatial distribution of resources and opportunities, and fairness in the relations of power that shape and transform the social space.

Spatial justice (incorporating social justice) focuses on both the just geographic distribution of resources and opportunities, and on the power relations that cause (in)justice between social groups and between spaces. Social and spatial justice are complex and overlapping theoretical concepts, with a strong normative character and a wide variety of different interpretations. Both see the distribution of resources and opportunities as a key factor in identifying (in)justice, with social justice focusing more on the distribution between social groups, and spatial justice more interested in the geography of distribution. Both forms of (in)justice are caused by the power relations and procedures that enable the domination and oppression of certain groups of people, and by the way that space itself is constructed and used. Both of these types of spatial justice will be empirically researched in the project.
2 & 3. Distributive and procedural: Spatial justice as a combination of distributive and procedural justice

Spatial justice is a form of justice that combines the two important forms of justice: procedural and distributive. This would enable us to go beyond the usual dichotomy of these two forms of justice, which should not be considered to be mutually exclusive. It would therefore enable the processes of multi-level governance to have the appropriate procedures for a better distribution of resources and opportunities, and better mechanisms to ensure democratic empowerment and legitimacy.

Providing access to substantive needs and the provision of opportunities are as important as the ways of achieving them. This requires attention to both the procedures of ensuring justice and the outcomes of these procedures.

Social justice involves both distributional and procedural aspects of justice, as applied to households and social groups. It involves the material conditions, institutional arrangements, and social relations and processes that facilitate a fair and equitable distribution of resources and opportunities in society. Social justice under the conditions of social inequality, therefore, involves in reducing social inequality and marginality, both through the provision of essential resources and opportunities, and through the institutional arrangements that are necessary towards this aim.

In practice, social and spatial justice require putting extra emphasis on improving the conditions of the underprivileged and marginalised households and social groups. This would necessitate identifying and targeting the disadvantaged households and social groups, providing the essential resources and opportunities that would improve the living and working conditions of the disadvantaged groups, and creating the institutional and procedural arrangements that are needed to make it happen. Research into social and spatial justice means investigating the causes and conditions of social inequality, exclusion, and injustice, and identifying the material and institutional resources and arrangements that are needed for reducing social inequality and marginality.

4. Spatial: Spatial justice within and between territories

Spatial justice is both inter-local and intra-local, as it is a concern at all spatial scales and territorial levels. It includes the questions of regional inequality as well as social inequality and exclusion within localities and regions. The focus on the locality should include both an investigation into spatial justice within the locality and across localities. Spatial justice would require a spatial rethinking of localities to ensure a more equitable distribution of resources and opportunities and a more appropriate governance arrangement to deliver it. Spatial justice would also require an inter-local analysis, so that inter-regional inequalities can be understood and procedures for reducing them be identified.

5. Temporal: Spatial justice within and between generations

The emphasis on the social relations in spatial justice would also mean that these relations are not static, but change in time, and therefore need to have a clear temporal dimension. The temporal dimension should be taken into account both for shorter periods of time and the longer timescales of sustainability. As indicated in Chapter 1.4, sustainable development requires justice within and across generations. This requires paying particular attention to the natural environment and how our quest for social justice for the present generation needs to be balanced with the needs of future generations, as well as the needs and vulnerabilities of other species on earth. The RELOCAL project cannot focus on spatial justice without emphasising the environmental aspects of social disadvantage and exclusion. Sustainable development overlaps with the notions of territorial cohesion and spatial justice. An important ingredient of the notion of sustainable development is a combination of inter-generational and intra-generational equity. It is important for the research to inquire the extent to which these forms of equity are detectable in localities, and how far it is possible to keep the balance between them in vulnerable places. The pressure for balancing local development and social justice should include the care of the environment and other species.
Work Packages, especially WP8 which deals with future scenarios, would need to pay attention to this important challenge.

The concept of locality

The second key concept of RELOCAL is locality, as the spatial focus of research and the nexus of a range of forces that contribute to spatial (in)justice and democratic legitimacy. Localities are not bound enclaves, but porous and interlinked parts of wider contexts. Therefore, RELOCAL adopts a critical and relational approach, analysing the locality from a critical and open perspective, through four interrelated dimensions: differential, vertical, horizontal and transversal.

1. Differential

A locality is not a homogeneous place, but a place of multiplicity, variation and diversity, which includes inequality and injustice within any given territory. Any understanding of the locality, therefore, needs to take this inner diversity into account, rather than assuming it to be a homogenous entity. Patterns of social inequality and diversity, and the processes of social inclusion and exclusion are at work at all levels of a place, however defined.

2. Vertical

The strengthening of local governance would potentially help bridge the democratic deficit, but it would need coordination and collaboration with other levels of power, as well as the cross cutting procedures and forces, so as to ensure solidarity within and across regions. The concept of multi-level governance is part of a hierarchical conceptualisation of power between local, national and European levels, but it suffers from a mismatch between the ambiguous division of labour between different levels of power. Nevertheless, a locality is subject to governance forces from higher and lower levels of decision making and power relations. The question becomes the relationship between these different levels of power and whether and how they can positively contribute to spatial justice.

3. Horizontal

The inter-local relations are important for spatial justice within national and EU territories, as they aspire to social and territorial cohesion. A horizontal comparison and coordination of procedures across localities is needed to ensure the appropriate distribution of power, resources and opportunities, in coordination with the vertical levels of governance. Horizontal relations may be investigated between adjacent localities, as well as through linkages and comparisons between localities in different parts of the EU.

4. Transversal

The transversal forces of the market and technology, which are not necessarily working through the hierarchies of multi-level governance and the networks of inter-local comparison and coordination, but operate at different scales and places and to different tempos, such as the role of international organisations and multinational corporations.

The locality is a combination of these four dimensions of differential, vertical, horizontal and transversal relations. The forms of political action to ensure territorial cohesion are often performed at distinct spatial levels. But there are many social and economic forces that are not confined to these discrete boundaries of decision making. The vertical relationships may create new hierarchies and generate the problem of democratic deficit and power imbalances. The horizontal forms of coordination are often presented as an alternative to the vertical arrangements. This is a tension between hierarchy and network. It is also a tension between subsidiarity and equity. Furthermore, the transversal relations cut through these policy networks and disrupt them. A relational reading of
the spatial, however, would enable us to go beyond the dichotomy of vertical and horizontal relationships, and also take into account the dynamics of heterogeneity and transversality.

This would require locating the local in the context of its differential, vertical, horizontal and transversal relationships. It would enable the research to test the hypothesis that the localities approach can address the challenges of inequality, power imbalance and democratic deficit. It would therefore address the call’s question on whether “regional autonomy or decentralisation are - or are not - justifiable on account of economic, political and social justice.” The spatiality of the local becomes the framework that links solidarity, democracy and sustainable development. The social life of the locality becomes the nexus of efforts for solidarity, democracy and sustainability, but always in relation to the vertical, horizontal and transversal axes, rather than an isolated and isolating parochialism. This would mean investigating the capacities of the local in both its procedural and distributive dimensions, and for its capacities for spatial justice and social inclusion within and across territories and social groups.

The relationship between spatial justice and the localities approach

The research hypothesis and key questions link the two concepts of spatial justice and localities approach. At the core of this relationship, and a primary defining relationship for the definition of spatial justice, is the relationship between procedural and distributive justice. Distributive justice is focused on identifying the patterns and perceptions of spatial injustice, exclusion and inequality, while procedural justice concentrates on actions and institutions that can combat spatial injustice.

![Figure 1.8.2. The distributive and procedural dimensions of spatial justice](image-url)
The research framework

The research framework will, therefore, comprise a spatial ontology, a relational epistemology, and a mixed methodology.

1. A spatial ontology: the localities approach

By adopting spatial justice as its starting point, the RELOCAL project’s key assumption, and the focus of its empirical data, are localities, the places in which the challenges of spatial justice and democratic deficit, and the responses to these challenges and inequalities, can be analysed and understood. Such a spatial focus facilitates the investigation of various challenges and responses within given territories and in their relations to other places, particularly under the conditions of crisis. This would respond to the call’s invitation to ‘explore the links between territorial cohesion, sustainable development and spatial justice in Europe in times of crisis’.

2. A relational epistemology

Justice is a comparative concept: it is a process of judgement on the quality of relations between two or more states of affairs. On their own, the number and composition of agents and material objects are not judged to be just or unjust. It is only when they mediate the relations between people and territories, and only in comparison with others, that they find such meanings. Relations, therefore, are the focus of analysis. Through them, the power arrangements that make up spatial governance, behaviour of actors, access to material goods and services, spatial and social relations between them, composition of localities and their relations with other localities become just or unjust.

3. A mixed methodology

The locality and its relations form the unit of analysis, where spatial (in)justice will be studied. The local area under investigation, however, does not need to be defined in a strict sense. We will not make try to draw rigid and final boundaries around particular areas, but see them as flexible definition of an area with porous and potentially changing boundaries. To undertake this investigation, the project will use a combination of quantitative and qualitative methods. Quantitative methods will be used for measuring the substantive dimensions of spatial exclusion/inclusion, and qualitative methods for analysing the experiences, relationships and processes and the various ways of combating spatial injustice. Investigating the power relations, the processes, the experiences of spatial exclusion and injustice, and the responses developed towards them, will be analysed in qualitative case studies. In addition to Work Package 6, qualitative methods are also useful for Work Packages 3, 4, 7 and 8. Quantitative methods will be best placed to compare different localities, especially regarding distributive justice. Quantitative methods will be
especially used in Work Packages 2 and 5. These methodologies will be further developed and introduced in the relevant Work Packages.

Figure 1.8.4. Relationship between the theoretical framework and other Work Packages

Conclusions

The RELOCAL project, therefore, will examine the capacity of place-based approaches to deliver spatial justice. Localities are defined as multifarious and porous, at the intersection of vertical, horizontal and transversal forces. Spatial justice is conceptualised as integrating social, spatial, temporal, distributive and procedural dimensions. By focusing on a spatial ontology, through a relational epistemology and a mixed methodology, we will investigate whether spatial justice, as a fair and equitable distribution in space of socially valued resources and the opportunities to use them, can be achieved through place-based strategies, and whether these can be achieved within as well as across places and times.
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