



Resituating the Local in Cohesion and Territorial Development



**Case Study Report**  
**Plumbuita PIDU**  
**Regenerating a Micro-Urban Area in Bucharest,**  
**Romania**

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## Abbreviations

EC	European Commission
EFRD	European Fund for Regional Development
EGTC	European Grouping of Territorial Cooperation
ESF	European Social Fund
EU	European Union
GDP	Gross Domestic Product
LAU	Local Administrative Unit
PS2	Mayorship of District 2, Bucharest
PMB	General Mayor of Bucharest
LC	Local Council, Mayorship of District 2
LP	Local Police of District 2
NUTS	Nomenclature of Territorial Units for Statistics
R&D	Research and Development
SGI	Services of General Interest
SME	Small and Medium-Sized Enterprises

## Executive Summary

### Background

'Plumbuita PIDU' (from here, the Action) was the action implemented by the local authorities of District 2 in Bucharest, the capital city of Romania. This case study addresses the micro-urban 'locality' of the Plumbuita—Steaua Roșie—Petricani area within the context of national and city-centred urban regeneration programs and the politics of cohesion. This multi-layered project, supported partially by the Regional Operational Program (ROP) program supported with EU funding, was implemented in 2010–2014, with some components finished by 2015 and 2016. It targeted a disadvantaged area within a developed locality, namely the city of Bucharest. The Action was defined as a 'long term strategy for area development aiming at job market and economic growth. This strategy will be implemented by individual projects identified in the Action plan'. The role of the EU Cohesion Policy was essential for the Action's initiation and implementation. It had a conceptual influence apart from the financial support, and thus helped constitute the understanding of a broader development for the area, not just for the benefit of the local population. The Action had several objectives: physical regeneration of the urban environment; infrastructure rehabilitation; economic development via growth of economic activities; employment opportunities; and ethnic group integration. It obtained financial support for two components of the project, namely the streets renovation and video-camera system.

### Findings

The project name, 'Integrated Plan for Urban Development for the Area Plumbuita—Steaua Roșie—Petricani from District 2, Bucharest', refers to a territory that includes two neighborhoods and the small residential area next to Petricani road. This locality's most challenging feature is its regimes of multiple ownership and geographical characteristics, which drove stakeholders to compete instead of collaborating with one another, including: local authorities of District 2, Romanian Waters, the Romanian Orthodox Church, the heirs of Ghika Palace, private land restitution claimants. In this context, the poor inhabitants of the area, among which include Roma ethnics, are hardly represented at the local level, and their needs were not addressed in the Action.

Only two components of the Action have been implemented, the other 12 lack financial resources, or encounter inadequate managerial capability, such as the fact that the desired development directions in the area fell outside the authority of PS2. The two components accomplished are: 15 streets have been renovated, the water and sewage system was implemented by General Mayorship of Bucharest (PMB), and a video-surveillance system was installed. The Action initiated by local authorities did assume the legal capacity to manage all the areas in the Locality. But the authorization for the management of the lake was not obtained in due time, thus some projects of the Action could not be completed.

### Outlook.

The Action aimed at micro-urban regeneration and restoration of the defined area of District 2, with a clear consequence of improving the quality of life for the inhabitants. But the scarcity of the implemented projects left the area almost at the same level of under-development and with no foreseeable plan for further evolutions. However, even if the decision-making capacity of the local authorities is limited, they have the competence to change institutional arrangements through different collaborations and to influence integrated urban regeneration through infrastructural projects, legal instruments, and funding opportunities.



## 1. Introduction

The Local Authorities of District 2 (from here, **PS2**), in collaboration with the General Mayorship of Bucharest (**PMB**), designed in 2009–2010 the **Integrated Plan for Urban Development** (PIDU).<sup>i</sup> Within this program, Plumbuita PIDU (the **Action**) has targeted the local development of a specific area in District 2 of Bucharest, the capital city of Romania. The place-based Action was initiated in response to national strategies for development<sup>ii</sup> and to the regional and European cohesion programs.<sup>iii</sup>

**The Action** was implemented by PS2 at a micro-urban level in the area of Plumbuita-Steaua Roşie-Petricani (the **Locality**). The master plan defines this specific area as the neighbourhoods of Plumbuita and Steaua Roşie (the two peninsulas shown in Map 5) and the small area on the right in proximity of Petricani road (red area in fig. 3). PIDU was designed for the entire micro-urban area, including the lakes (fig. 4), the Plumbuita Monastery area (fig. 3), the park (fig. 13), the Ghika Palace (fig. 6), and Teiul Doamnei Ghika Church (fig. 5). The Action aimed to respond to a long-standing spatial injustice, but it was only partially implemented due to weak institutional capacity, legislative constraints, and public and private stakeholders' divergent interests. The overlapping of different authorities in this area, as well as the legal issues regarding land ownership and management impeded the development of the initial objectives included in the Action.

The Locality is situated at the crossroads of several public institutions and private actors that have (partial or overlapping) responsibility over the area: PS2;<sup>iv</sup> PMB-having responsibility over national valuable buildings (being in private or public ownership) and the main road of Petricani; National Administration of 'Romanian Waters', which is a public institution coordinating the legal status of all national waters, but has no management attributions over the lake and the surrounding areas in the two neighbourhoods; the Romanian Orthodox Church for the Plumbuita Monastery and Teiul Doamnei Ghika Church; and the private owners of Ghika Palace, who subcontracted administration of the palace to a private company for event organization (Coman, 2018).

Inhabitants of the area have weak representation at the local level, lacking a constituting 'group of individuals engaged to foster local development and spatial justice on the long run' (RELOCAL). This aspect of participation in civil society, or the lack of it, will be analysed in this report. The Locality has no local community's representatives at the PS2 level, and no association or NGO is working in the area or targeting the area with their programs. The only non-profit private enterprise is the 'Hospice Casa Speranței'<sup>v</sup> a palliative health care centre located in the Plumbuita neighbourhood established in 2014. It has no direct relationship with the PS2 and received no public funds. Moreover, the inhabitants of the Locality have not been consulted either during the design and the implementation of the project, or at the finalization of the individual projects of PIDU.

Generally, the political context of the area has been defined by the struggle between the ex-mayor Nicolai Onțanu,<sup>vi</sup> who ruled for 16 years, winning the elections in 2000, 2004, 2008 and 2012, and the opposition parties. Since 2016, the mayor has been Mihai Toader, a member of the Socialist-Democrat Party (PSD-UNPR, the same as Romania's governing party), and the vice-mayor is Cristian Diaconu, a member of the opposition party, the National Liberal Party (PNL). More importantly, the most recent local elections shifted the composition of local council, which by 2018 (when the research took place) was constituted by the following number of councillors: 12 PSD-UNPR, six PNL (Liberal National Party), five USR (Save Romania Union), and two for each of the next parties (ALDE, PMP, and Romanian Ecologist Party).

The analysis of the 'PIDU Plumbuita', the Action, focuses primarily on the entanglement of institutional responsibilities and attributes of public authorities, which led to the partial accomplishment of the PIDU program. For example, the Mayor of Bucharest initially promised to collaborate in implementing the Action and help in obtaining the necessary funding. PMB did in fact collaborate by implementing the sewage and water system next to the road renovation. However, one of the main issues to be politically and institutionally solved were the negotiations between Romanian Waters and PMB. The aim of those negotiations was that 'Romanian Waters' would agree to cede to PMB the (managerial) authority over the three lakes situated in District 2. This position was based on the fact that all the lakes in the area of Bucharest city are under the direct authority of PMB, with the exception of three lakes: Plumbuita Lake, Fundeni Lake, and Lake Cernica 1. The type of agreement between PMB and PS2 would have been automatic, as all the other lakes in Bucharest are managed by district authorities. But in this case, Romanian Waters did not cede the authority to PMB, and the subsequent collaboration of PS2 with PMB never materialised.

The impact of the Action will be emphasized in our analysis. While there is a very limited implementation of the Action, PS2 officials claimed that public perception of the Locality has been transformed toward a higher degree of public trust. The Action mainly impacted the local inhabitants from Plumbuita and Steaua Roşie neighbourhoods, as well as the Local Police.

The implemented projects targeted rehabilitation of streets, the development of sewage and water infrastructure, and video-surveillance cameras system. Regardless of the legal situation of the houses ownership in the area or level of income of the residents, all inhabitants benefitted from the Action's outcomes. However, the law allows public institutions to implement such projects only in public spaces, and the distance from the street to peoples' houses falls on their private costs. In addition, the project implemented for the benefit of the Local Police and neighbourhood security was considered a success by the beneficiary (see chapter 3. The Action that explores and documents the two individual projects implemented). Local Police confirmed the utility and importance of surveillance cameras installed in the area.

The report is based on empirical research, data analysis, and document analysis. The focus of empirical research connects the description of the social life in the locality with the analysis of the degree to which distributive and procedural dimensions of spatial justice have been reached by Plumbuita PIDU. In the specific context of Romania's and the capital city's institutional structures and territorial governance, this report investigates and documents the responses to social, territorial, and political challenges and inequalities. Moreover, it takes into account further developments and strategies designed and put in practice after this Action. By contrasting the data obtained during the fieldwork with more recent data obtained from the leading institution (PS2), the analysis shows the potential for change and institutional progress at the local level. However, in order to address and not reproduce spatial injustice, local authorities as well as different other levels of authority, such as the National Authority for EU Funds Management, should have a better plan for implementing integrated development measures.



## 2. Methodological Reflection

Plumbuita PIDU meets the criteria of case selection for RELOCAL research, because it is a mature, policy-driven, and area-based Action that aims to improve the infrastructural condition of a micro-urban area neglected by developmental investments, even though the territory always presented a potential value from a historical patrimony and natural resources point of view.

The multi-layered approach of the research design used qualitative methods, notably semi-structured interviews with stakeholders, experts, and the local population; historical data; discourse analysis of public statements; and document analysis of policy papers.

Actors involved in the Action and connected to the locality have participated in the research. However, some refused the recorded interview, and others refused to be interviewed. This research builds on 20 semi-structured interviews, out of which 18 are recorded, two not-recorded; group discussions (one at the local police and the other with the inhabitants of the neighbourhood); and several formal and informal meetings with the vice-mayor of PS2 and other local councillors. Out of a total of 20 interviews, six were taken with representatives of institutional stakeholders (coordinator of EU funds at PS2, local counsellor PS2, director at Romanian Waters, the abbot of Plumbuita Monastery, general director of the Local Police, and an NGO president), three were conducted with experts, and the remaining 11 with the inhabitants of the neighbourhood (table 4). In addition, the research gathered data from the correspondence with local counsellors and other data obtained during our RELOCAL workshop that took place in January 2019.

Ethical issues have been at the core of the research design and remained a constant concern during the empirical research. The recorded interviews and in particular obtaining informed consent have been the most difficult aspects of conducting research within the locality. Most of the informants feared journalists, and the formal consent form created suspicion instead of suggesting trust. Those who work in public institutions especially have been reluctant to collaborate with the researcher without the consent of their hierarchical superiors, being unsure of what they could share in terms of institutional knowledge.

Important implications for the research, its development, and its analysis have been determined by the requirement of engaging stakeholders in the research process. Some stakeholders have shown a lack of interest in participating in the RELOCAL project, claiming they do not see any benefit in the collaboration. Others argued to not have participated in the implementation of Plumbuita PIDU. A key actor, the Mayor of District 2, was reluctant to give an interview, and ultimately did not attend the confirmed meeting. He was among the few who has been part of the implementation team, as he had been the vice-mayor at the time. He also refused to authorise access to conduct observations within PS2 institution. This refusal led to poor engagement overall of PS2 with RELOCAL. However, one interview was conducted with an employee of the institution who was an expert in EU funds and projects implementation. Moreover, a member of the local council agreed to give a recorded interview, and there were a few informal talks with the vice-mayor. During fieldwork official documents were obtained that include data on the outcomes of the Action. Opinions about perceptions on spatial injustice were collected from several experts, people benefiting from the Action, and several representatives of the authorities involved in the implementation of the Action, such as the Local Police. All data were compared and confronted with available quantitative data, extracted from PIDU Plumbuita (2009), the Synthesis provided by PS2 (2018), and the Local Strategy for 2016-2025 (2017).

The conceptual framework of the research design had to be adapted and changed according to the understanding of each person interviewed. In many cases, the key concept of 'spatial (in)justice' was not mentioned as such, but rather paraphrased and explained in order to be understood by the informant. Once the term was explained and they were asked their opinion about 'social injustice', 'the neighbourhood's fame', or 'the difference felt in comparison to other places in the city', most of the interviewees gave a fair and complex answer to questions, often explaining how things changed (or not) in the area and how they connect these changes with social and political phenomena or to the urban development politics of the city.

### 3. The Locality

#### 3.1 Territorial Context and Characteristics of the Locality

**Bucharest city**, the capital of Romania, has the structure of a county in the national framework of the administrative-territorial organization of the country. It is divided in six districts, geographically looking like cake-slices, each one having authority over a part of the 'old city' and suburbs (map. 1). The entire population is over 2 million people, which situates Bucharest in 6th place among European cities. The city is 238 km<sup>2</sup> with a population density of 70% built area (Bucharest INSSE, 2016). Bucharest city has its own directly elected mayor, who leads the local authorities of the municipality (Primăria Municipiului București, PMB) and its local counsellors. In addition, each district has its own elected mayor and city hall (Primăria de sector, PS) and elected local councillors who form the Local Council (**LC** from here). PS2 has 27 local counsellors. The history of Bucharest city began in 1558; in 1659 it became officially the capital of the Țara Românească (or Valahia). Bucharest was declared municipality in 1968.

**District 2** of Bucharest city is classified third among the districts according to its population, 372,913 inhabitants (Bucharest INSSE 2016), which situates it higher than Cluj-Napoca, Constanța, or Iași—the biggest cities in Romania after Bucharest. District 2 has most of the cultural monuments, among which is Plumbuita Monastery (built in the 1560s), and Tei 'the round' Church. On the north side, the Colentina River created several lakes, which have been designed during the 1930s. District 2 is one of the most ethnically diverse areas of Bucharest (Report on Bucharest, 2016; Local Strategy, 2017).

The Action under our scrutiny takes place in the '**Plumbuita-Steaua Roșie-Petricani**' area, geographically defined by the two neighbourhoods within the administrative boundaries of District 2 in Bucharest (**the Locality**). It is bounded by water—Plumbuita Lake, which is under the management of the National Authority 'Romanian Waters'; by the public park 'Plumbuita', under the management of PS2; and by the Petricani Road which connects Bucharest city with the Romania's northern highway (A3) (fig. 13). As a geographical position, the area, formed by two peninsulas, is isolated, without public transportation and with a difficult connection to the main city roads. There are, however, three roads that connect the area to the city. The targeted area, as unit of analysis, is a small-sized urban 'locality', which went through several legal and judicial struggles, i.e., restitution claims for 3.7 ha of Plumbuita Park (map. 9), and the administrative jurisdiction over Plumbuita Island and the lakes. The categorization of Plumbuita as a disadvantaged area builds on its geographical marginality within Bucharest, its historically debated administrative identity, as well as on the presence of Roma communities on its territory, who are faced with structural racism manifested by both the majority population and public institutions.<sup>vii</sup> Due to such diversity in the area, the case study shows how different interest groups organize in order to push their goals on the local government's agenda.

As stated above, in the Locality there are several architectonically iconic places: Plumbuita Monastery, Ghika Palace, and Ghika-Tei Church, the latter being one of the two Romanian churches with a specific round shape (fig. 3). The history of the Locality is marked by two important origin points: first, the oldest documents from the area point to the existence of Plumbuita Monastery (cca. 1564), where the first printing book took life (Zăvoianu, 2001). Second, the neighbourhood is linked to the name of Ghika,<sup>viii</sup> who was the first local monarch to inaugurate Bucharest as the capital city. Recently, the historians of Roma people in Romania demonstrated that mainly boyars and the monastery owned Roma slaves, in addition to private ownership. Historical documents of Bucharest attest to the trading of Roma ethnics, especially by rich owners close to the Ghika family.<sup>ix</sup> Even if historical data on Roma in the area are scarce, we might presume that an important part of the Roma

population present now in the Locality<sup>x</sup> are mainly descendants of the monastery's slaves (Bucharest Museum, vol. XXVII), an assumption confirmed also by Roma inhabitants who remember their ancestors living there in the first part of the twentieth century. By contrast, the non-Roma population in the Locality arrived during the 1950s and 1960s during the socialist industrial development, or even later by marriage. They belong mainly to a poor peasant class from different parts of the country, arriving in Bucharest looking for work.

The most important period for installing socialism was the 1960–1970s (O'Neill, 2009; Sillince, 2014), when housing policies were influenced by the nationalization process and by massive investments in public housing (Chelcea, 2012). The urban and industrial development drew on an internal migration flow of the population from rural areas to the cities, notably towards Bucharest, an aspect that led the socialist regime to heavily regulate the residency and work permits issued in the big cities (Law 12/1971). In this context, the Locality suffered several transformations. First, during the 1960s the local population—according to the memories of the inhabitants—participated in the developmental projects in the area: the state, with the participation of the local population, built street water pumps and pavement for the streets. Second, while the area near Plumbuita Lake saw the construction of Colentina and Doamna Ghika boulevards and blocks of flats, the Locality remained untouched by the socialist urban development plans. Third, by the 1970s many of today's inhabitants, who were internal migrants from poor rural areas, had limited rights to residency and employment in Bucharest.<sup>xi</sup> Today, they constitute the population lacking property documents, since they bought their houses on the black market with a *hand receipt* for the transaction.<sup>xii</sup> They did not manage to obtain property documents despite an alleged claim of the local authorities to have initiated solutions. Some inhabitants obtained legal property documents if they had money for lawyers, and others were supported by private investors to obtain these documents. Otherwise, the poor inhabitants cannot access in any way legal documentation that prove ownership of the houses they live in. Among them many do not even have ID cards, or legal residence in the house where they live (Vrăbiescu, 2017). Those who have ID cards are usually registered with a generous neighbour. The situation tends to become chronic as even those who have documents do not have money for inheritance fees. Many are constrained to keep the house in the name of a deceased person for long periods of time.

The Locality has been characterized by legal and administrative turmoil before 1989, a condition that continued afterwards, being even more convoluted due to the restitution processes and to the corruption accusations targeting the political leadership of District 2. There were two main restitution trials that targeted the area. One concerned the allegedly heirs of Ghika Palace and the other was a private restitution claim for almost four hectares of Plumbuita Park. Both private claims are considered to be forged by public opinion, being the initiative of and the judicial manoeuvres of real-estate 'sharks' and implying corruption scandals. None of these trials is completely settled in court, although the consequences have been decided for the public space: both places are used as private property by not-yet-legal owners. For example, the Grigore Ghika Voievod, also called 'Moșia Colentina', was settled in 1833 and included the Ghika Palace and 22 hectares of nearby land. By the mid-nineteenth century, this property was left for 'the benefit of local population', and it should have been legally managed by 'trustees' who were direct decedents of the Ghika family but who had no right of property. The place was administrated by the Foundation<sup>xiii</sup> until it was nationalised by the communist regime in 1948, and after some reconstruction it was used only between 1978 and 1989. In the early 1990s, the palace entered under the management of the state company DIHAM S.A.<sup>xiv</sup> as a national asset, but it was not renovated as it should have been (cf. OUG. 27/1992). By 1998, Simone Helene Raletti started a restitution claim in relation to PS2. Immediately after winning the trial in 1999 against the local authorities, she sold the land to a law company who helped her with the trial and

rented out the palace.<sup>xv</sup> Today, a new residential area (Tei Residence) has been erected on the land, whereas the palace is managed for organizing private events. A successor of the Ghika family sued Raletti for forgery, but to this day the courts have given no final decision on the matter.

Multi-layered analysis of policy, of legal issues (such as the restitution laws), and of the private interests of real-estate agents reflect the lack of spatial justice in the Locality. This type of urban spatial injustice has been tackled by scholars who demonstrated the ‘infra-structural violence’ and ‘cultural and architectural abuse’ in Bucharest during decades of urban planning (O’Neill, 2009, 2010; Ionescu, 2011; Rodgers and O’Neill, 2012; Teodorescu, 2014). The main investments of the city focused on the city centre and some main infrastructural changes. After the privatization of the biggest pool of social housing in the 1990s, many inhabitants of the city became house owners,<sup>xvi</sup> including apartment owners in blocks of flats (Chelcea, 2003, 2006). At the same time, the city became an important electoral battleground for local politicians. For example, the biggest investment that PS2 coordinates is the thermo-insulation of the block of flats. The budget comes mainly from PMB (75%), but also from the local PS2 budget (25%). However, there are no similar housing regeneration policies for privately-owned houses or for houses with a low number of flats.

### 3.2 The Locality with regards to Dimensions 1 & 2

#### Analytical Dimension 1: Perception of spatial (in-)justice within the locality

The **perceived geography (‘map’) and space (‘place’)** determined local inhabitants and local authorities to have a convergent opinion on the area. The underdeveloped and geographically marginalized condition of the locality is obvious when talking about transport, infrastructure, water, gas, and sewage. The efforts done by authorities did not include public transport, which is still absent in the Locality.

The production of space has a political, geographical, and historical dimension. First, the urban history and evolution of different areas in the city led to poor development of the Locality. Poor areas in Bucharest are defined as ‘poverty pockets’ separated by the rest of the city through (non-inclusive) urban planning: *‘these were areas in which the state or municipality, particularly during the communist era, did not intervene with good systematization plans, for major systematization. They were left out of major urban systematization keeping their structure as private property: individual yards, individual houses, with wine-pergolas...’* (interview\_1.16).

Social and spatial boundaries have a clear origin. On the one hand, the lakes geographically isolate the Locality. On the other hand, a racialized perception of the inhabitants persists among both the local population and the authorities. In addition, there is the perception of an intended isolation on the part of local authorities towards the population living especially in Steaua Roşie neighbourhood (called Tei Toboc in map. 5-7). One woman explained that the mayor at that time was very proud about a fence he approved that separated the two neighbourhoods, but she contested him directly, saying, *‘You know what I don’t like, Mr. Mayor? That you separated us completely from the city. Here we are Indians, and from here up [from the barrier, fig. 10] there are Americans. He laughed, but I said it is nothing to laugh about’* (interview plumb\_1.13).

Specifically, **the perception of spatial injustice** points to infrastructural disadvantages and social exclusion rarely being defined in a more complex way by the Locality’s legal, urban, and political characteristics. There are four types of perception of spatial (in)justice within the locality linked to the following aspects discussed below: (a) geographical mar-



ginalization; (b) legal issues; (c) social exclusion; (d) urban isolation. The interviewees confirmed one, two, or all these types as being at the core of spatial injustice.

(a). The Locality was **geographically marginalized**, although in recent decades and in the near future it will be more and more part of the city. The two peninsulas that constitute the Locality are surrounded by water, one uninhabited island, and a large green area of the park around the Church and Palace. The Locality is perceived by the local inhabitants as a pleasant area to live, but with social and infrastructural problems, abandoned places, or even segregation as consequence of different local policies.

*When I first arrived here [50 years back, the area was] like a place in the countryside than a Bucharest neighbourhood. I first arrived in Bucharest in '68. I did not like Bucharest because all I saw was half-houses that were poorly made. When I lived in the countryside I imagined Bucharest city to be a palace, and when I came here it was a big disappointment. (...) But this street was fine because people have made it so with voluntary work of people that lived here. When I arrived, there was electricity. The water was on the street in common pumps. I cannot say it was hard, as we were used to it coming from the countryside and not knowing anything else. This neighbourhood remained the same, except that now they put in asphalt and sewage. (interview plumb\_1.5).*

(b). The **legal issues** found in the Locality have deterred local authorities from intervening and developing programs for urban regeneration. On the one hand, different state institutions compete for management of the lake area. Plumbuita Lake surrounding the two peninsulas is under the direct management of Romanian Waters—a national authority with no budget for direct management. This institution has the crucial role of regulating and monitoring the appropriate exploitation of all waters in Romania, regardless of the private or public status, or regional or local authority that manages them. However, given the role and structure of this institution, there is no bureaucratic, legal, or financial funding to directly manage a lake. One of the interviewees explained why it is important that the authority over the lake will shift from Romanian Waters to PMB—the local authority in charge of maintaining and managing all the parks and lakes on the administrative territory of Bucharest:

*The change is that type of projects like this one [the Action] could have been successful. [Could have been done] by also involving the lake. When the local authorities want to implement a project with EU funds in order to do something on Plumbuita Lake, those people at the EU funds [institution] will ask about the cadastre. And as the cadastre is in somebody else's name, the local authorities will lose the project. (interview plumb\_1.19)*

On the other hand, legal issues are linked to the restitution process of public spaces (Vrăbiescu 2016), as detailed above. This also deters the authorities from exploiting and managing public areas that do not have a clear ownership status. These types of legal issues not only act as obstacles for project development, but also contribute to the spatial injustice in the Locality.

(c). Many interviewees claimed limited development was due to **the lack of social and cultural capabilities of local inhabitants**. Surprisingly, the unanimous complaint concerns waste, especially the residue thrown in the lake. Starting from this issue, many interviewees blamed people's low level of education and high level of criminality. Recurrently, in talking about the local population, interviewees connected the Roma population with criminality: *Here [in Steaua Roșie] is like another world. In Plumbuita there are also Gypsies, but they have their business, selling flowers or other things. They do not rob everybody; they*



*jump the fence for a piece of iron. Here is awful. We are two worlds, and what separates us? A few metres. (interview plumb\_1.5)*

Local authorities and some experts, instead, define the problem more as a complex conditionality of poverty, ethnicity, and cultural customs.

*Plumbuita, Baicului, Pantelimon have a poor population, so to speak. There are [poor] in other areas. Here they are numerous I would say. (...) First, the cultural differences matter. There [in Plumbuita] are numerous Roma communities. I mean the majority of the population is of Roma ethnicity. Why do they not integrate? This I don't know. We made some projects, we did some efforts for integrating them. Some [projects] were okay, they had some results, others not. (interview plumb\_1.1)*

(d). The perception of spatial injustice comes also from **urban isolation**, particularly the lack of infrastructure that would connect the locality with the rest of the city. Many complained that the lack of public transportation obliges them to walk at least half an hour to the first tram station, a distance that during winter feels even longer. One of the interviewees explained the main issues of the area from this perspective:

*It is difficult to get out of the area. Even with a car, there are two ways and there is not a good entrance to the main road. You have to wait for someone to let you pass. So if you are lucky, you pass and go to the city, if not, not. (interview plumb\_1.18)*

In trying to define **spatial in/justice**, experts were reluctant to give a simple definition and, related to our case study, they stated different opinions. One of them detailed:

*This is how the definition should be stated: by comparison with an ideal situation where it would be just, we detect an injustice that is reflected spatially. Now, it is important to acknowledge that only few people consider spatial distribution as an act of justice. So, the idea of justice does not exist. Consequently, the idea of injustice [related to space] does not exist either. So, these terms do not exist at least at the level of Bucharest city in reality or with the people that work in managing this city. The notion is neither defined, nor applied. (interview 1.16)*

**Stakeholders** explained the spaces of social injustice within the Locality by its geographical marginality and the characteristics of the population.

*District 2 does not have clearly delimited areas of very rich or very poor populations. What you could see, and this is the reason for implementing the video-surveillance system, is that there is a population of Roma ethnicity. And here we tried to bring in the EU projects on POR for helping them—as you have mentioned—to [improve] the urban conditions. Around the year 2000 we had approximately some hundreds of streets without asphalt, without sewage, and people did not have gas or running water. (...) If you ask about poor people, I would actually mention the old city, the part of the old city [that administratively belongs] to District 2. (interview plumb\_1.3)*

Local representatives, while describing their mental maps about the impoverished territories of the city, mostly pointed to the more central areas of the capital instead of naming this particular area as especially poor.

*There are problematic areas we know: Plumbuita, Baicului, but people that live in a high degree of poverty are also in the city centre areas, or close to the centre, areas that belong to the administrative territory of District 2, where there are old houses that they have occupied. The old issue was that, like in downtown, we also have areas in the centre. There are many people of Roma*

*ethnicity or people that do not have income or work places. (interview plumb\_1.1)*

All the interviewees (the local inhabitants, experts, and stakeholders) agreed that poverty, socially excluded populations, and spatial inequality is more dispersed at the city level and did not necessarily affect the Locality. The Locality is perceived as a poor area, but neither the authorities nor the local population saw it as one of the main spatially problematic areas of Bucharest.

## Analytical Dimension 2: Tools and policies for development and cohesion

### Development trajectory

The role of the **EU Cohesion Policy and other EU policies** was essential in the initiation and development of the Action (PIDU, 2009; PS2 Synthesis, 2018; Local Strategy, 2017). They did have a conceptual influence apart from the financial support, and thus constituted the understanding of a broader development of the area, not only one that is conceived of for the benefit of the local population. However, the scarcity of programs implemented left the area almost at the same level of underdevelopment. The Action implemented in the Locality responded to the requirements of the national and local policies for development. At the national level and the level of Bucharest city, several programs for development were designed, among which were: The National Strategy for Sustainable Development 2013-2016 and 2020-2030, Strategy for Territorial Development of Romania 2035, National Program for Local Development (PNDL) of the Ministry of Regional Development and Public Administration (MDRAP), Regional Plan for Development of Bucharest-Ilfov Region 2014-2020, Strategic Concept of Bucharest (CSB2035), The Plan for Sustainable Urban Mobility for Bucharest-Ilfov Region, Local Strategy (PS2, 2017), and the PIDU programs (map.3) designed and implemented by PS2 (map. 11, table 3).

### Perception of impact

The Action was perceived as a relative success by PS2, considering that out of 12 projects only one was completely implemented—the video surveillance system—and one was partially accomplished—the streets renovation.

Significantly, there is a unanimous perception related to the project's outcomes. The perceived achievements are: the asphalted streets, even if out of more than 50 streets identified in the project only 15 have been renovated (map. 8), and the sewage system (implemented by PMB). Next to this, the video-surveillance camera system (map. 6) is not perceived to have a direct impact in the Locality but rather for the work of the police. The water and gas systems were already in place, even if not legally or not for all the houses. These infrastructure systems have been extended partially, but none covered all the houses. It was not clear how and who should be contacted to legalize the utilities' contracts. People complained especially about the gas system, which by now is offered by several private distribution companies. They did not know where to ask and with whom they should talk to have the extension provided.

Local inhabitants and experts noticed several problems: the sewage system in Plumbuita had been introduced with an engineering error, having the inclination in the opposite direction than the lake, which is the main collector; the filtering of domestic sewage put in place was low-quality that by now is all rotten; the streets in Steaua Roșie did not have their inclination degree well calculated such that now there are some streets constantly flooded at any rain; though the streets have been covered with asphalt, in many parts they did not respect the legal standards and/or not respecting the pedestrian side-walk; the

electricity pillars were built according to a plan that did not include the entire area of the neighbourhood, but stopped at one point on the main street along the lake.

There is also a confused perception about the responsibility and accountability of PS2 concerning the aims and failures of the Action: *In fact, what has been done here are the streets. That's it. Lately now this 'Wheel'*<sup>xvii</sup> (interview plumb\_1.6). However, the impact of the Action and other local initiatives has been perceived as changing towards a better state of the Locality: *I think a lot changed for the better, because now we have sewage, it is something. It is not as bad as it was. Before was not good, we had mud, water, it was dirty* (interview plumb\_1.10).

### **The perception of policy choices**

PS2 has developed several Local Strategies for development (2007–2013 and 2016–2025). The present Local Strategy 2016–2025 (published in 2017) has been developed according to the strategic plans of hierarchical authorities, such as: Multiannual Financial Framework for 2014–2020 (MFF of the EU), EU Cohesion Policy, European Strategy 2010, Strategy for Territorial Development of Romania (Ministry of Regional Development and Public Administration—MDRAP), Regional Development Plan of Ilfov-Bucharest region 2014–2020, etc. (Local Development Strategy, 2018, p.18–19). One of the main funding programs targeted by the Local Plan for Sustainable Development of PS2 was the Regional Operational Plan 2007–2013 (ROP). During this period, PS2, with the support of EU funds, implemented and co-financed 11 projects with more than 32M euros. These 11 projects were distributed within three PIDU projects: 'Baicului', 'Creangă', and 'Plumbuita-Steaua Roşie-Petricani'.

Urban development public policies have been designed, but during the implementation process many projects did not materialize. PS2 distinctively included into the Action some activities for vulnerable groups (notably the elderly). At the same time, the Action addressed only real estate investors' interest in housing infrastructure, ignoring public housing or a mandatory allocation of social housing within the new developed projects. Currently, PS2 relies on the masterplan and reiterates its mission in the Local Strategy 2017, defining its reasoning and policy choices as follows: 'PIDU Plumbuita built its strategy for sustainable development following ROP objectives, one of the operational programs supported by the EU. (...) ROP is a strategic document that seeks to implement elements from the National Strategy for Regional Development (SNDR), part of the National Plan for Development (PND). Like other operational programs, ROP contributes to reducing economic and social development disparities, objectives to be achieved within SNDR and PND.' (PIDU 2009, 148). However, the timeframe does not correspond to the implementation schedule and shows the gap left by the weak institutional capacity of PS2 and the aims of national and regional platforms for territorial development.

*Recently we wrote a strategy for vulnerable areas. But it did not make it to the second round. Like PIDU there have been other projects as well. We know exactly what we have to do in certain areas. We have to look for funding sources and implement the projects in a rhythm determined by our institutional capacity and upon the opening of different axes of EU funds. In fact, for Bucharest there are no more axes opened because we are considered a developed region. But in this developed area, there are areas that are very [underdeveloped].* (interview plumb\_1.1)

Similar to perceptions defined in the research used by the Local Strategy 2017, the inhabitants of Plumbuita have reasonable perceptions about their neighbourhood. They do not necessarily think it is a bad or poor neighbourhood, but they do think petty criminality is an issue there. In a comparison between official data about criminality and the inhabitants' perception of it, there is a notable difference: the inhabitants complain about petty-crimes

(stealing fruits from the trees, TVs, or iron tables from the garden), whereas the local police considers that people who have a criminal record do not perform the felonies in the area, but they or their families live in the Locality (interview plumb\_1.4).

Another convergent aspect confirmed by both the authorities and the local population is related to illegal waste. The inhabitants complained, but PS2 said they did offer contracts to each family who lives in the neighbourhood to collect domestic garbage once a week. However, the complaints point to the fact that there is no collection of the waste that results from construction, furniture, or big electronic materials. People claim that there is no surveillance and there are no consequences for those who use the lake and its shores to throw construction waste or old furniture. They claim that many people come from outside the neighbourhood to do so. In response, PS2 defend their duty to collect the garbage only from those who have a contract, and that leaves unattended some inhabitants who do not have property documents.

PS2 favoured the idea to continue projects which started in 2010. The choice for projects like the PIDU is perfectly reasonable and reiterated within the Local Strategy 2017. The masterplan designed in 2009 is the basis for new projects submitted (again) for funding. For example, under the frame of URBACT III, there are two projects: 'The Production of a park for public usage in Creangă neighbourhood', and 'The Park Colentina River, public garden and sport terrain Michel Platini'. Though these projects have no budget yet.

## 4. The Action

### 4.1 Basic Characteristics of the Action

**The Action** (Plumbuita PIDU) was designed to contribute to urban regeneration through an integrated plan aiming to support social and economic growth. The characteristics of the Locality contributed to the conceptual framework and the implementation of the Action that was submitted for approval by the Local Council in 2009 and approved by the Mayor in 2010 (18393/18.03.2010). At that time, the National Authority for EU Funds Management was the mediator for the EU financial support. The implementation displayed several actions. PS2 contracted private companies for the modernization and rehabilitation of the streets and took bids on the project for the video surveillance system. PMB was responsible for the sewage and water system. An important stakeholder of the project was the Local Police, being the project manager and beneficiary of one of the two finalised individual projects, i.e., the video surveillance camera system.

The Action was policy-driven, initiated from the local governmental body (at a sub-municipal level), and shaped by the locality on the basis of SWOT analysis (PIDU 2009, 144–146). The Action was the third project implemented by PS2, after the ‘Creangă’ neighbourhood that focused especially on the Roma population, and the ‘Baicului’ neighbourhood.

*This project, Steaua Roșie-Petricani, is the second one that focused on Roma community, a materially disadvantaged community where the level of non-education is very high, more than 70%. They [the Roma] practically have no responsibility to send their children to school, and from talks and what we saw in the neighbourhood (lit. what we walked with our feet). We seize the opportunity to implement projects with EU funding during 2008–2012, when we wanted to include a social program in order to have an ‘integrated plan’. So, as a social program we thought about this video surveillance system. When we thought about this opportunity to implement these ‘integrated plan’ type of projects we had to have, first of all, the insertion and rehabilitation of the infrastructure, but we needed a second project, which was this video surveillance project. (Interview plumb\_1.3).*

The Action was connected to the National Strategy for Sustainable Development (*Strategia Națională de Dezvoltare Durabilă 2010–2020*) and answered to certain directions of development that the EU encouraged, notably the development of urban centres (ROP 1.1. urban centres). It had five **objectives**: physical regeneration of urban environment, infrastructure rehabilitation, economic development by growth of economic activities, employment opportunities, and ethnic group integration. The initial design included 12 individual projects as reflected by Table 4 in the Annex.

The outcomes of the Action show that only the first component of Project 2 and Project 9 have been implemented. All other projects could not be implemented ‘due to the lack of financial resources, to lack of managerial capability, to the disapproval of shifting the management of certain territories and water to PS2, or due to the fact that the desired development directions in the area fall outside the authority of PS2’ (Synthesis PIDU Plumbuita 2018, pp. 2-4).



## 4.2 The Action with regards to Dimensions 3–5

### Analytical Dimension 3: Coordination and implementation of the action in the locality under consideration

#### Decision-making capacity

The decision-making capacity of PS2 is limited due to an unfinished decentralization process, leaving unclear the distinction between the responsibilities of PMB and PS2. With limited territorial management capacity, PS2 does not own property but can only manage different public areas. PS2 collects local taxes but has a limited budget. The perception of local population about PS2's responsibility towards the district is bigger than its actual capacity for action (budget, decision-making, authority). The Locality has been targeted by PS2 for urban regeneration as well as for its touristic potential.

Many projects defined initially by PIDU as necessary could not be realised for several reasons. First, the condition for a successfully funded PIDU project, whose design included the lakes and the shore areas, was to settle an agreement for the authority that applies for funding, PS2, to have a legal right to exploit the area. This aspect is specified in the contract with the funding authorities (EU Structural Funds terms and conditions). For this to happen, PMB should have obtained the managerial authority from Romanian Waters, then a bilateral agreement between PMB and PS2, which would have been sealed for the management of Plumbuita Lake. But the Romanian Waters company did not agree to cede the management to PMB.

*The local authority of District 2 would like to obtain back the right to administer the lake, Plumbuita Lake. Now, this was an error because the District authorities do not have patrimony. Maybe they did not know that... in 2009. The lake can be transferred only to the PMB, and the General Council can decide to give [the lake] to be managed by the district authorities. Even there is no surety that this can happen, because PMB has its own [state] company called APCAP [The Authority for Cemeteries, Lakes and Green Spaces] that manages more lakes than us (i.e. Romanian Waters) [in Bucharest]. However, the park nearby and the lake's shores belong to the ADP [The Local Authority for Parks which is part of PS2]. (interview plumb\_1.19)*

Second, different authorizations needed to implement the urban regeneration project were not issued on time by different other authorities, such as Patrimony (a national authority), or PMB. The coordination between PMB and PS2 went well during the first implemented project, namely, the coordination between the road infrastructure and sewage and running water systems. PMB fixed the sewage and running water-plumbing systems, and then the contracted company for fixing the streets entered and finished the road renovation.

#### Distribution of power

This issue is relevant for all of Bucharest and shows the importance of having more than one authority as partners in any urban regeneration project. The distribution of power in Bucharest city is both horizontal and vertical (Local Strategy 2017). One of the experts explains:

*I do not think PMB has any interest in the neighbourhood per se. For PMB, the lake areas might be interesting, or what's at the north, or maybe what they wanted to do here—a cultural park. These might be interesting for PMB. [The Locality] is a problem of PS2, and PS2 has to fix what is there. (interview plumb\_1.18)*



The organization of local authorities in Bucharest municipality has several consequences for the integrated development of urban areas. The authorities of PMB and PS2 spatially overlap and are vertically conditioned in their decisions. For example, the main streets with public transportation are under the management of PMB. PS2 has authority over the secondary streets, electricity pillars, and public spaces, territories, and public utilities. PS2 has a limited authority: it has no property ownership over the land, although it is the beneficiary of local taxes on parking areas and buildings, has the capability to build its own budget, and to reorganize public spaces. However, it relies on the central budget of PMB to advance main infrastructural projects or urban area regeneration plans. Consequently, several projects for urban development cannot be developed except in cooperation with PMB.

The problems are not only the distribution of power, but also how the budget is allocated to each district, to administrative territorial units (territorial unit area, TUA from here) and/or other metropolitan institutions, and within and between districts of the same city. Thus, the main complaints were that within the District, PS2 would develop projects for the block of flats rather than for houses; whereas the experts have pointed out that the way the TUA and FUA (functional unit area) are now designed in Bucharest does not give too much chance for a coherent development, neither for socially oriented projects nor for cultural/touristic ones. Starting with the latest Local Strategy and the governmental change in the national and regional strategy for territorial development, PS2 has envisioned programs embedded in regional, national, and local strategies.

### Modes of leadership

Two tensioned leadership models influenced the Action. One was established in the conflicting relationships between the mayor of District 2 and the general mayor of Bucharest. And the other one occurred at the level of project-based leadership, where there was an overlap of responsibilities between the project manager and the project beneficiary. The first leadership model has a politically driven agenda, sometimes defeating the institutional interests, sometimes reflecting personal or professional disagreements: *[T]hey gave him [the mayor of District 2] money but did not let him do the job, then they [the PMB authorities] took the money back and gave the green light to implement the projects (laughing) 'how can I do the project if I have no money?!' and so on.* (Interview plumb\_1.3).

The second type of leadership is reflected by the person who initiated and coordinated the project of the video surveillance system. Exposing this leadership model, he explains at the same time the project's relevance for his institution.

*Madam, I am the one. I am the project manager of all these video surveillance projects 'Baicului', 'Andronache', and this project, 'Steaua Roşie-Plumbuita.' We have managerial teams for these projects that we implement with European money. For those that are financed by the local budget we do not need a managerial team, [because] everything enters as expenses of the local budget. I did not have complaints from the Authority for [Project] Management, or from the Agency for Regional Development or from the Ministry of Finance (ANRMA-FPRA), who is in charge of and assess public acquisitions. Things went pretty well and my people who worked [in the project]—to show a lack of modesty—they congratulated me. They said: 'It's great!' We worked in a team and now everybody knows me there [at PS2].'* (Interview plumb\_1.3)

The person in charge had multiple functions due to cumulating positions and responsibilities: *'I am the director here, but also a project manager'*, explained the same interviewee. For a project manager, the best way to perform the tasks well is by knowing how the institutional framework works and what the needs are. Thus, the interviewee saw no conflict

of interests; on the contrary, it was an advantage to be a professional, especially one in a managerial position that knows institutional needs.

### Structures of coordination

Experts' perspectives on the area confirm the need for collaboration between different levels of authority: *Everywhere are more authorities. Anywhere where you lay your finger in Bucharest you will find the interest and responsibility of more than one authority. It is never one authority responsible* (Interview plumb\_1.18). The Locality's mostly geographical and infrastructural isolation points to the need for collaboration between PMB and PS2. The issue of social exclusion is the responsibility of PS2, which should address the housing documentation issue and any other public-private issues, as will be described further.

PS2 implemented two components of the Action: the road infrastructure and the video surveillance system. It subcontracted a company to execute the work for street renovation after PMB implemented the sewage and water system. The second project was managed and implemented by the Local Police, who were responsible for the video surveillance system.

A fair distribution of power may increase the leadership potential and thus it is important to be aware of how the leadership and institutional negotiations are applied:

*[PS2 requested the lake to be shifted to their management] and initially we said yes. For sure, no one is at ease to lose some of their activity to this type of [state] company or especially in these times we live. But I have to look and see what is the more important interest. Let's do things so they work, to leave something behind after we go. This is how some of us understand, but other not.* (interview plumb\_1.19)

The advantage of having the lake under PS2 authority would be that the exploitation would be unitary if the same authority could manage the resources. And the Romanian Waters would still be functional in the sense that they would give the authorization, as the national legal authority over all the waters. For any lake in Romania, regardless of its size, Romanian Waters issues the authorization for any exploitation. This type of coordination between state institutions is essential for the realization of integrated urban regeneration projects. The partial accomplishment of the Action showed how the lack of coordination leads to failure: *'The difference is that projects like this one [Plumbuita PIDU] could have been done'*, as one of the stakeholders put it.

### Analytical Dimension 4: Autonomy, participation and engagement

The main actors who participated in the elaboration, implementation, and evaluation of the Action are PS2, PMB, and the local police of District 2. PS2, who is the main stakeholder but has **limited autonomy**, participated in all steps of the Action: from its design to the implementation and final evaluation of the program. Nonetheless, the institution suffers from a **lack of transparency**, which might have influenced the negotiations over its patrimony and the perception of its legitimacy, responsibility, and accountability.

The issue of **autonomy** is one of the most important aspect for the Action's implementation. In this sense, it is crucial that PS2 does not have patrimony but only manages the administrative territory on secondary streets, parks, schools, and kindergartens, as well as regulating the authorization of construction projects. The main roads or the main infrastructure system of water, sewage, and electricity are managed by PMB. This aspect influenced the negotiations with Romanian Waters, the claims being debated in the Romanian Parliament.

Internally, PS2 suffered from a **lack of transparency**, which was an issue commented on and addressed by the opposition party at different levels of governance. In an interview, a local councillor said that one target for the opposition parties was to have a ‘Transparency Commission’: *‘and the transparency commission was settled. Having this commission for transparency, [I could ask] what I wanted to know: contracts and expenditures. And I was on the same side as PDL being in opposition. For them [the issue of transparency] was important for the party image, for politics. So the president now is the vice-mayor...’* (interview plumb\_1.2).

There is a very dynamic civil society at the level of Bucharest city as well as at the district level. Local NGOs focus mainly on environmental issues and issues concerning public space and urban development. Roma NGOs are present at the city level, but less through programs or activities developed in the neighbourhoods of District 2. In comparison to other areas of Bucharest, **NGOs and civil society activities have been less tuned** to the challenges of the isolated and marginalized community in Plumbuita. Out of the 34 NGOs that offer social services within District 2 in collaboration with PS2 (DGASPC),<sup>xviii</sup> none function in the Locality. Here there are no specific NGOs or civil society initiatives. Nonetheless, to set up and maintain an NGO or an association is financially costly and implies heavy bureaucratic work.

However, the **local population** is active and tried ad hoc initiatives to improve their lives and to address issues that are important to them. These initiatives were negatively received by the local authorities. For example: a few small streets had not been asphalted, so a few people asked PS2 to put asphalt on the 20m length street in front of their house. PS2 claimed that this could not be accomplished, as the project was finished and no more funding remained. When the inhabitants wanted to put asphalt down on their own, the local police warned them not to do it or to change anything on a public road. This road measures 20x3.5m and spans 5 houses inhabited by more than 30 people total, among which include children and old people for whom it is the only access road (fig. 6).

*We wanted to use our own money to put asphalt on the road here where we don't have it. (...) We were not included in the street [project], because it is private, so to speak. Meaning we should do it ourselves. But when we tried to fix it ourselves they [the authorities] told us we are not allowed and that we will be fined [if we will do it]. Police came three times to warn us. We wanted to have the road fixed with our money. But they did not let us, saying it is a public street, that the mayor has to do it. When we went to the mayor, and they said it is not in the project, and we have to wait. Look, now rain came and only holes [are left].* (Interview plumb\_1.15)

Even when people mobilise in the neighbourhood to pursue a common interest, they often met the closed doors of PS2. The legitimacy of PS2 Local Strategy is now exhibited by claiming ‘public consultations’ and ‘participative management’. Along these lines, there are several projects that have been designed to strengthen the institutional capacity for management.

## Analytical Dimension 5: Expression and mobilisation of place-based knowledge and adaptability

There are two positions towards the way the (SWOT) analysis has been done in the area before the Action was designed and implemented. **PS2 claims to have performed the analysis of the area, whereas experts and the inhabitants claim otherwise:** ‘For designing the PIDU and for identifying the needs and development opportunities of the area

of Plumbuita-Steaua Roşie-Petricani, socio-economic analyses of the area have been conducted, and the issues and problems to be overcome have been identified, and also the specific objectives in order to elevate the identified problems. (...) During the planning we aimed to reach other benefits as well: the creation of a local community vision for its future development; ensuring equal benefits for all community members; settling common aims for the neighbourhood development; using [the Action] as an instrument for future investments.' (Synthesis PIDU Plumbuita, 2018, p. 1). PS2 claims to have had an integrated approach, but there is no accountability of the implementation process. No place-based knowledge was produced before (SWOT analysis of PIDU design), either throughout or after the Action was implemented. Data from field-notes and interviews show that inhabitants perceive a lack of transparency in the decision-making process (interview plumb\_1.2), and confirm that **there was no consultancy of the local communities** in designing and developing the Action (plumb\_1.5, plumb\_1.10, plumb\_1.13, plumb\_1.18).

There is a need to have internal structures within local public authorities for managing projects, without having to buy external services from companies. This is a claim from some of the stakeholders and critical analysts on the EU funds implementation (see plumb\_1.1 and plumb\_1.21). Stakeholders mainly complained about the lack of coherence in funding from the EU, meaning that an important issue that could not be addressed at a moment in time due to a lack of expertise available or imprecise writing of the project could then not achieve further financing. They complained that the frameworks of EU funds are not flexible enough and should be adapted to the local needs. They confirmed the 'inflexibility' of the EU funding system and the challenge it was to work in a restrictive framework that does not allow changes. They claim a **lack of clarity of funding schemes**.

Even when institutional frameworks for project management exist, there are other issues to be solved. There was a political will to solve the issues in the Locality, but there were too many rules and too many studies that they had to refer to:

*In my opinion there was a problem, and they had to solve it. That they could benefit from some money, great! (...) [But instead] if there were two rules demanded by Brussels, we put in three more. Things like this cannot work.*  
(interview plumb\_1.19)

Furthermore, **two types of knowledge are produced at the local level**, both being represented in the Local Strategy, which claims to rely on public consultation regarding different topics discussed by the inhabitants of several administrative areas: quality of life, ideas for development, security, transport, social services offered by the local authorities, etc. (2017, p. 348). Research conducted by PS2 shows an important aspect related to the transparency and engagement of public institutions. One of the results points to the local inhabitants' perception of PS2 management and implementation of projects for urban regeneration, showing that '31% said they are unhappy and only 12% happy, while the majority of 48% said they do not know about the projects of PS2 because there was not enough transparency and information' (p. 367). Importantly, these numbers indicate that people are aware of the quality of public investment and are critical towards the public institutions' lack of transparency. Another research result points to the perception of the quality of life, showing how people living in the Obor area have a positive perception over their neighbourhood, whereas all other areas, including Plumbuita, score negative. An important aspect to be noted is that social housing is an unknown topic to local inhabitants. Though, Local Strategy plans to offer 20 social housing units within the horizon of 2025 (p. 343). Another topic noted in the research conducted for the Strategy is the local market. Particularly in the Plumbuita neighbourhood, many people complain (66%) that there is no market in their area.

Importantly, the issue of housing documentation lingers without the intervention of the local authorities. Those inhabitants who do not have property documents cannot have

utility contracts with the service providers. They complained about their difficult relationship with the Local Authorities, but PS2 said that the situation of legalizing property documents is not in their hands, and that each person should seek help and handle their problems on their own.



## 5. Final Assessment: Capacities for Change

### Synthesising Dimension A: Assessment of promoters and inhibitors (regarding the Action: dimensions 3 to 5)

The analysis of the coordination and implementation of the Action in the Locality revealed the intricacies of political and institutional interests that lead to spatial injustice. The main **promoter** of the Action was the existence of the marginalized urban areas and the opportunity to access EU funds. At the same time, the lack of institutional coordination for the implementation of the Action was the main **inhibitor**. A few questions remain to be answered in relation to the identification of promoters and inhibitors:

1) To what extent did the project implementer, PS2, have to 'check boxes' in order to obtain the funding, knowing that they would not implement the entire project? The Action is not a model of 'good practice' but opens several layers for analysis: the dialog and negotiations between different structures of authority, the impact and importance of the EU funds at the local and sub-municipal level, and the importance of micro-urban areas in the general strategy for development. It has the potential to improve understanding of the opportunities or, on the contrary, the fallacies of implementing POCA/POCU type of projects on the present EU axes. A recent report shows that: 'One of the top difficulties in implementing projects (with EU funding) is given by the complexity of integrated intervention, which demands the correlation of activities in different domains: children's and adults' education, access for the labour market, the development of local entrepreneurial initiatives, improving the health level and associated risks preventions, housing conditions, legalizing/regulating housing situation and the ID cards, etc.' (CeRe 2018, p. 37). An integrated project having activities from several domains risks the implementation of the entire project: 'if one of the suppliers for a certain service fails, then the project's targets are directly influenced even if all the other suppliers accomplish their tasks' (CeRe 2018, p. 37). Analysis of dimensions 3–5 of the Action, indicates that the EU funding program requirements are a challenge for stakeholders, they should be won on a base of a competition, thus they cannot be the main promoter for implementing the Action.

2) The Action developed a SWOT analysis in 2009 for Plumbuita, in which it indicated a Roma population in the area that 'has notably criminal characteristics'. The same data are used in the Local Strategy 2017. These data are estimative and very problematic, raising concerns about the way poor areas and the Roma minority are defined and tackled by urban development programs. In the definition of the geographically marginalized areas, substandard housing becomes similar to 'area inhabited mainly by Roma ethics (90%)' (Local Strategy, 2017). These issues are addressed by other types of initiatives, such as the DGASPC S2 project with a specialized NGO called Integrated Development for Marginalized Communities in District 2 (2017, p. 268). Thus, PS2 not only shifts the responsibility on the shoulders of the Roma for living in precarious conditions, but it contributes also to their further racialization.

3) To what extent is this urban regeneration project another example of 'degradation by regeneration'? Considering the partial and improper implementation of the Action, having errors within the water and sewage systems, and the street renovation being accomplished with many technical deficiencies, the Locality suffers more than before. Some problems remain the same, such as the limited access to water or electricity, others are newly determined by the deficient construction. Many issues identified as problems in the Locality in 2009 are still present, with little prospect of them being fixed. For example, due to non-normative street renovation, no public transportation can be implemented in the



area. These constitute inhibitors for developing further the Action. On the one hand, it will be difficult for the local authorities to justify the need to implement a similar project, or components that have been already implemented (water, sewage, streets), although these are by far not solved issues. On the other hand, it will be difficult to advance further projects or to complete previous ones because same important inhibitors should first be solved, such as the management authority over the lake.

## Synthesising Dimension B: Competences and capacities of stakeholders

The main mechanisms and procedures that reproduce spatial injustice connect the lack of institutional transparency to the lack of accountability. The **potential for a localized action** is very high, but there is a need to restructure the mode of governance at the local level. On the one hand, the institutional memory is weak, lacking public accountability. The implementation of the Action is relegated to the local government. Once the leaders of the implemented projects are not in public positions anymore, there is no responsibility transferable to the new local government. Restructuring the local management may start by emphasizing public accountability. But the capability to articulate needs and equality claims should be at the forefront of the local authorities.

On the other hand, there are several examples of **formal and informal empowerment** for the local authorities. First, while the design of Plumbuita PIDU had no local community involved, the present Local Strategy built its SWOT analysis on research done in the Locality and included several public consultations that tested the potential impact of the designed projects. Second, the institutional arrangements can be changed. Even if the components were delayed and implemented later (2013–2014), the collaboration between the local institutions is feasible, for example, when PMB acted in coordination with PS2 for one of the two individual projects implemented. On the positive side, institutional capability might be reinforced under the latest national and regional strategies. PS2 has the capacity to implement projects, and its urban development plan looks improved in the latest Local Strategy. However, there is still much to reform internally before exploiting European opportunity structures.

The formal stakeholders and urban planners at the local institutions understand spatial justice by defining places with poor infrastructural development, unemployment and low education of inhabitants, as well as by the presence of Roma ethnics. They identify informal stakeholders as private companies and specialized NGOs. Their main reason to implement the Action's components was the identification of an urban regeneration area, the coherence of the Action with similar implemented projects, and access to funding. The Action led to a formal empowerment of local authorities, both PS2 and the Local Police. The two implemented components had partial positive effects on the Locality and encouraged a place-based perspective.

The decision-makers at the local level do have the intention and capacity to reach out to and settle cooperation networks. At risk is the underrepresentation of vulnerable and marginalized groups at the decision-making level. There is no mechanism in place in local governance that will ensure the participation through democratic procedures of the Roma community or the destitute citizens who lack housing documents. The factors impeding actors at the lowest local level to address the issues of vulnerable groups include a lack of legal tools for legalizing the situation of all the inhabitants that are in dire housing situations.

The most important clash of interest for achieving spatial justice in the Locality is the changing value of the land due to its position in Bucharest. Real estate investors need to

gather cheap land and property in the area before local authorities will start investing in the Locality. This interest would coincide with the interests of the destitute local population who wants to have property documents to regularize their status or/and for the possibility to sell property. By contrast, local authorities have no interest in offering better housing conditions or improving the legal situation of people living in the Locality, but rather expect to use 'marginalized community', 'isolated area', and 'Roma ethnics' as tokens to apply for funding. At the same time, the national authority Romania Waters has no clear ideology or legal trajectory to cede the management of the lake, thus making the entire area less attractive for an integrated urban regeneration project.

### Synthesising Dimension C: Connecting the Action to procedural and distributive justice

A few **factors** translate the impact of the Action on the local population and on the Locality at large. First, the restitution processes and losing the public areas for private interests affected the spatial justice in the Locality. This led to an unfair distribution of possibilities for development in the area, and in the long run to a bigger gap in the distribution of resources. Second, the video surveillance system did not change the social behaviour as intended, but instead reinforced the presence of a repressive state. Third, the Action was not oriented towards the interests of a dispossessed population living in informal houses or substandard housing conditions (fig. 12). Even the issues claimed by the Roma population from the Locality were not addressed by the Action. Fourth, an involuntary effect of the partial implementation of the Action and of the weak institutional capacity is that many people ignored the area's urban planning, and they built houses not respecting the urban regulations (fig. 11, fig. 1). The local authorities did not manage to keep under control a random and irregular housing development.

Experts explained the concept of spatial injustice connecting it to the **partial accomplishment** of the Action. While the Action brought to the Locality renovation of streets' and a camera surveillance system, implemented water and sewage systems, and regulated and expended the gas and electricity networks, its isolation still persists because essential factors have not been addressed: the management of the lake, the standardized streets system, the legal situation of houses and of some properties, and the connection with the main two roads bordering the locality—Petricani Bld. and Colentina Bld. Besides, against the aims of transforming the Locality and to include it in a touristic objective of Bucharest, the old constructions on the small 'Island' and the bridges are continuing to degrade (fig. 8, fig. 9). Another expert has emphasized the multiple aspect of spatial injustice: accessibility to the city; property rights and the lake management; the geographical border of the area; the lack of understanding of local population and their needs; and the uncontrolled development of houses in the area. The expert gives the example of how both poor people who live in crowded houses will build at attic without authorization, and rich people who build villas will not respect the height standard of the area (urban area plan) and build a P+3 or P+4 building where the regulation allows only P+2.

The local population did not essentially change its behaviour or life opportunities. There is **no better access of local marginalised population** to substantive needs and opportunities. At the same time, the local capacity building has not been improved, and **no essential institutional change happened**.

The perceptions of stakeholders in relation to distributive and procedural justice did not change. On the contrary, the stakeholders by now use an even more **racialized definition of marginalized population in addition to the criminalized characteristics attributed to the Roma minority** who live in poor neighbourhoods (see Local Strategy 2017). The

relation between local authorities and the inhabitants of the Locality is in a negative trend due to those encounters related to the renovation of streets or other utilities. The mutual trust and the climate of co-operation was not improved, especially since the discrimination between poor inhabitants and the wealthy newcomers deepened. The Locality was not impacted in its sense of identity or belonging neither in a negative nor in a positive way.

In spite of specific local settings, neither the formal government, nor the market rules impacted the outcomes of the Action. Instead, **the main local factors that conditioned the outcomes of the Action** were related to geographical marginalization, legal issues (restitution claims, lack of property documents), urban isolation, and the institutional authorization for management. The impacts that shaped the outcomes is directly related to a lack of understanding of the local population and its needs, and the lack of willingness of using such knowledge to accomplish an integrated project for urban regeneration.

Data show that the success of the Action was related to the **failures of procedural justice**. On the one hand, institutional and legal frameworks, and the decision-makers lack of knowledge about the Locality did not allow the full implementation of the Action. For example, one important factor was the absence of communication between the inhabitants and the local authority about the regeneration project. On the other hand, when spatial justice is perceived as an outcome of distributive justice, authorities focus on social issues and not on a complex of factors that determine the marginal conditions of the Locality. A better analysis of the local population and its aspirations, of the urban conditions and needs, and a clear understanding of the Locality in its potential for infrastructural development and residency neighbourhood could have led to more just outcomes. The specific way in which the Action had been implemented, with many errors and only very partial accomplishments, demonstrates that local authorities did not evaluate well the risks and the (potential negative) impact on the Locality.

The Action has not been implemented at the expense of other 'localities' in need. On the contrary, the area on which it focused (Plumbuita) has been left out in many other occasions by major urban strategies. This Action wanted to correct this fault but did not achieved its purposes. Unfortunately, given the institutional weakness of the implementers, other similar projects may suffer the same fate. Unless a better coherent strategy and urban cohesion policies are in place, and a better mechanism for EU funding is implemented, urban regeneration will remain at risk of being unaccomplished. In addition, there is a clear need to address spatial injustice in ethnically and socially mixed places and to understand the specificity of a poor and marginalized Locality within a developed region, or, differently put, to understand, acknowledge, and address the factors that led to the (partial) failure of the Action.

In the general context of Bucharest city and the larger Bucharest-Ilfov region, it is important to have an integrated urban development plan, but one in which all the dimensions are addressed in both the design and the implementation of the Action. Urban regeneration cannot be built on grandiose ideas that lack a deep and serious knowledge of the Locality and its inhabitants.

**Can these factors achieve spatial justice over places and time?**

If the proper development of local programs is intertwined with continuous funding of the projects design in the Strategy, PS2 as the main stakeholder can have a coherent local policy. However, there should be a follow-up and a serious assessment and monitoring of previously implemented projects.

Local actors do have (even if limited) capacity to change and exploit European opportunity structures. The potential should be instead understood in a timeframe that is not always the same as the one analysed through the present measurement system. To give an example, many projects have a very short opening call to action or implementation action, whereas the existing laws and regulations at different local, regional, or national levels would need a longer time for delivery of the authorizations, services, or products.

The time dimension in analysing spatial justice is crucial for understanding the causes of spatial injustice and the potential for change at the local level. Instead of running the risk of reproducing spatial injustice, local, national and European levels should address redistribution in a more suitable way, through adequate institutional collaboration and coordination.

## 6. Conclusion

### What is being achieved in terms of delivering greater spatial justice?

This case illustrates the phenomenon of the existence of underdeveloped areas Plumbuita neighbourhood in developed localities (Bucharest); even more, the existence of a poverty pocket (poor informal housing) within a larger area with a cultural/historical/natural potential of the Locality. On the one hand, the Action is no longer embedded in policy discourse, mainly because the political team and some civil servants changed since the last elections in 2016. The new local government is designed with another strategy (Local Strategy 2017). On the other hand, the Locality remains marginalized and isolated despite the efforts performed through the Action, having little chance to enter the focus of urban regeneration plans.

This aspect shows the dichotomy between 'urban regeneration plan' and 'integrated urban policy', which to this point led to conflicting strategies and finally to the failure of the Action. The 'integrated urban policy' should have addressed all the aspects of Plumbuita's societal life (including the most disadvantaged areas and population), which could not happen via the 'urban regeneration plan' mostly targeting infrastructural development. However, the Action ended up not serving the needs of the poorest, but implemented one program that re-enforced their stigmatization, the video surveillance system.

The two implemented programs of the Action had a fair impact on the local population and on the Local Police. For the Local Police, the Locality became easier to access. By having asphalt on the streets, the police cars can enter and patrol the neighbourhoods of Plumbuita and Steaua Rosie, and due to the video-surveillance system, these areas are constantly watched and police intervention is allegedly faster. Local inhabitants instead emphasized the positive effect of the streets renovation, water and sewage systems—with their acknowledged liabilities. In addition, the local population could not assess the (positive) impact on their daily life of the video-surveillance system. They do claim petty criminality is not as bad as before, but they also counter this by explaining that illegal waste in the lake should have been solved by identifying the culprits through the video surveillance system. The kind of contradictory statements around the impact of the Action in the Locality reveal the fact that the Action echoed a certain ideology of public policy. **Instead of policies for spatial justice, there is a preference for policing a particular people who inhabit poor and underdeveloped places.**

At this moment, the actors involved in the Locality have no particular interest in developing or intervening in the area before the legal issues are solved. Private land claims, restitution processes, and unaccomplished urban programs contributed to a perception of weak local authority. Private actors, as well as EU funds, are perceived as essential contributors to the development of the poor areas. The Locality is targeted to be part of a bigger strategy for urban development (CSB2035, Local Strategy 2017), preferably with EU funding and not supported by the local budget for urban regeneration. However, if key issues regarding the PS2 management and authority will not be solved, the potential for change is even lower.

### What are the policy changes ahead that will have a bigger impact?

The **EU policies on territorial cohesion** must assess the reasons why the full Action has not been finalised and to understand the challenges the project promoters had. For exam-

ple, the inflexibility of the EU funds and the National Agency for Project Management can be addressed by both the EU funds Agency and the national agency.

Regarding **the national policies of development**, it is important to see to what extent many promoters are inhibited by the inflexibility of the regulations not only in accessing funds, but also in implementing projects. For example, the delay in obtaining authorisation from other institutions can be better regulated. Some kind of fast-track institutional cooperation is desirable.

Among the factors enhancing local abilities to articulate needs and equality claims is a pressure on the part of an organized **civil society**, and opportunities for accessing EU funds for urban development. Factors that limit local ability to propose actions include the lack of collaboration between public institutions, legislative loopholes, and long bureaucratic timeframes. Data show how weak institutional competences facilitate private interests against the local population and do not defend the public good (e.g., the restitution cases mentioned). Further, lack of professionalism does not necessarily deny the existence of corruption, but it plays an important role in creating and maintaining forms of spatial injustice.

The local capacities for exploiting European financing structures has a descending trend. Regardless of the Action's outcomes, the Locality changed its characteristics. If a decade ago the Locality could have been defined as 'underdeveloped' and 'disadvantaged,' today it rather fits into the category of a desired and wealthy place (proximity to A3, the lake shore, small size, iconic monuments, new private residential units, etc.). Being unable to use EU funds to accomplish aspect of the project that were not achieved in the previous implementation, the local authority will probably abandon any initiative to invest in the area. One example is that PS2 recently submitted in 2018 a proposal to receive a budget to continue the Action, but the project was among the few rejected by the MDRAP. The argument on the part of the Ministry was the lack of coordination and sealed collaboration with other partners, especially the lack institutional agreements.

The Locality and Action confirmed that processes of place-making are directly related to spatial justice, but it is not self-evident whose interests are followed when claims of spatial justice are formulated or who is in a power position from where he/she can participate in defining them. At the same time, the limited implementation of the Action proved that the initial design for urban regeneration has a crucial element in the way projects become efficient and whether they have a positive impact or not. The outcomes of the Action show that most of the projects have not been accomplished or their effects have negatively impacted the local development.

The partial implementation of the Action has resulted in a more difficult situation for the Locality than was there before. First, the funding possibilities for the 'marginalized areas' within the developed city/district are less clear now than they were a decade ago. The impossibility to finalize the Action leaves the Locality with the perspective that it will never be finished or completed because it was promised and designed for the Action. Second, even if the local population can be defined still as marginalized and without equal access to resources, the irregular development of the area that brought wealthy inhabitants and prosperous (or stable) private enterprises (such as Hospice) to the Locality will no longer allow the Locality to be categorized as marginal and destitute. Probably the most eloquent example is the street renovation that will now determine the development of public transport. This is the responsibility of the local authorities, but due to the bad engineering of the streets, it is not possible to introduce public transportation in the neighbourhoods. In this sense, we can say that the Action's achievements are not sustainable and might not be exploited further to develop connected urban programs.



Urban development plans supported by the EU funds at the local level run the risk that the local authority will either maintain the categorization of the Locality as marginalized, due to the EU requirements for funding, or will completely abandon the area, which will lead to further discrimination for those who are marginalized. The funding should be adjusted in coherence with a general urban planning for development, while keeping in mind the existing inequality between the inhabitants of the same neighbourhood, an inequality produced by partial and incomplete implementation of previous actions. Thus, the opportunities for funding should not refrain local authorities to seek financing projects from the local budget directed to the Locality.

Moreover, mechanism of adjusting for institutional weakness should be funded and monitored in a way that will contribute to a coherent implementation of the urban policies regardless of political change. A shift of the monitoring from political to technical measures might be recommended regarding project implementation.

Wrapping up, the analysed data on the Action shows that incomplete implementation of the programs and the lack of follow-up and continuous funding of the Strategy leads to a deficit of equity and equality in the Locality, thus reproducing patterns of spatial injustice. The more time that passes, the less probable it is for the local authorities to be able to re-address the same issues they started the urban regeneration project for a decade ago. This analysis demonstrates the necessity of adjusting EU funding framework to the realities that the local authorities are confronted with. At the same time, it emphasizes the compulsory monitoring of institutional development and capacity building of PS2 in order to respond to the needs of the most marginalized and destitute areas with dedicated programs, and not only on the basis of the EU funds.

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## 8. Annexes

### 8.1 List of Interviewed Stakeholders

Stakeholder name		Code
PS2	interview	plumb_1.1
PS2 Local Council	interview	plumb_1.2
Local Police S2	interview	plumb_1.3
	planned group discussion	plumb_1.4
Inhabitants of the area	interview	plumb_1.5
	interview	plumb_1.6
	interview	plumb_1.7
	interview	plumb_1.8
	interview	plumb_1.9
	interview	plumb_1.10
	interview	plumb_1.11
	interview	plumb_1.12
	interview	plumb_1.13
	interview	plumb_1.14
	interview	plumb_1.15
	planned group discussion	plumb_1.22
Experts	Interview	plumb_1.16
	Interview	plumb_1.17
	Interview	plumb_1.18
Romanian Waters	Interview	plumb_1.19
Monastery	Interview	plumb_1.20
NGO	Interview	plumb_1.21

### 8.2 Stakeholder Interaction Table


Type of Stakeholders	Most relevant 'territorial' level they operate at	Stakeholders' ways of involvement in the project (What do we gain, what do they gain)
Local politicians	District of Bucharest city	Interview, interest to collaborate (opposition party)
Local administration	District of Bucharest city	Interview, interest to collaborate if we offer something in exchange: knowledge, etc.

Associations representing private businesses	-	
Local development companies/agencies	-	
Municipal associations	-	
Non-profit/civil society organisations representing vulnerable groups	National level	Know-how exchange
Other local community stakeholders	National level	No interest in collaboration
Local state offices/representations	National level	Urban planners' perspective is important
Regional state offices/representations	-	
Ministries involved in (national or EU) cohesion policy deployment	MDRAP	January 30, 2019 workshop
Cohesion Policy think tanks (national/EU-level)	MDRAP	January 30, 2019 workshop
Primary and secondary educational institutions	-	
Colleges and universities	National level	Faculty of Architecture and Urban Studies
Social and health care institutions	-	
Cultural institutions and associations	National level	Religious institutions
Media	National level	TVR

### 8.3 Map(s) and Photos




1. Bucharest city map by administrative Districts



2. Map of territorial units in District 2, Bucharest





**3. Map of District 2, Bucharest**  
(the stripped areas are those targeted for socio-economic and urban regeneration PIDU projects:  
Baicului, Creangă and Plumbuita-Steaua Roșie)  
Source: Local Strategy 2017




4. Plumbuita area within Bucharest city map



5. Plumbuita area, Google Earth view




6. Video surveillance system in Plumbuita area




7. Development plan for the Western part of Plumbuita lake







8. Name and place of the streets that have been renovated



9. Plumbuita neighborhood: the private claimed area (in red)



10. Lived space per capita: national - total, national - average, average - urban, average - Bucharest  
(Source: INS, Audit Urban 2018)




## 11. Decision-making process for the approval and financing of PIDU Plumbuita

### Additional Photos




**Fig. 1.** View from the park to Plumbuita neighbourhood, P+4 building on the lake's shore



**Fig. 2.** Photo from Plumbuita neighbourhood



**Fig. 3** Plumbuita Monastery



**Fig. 4** Tei Church (the round church)



**Fig. 5** Ghika Palace





**Fig. 6** Photo from Plumbuita neighbourhood: the small Street without asphalt (2)



**Fig. 7** Photo from Plumbuita neighbourhood: Hospice Casa Sperantei



**Fig. 8** Photo from Plumbuita neighbourhood: The bridge between the Island and Plumbuita



**Fig. 9** Photo from Plumbuita neighbourhood: The „Island’



**Fig. 10** Photo from Plumbuita neighbourhood: limit between Steaua Roşie and Plumbuita Park



**Fig. 11** View from the park to Plumbuita neighbourhood



**Fig. 12** The bridge between Plumbuita and Steaua Roşie neighbourhoods



**Fig. 13** The highway A3 and its entrance in Bucharest – plan to finalise the works in 2018 (photo source: ProTV)

## 8.4 Tables

	National level		Regional Level: Bucharest city		Local Level: District 2, Bucharest	
	Urban development programs	Main goals	Urban Development programs	Main actors	Urban Development programs	Main actors
2007 - 2013	<p>Regional Operational Program (ROP)</p> <p>Cadrul Strategic National de Referinta (2007-2013)</p> <p>National Development Plan (PND) 2007-2013</p> <p>National Strategy for Sustainable Development 2010-2020</p> <p>Lisbon Agenda + Göteborg Agenda + Convergence + European Fund for Regional Development (FEDR), Social European Fund (FSE), Cohesion Fund (FC).</p>	<p>Social urban regeneration funding: European Fund for Regional Development</p> <p>&gt; the rapid reduction of disparities between Romania and the EU (PIB&lt;75%.)</p>	<p>1. Planul de Dezvoltare Regionala Bucuresti – Ilfov 2007 – 2013 (PDR BI);</p> <p>2. Strategia regionala de inovare a regiunii Bucuresti – Ilfov;</p> <p>3. Planul regional de actiune pentru ocuparea fortei de munca si incluziune sociala si Planul de implementare a planului regional de actiune 2006 + 2008, Bucuresti – Ilfov;</p> <p>4. Cadrul Strategic Regional pentru Regiunea Bucuresti – Ilfov</p> <p>5. The Plan for Sustainable Urban Mobility for Bucharest-Ilfov Region</p>	PMB; Romani-an Waters	PIDU Plum-buita (Partially accomplished)	PS2 Local Police S2
2014 - 2016	<p>Regional Operational Program 2014-2020</p> <p>Operational Program Human Capital</p>	Axe 5: Reducing the no of	<p>PIDU Bucharest (not started yet)</p> <p>Regional Plan for Develop-</p>		Integrated Development of Marginal	PS2 C4C NGO Communica-

	tal (POCU)2014-2020	people who are at risk of poverty and social exclusion from (Roma and non-Roma) marginal communities in towns with more than 20,000 inhabitants, emphasizing those localities with mainly Roma communities. Implementing integrated measures in the context of DLRC mechanism.	ment of Bucharest-Ilfov Region 2014-2020		Community from District 2	tion for community ACZ Consulting
2016 - 2025	<p>ROP 2014-2010</p> <p>Operational Program Administrative Capacity (POCA)</p> <p>The National Strategy for Sustainable Development (2013-2020-2030),</p> <p>National Program for Local Development (PNDL) of the Ministry of Regional Development and Public Administration (MDRAP)</p> <p>INTERREG Europe Program</p>		Regional Plan for Development of Bucharest-Ilfov Region 2014-2020		<p>- Local Strategy for Urban Development</p> <p>- 'Chose Freedom, Say no to corruption'</p> <p>- Disaster Reconstruction Unified Platform Assistance for Life (DRUPAL)</p> <p>- Building Energy Efficiency Technology Selector (BEETS)</p> <p>- Improvement of regional pol-</p>	<p>PS2, PMB</p> <p>PS2; Freedom House Foundation</p> <p>PS2, University of Lisbon, PT; European Group for territorial cooperation NOVUM, PL; SI-MO-RA, HU; University for Applied Sciences, Austria.</p> <p>PS2; JUN-TAEX Local Authority, Spain; ITeCONS, PT; AG.EN.A, Italia etc.</p>



					icies to support shift to larger use of renewable energy sources (IM-PRESS) - Recognition of Supporting Energy Efficiency with Plant Vegetation Technology (RESET)	PS2; Si-MO-RA Ltd., etc.  Italian National Agency for New Technology; PS2 (partner 7), etc.
>2035	Strategy for Territorial Development of Romania 2035		Urban Strategy for Bucharest-Ilfov region			

**Table 1.** Framework for urban development programs between 2007-2018

Name of Case Study Area	Integrated Urban Development Plan 'Plumbuita' implemented by PS2, Bucharest.
Size	Micro-urban; District 2: 32 km <sup>2</sup>
Total population (2016)	Bucharest 2,102,912 inhabitants District 2: 372.913 inhabitants Plumbuita area: 24.000 inhabitants
Population density (2016)	11,697/km <sup>2</sup>
Level of development in relation to wider socio-economic context <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Disadvantaged within a developed region/city?</li> <li>Disadvantaged within a wider underdeveloped region?</li> </ul>	<b>Disadvantaged area within the developed city of Bucharest.</b> District 2 of Bucharest is considered developed area. The geographical location conditioned the isolation of the two peninsulas that constitute the inhabited part of the Locality.
Type of the region (NUTS3-Eurostat) <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Predominantly urban?</li> <li>Intermediate?</li> </ul> Predominantly rural?	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Predominantly urban</li> </ul>
Name and Identification Code of the NUTS-3 area, in which the locality is situated (NUTS 3 Code(s) as of 2013)	RO32 Bucuresti-Ilfov
Name and Identification Code of the NUTS-2 area, in which the locality is situated (NUTS 2 Code(s) as of 2013)	RO32

**Table 2:** Basic socio-economic characteristics of the area



Project	Sub-project	Value
1. Updating the Urban Area Plan (PUZ) <sup>xix</sup> for the Plumbuita-Steaua Roşie-Petricani area, adding new measures to respond to spatial reorganization designed by the action.		
2. Urban infrastructure rehabilitation and public services renewal in the area. (7 components)	Streets modernization in Plumbuita and Steaua Roşie neighbourhoods, including a haulage road	Total value: 1,915,138.39 Euro EU funding: 1,638,595.60 Euro PS2 co-financing: 276,542.79 Euro
	Cultural park 'Plumbuita Island' (see fig. 3)	-
	Restoration of kiosk in the Cultural park 'Plumbuita Island'	-
	Rehabilitation of new public spaces (e.g. parks, playgrounds) and the adjoining park of the Plumbuita Monastery	-
	Rehabilitation of pedestrian passage and bridge to the 'Plumbuita Island' and haulage road around the Monastery	-
3. Urban infrastructure rehabilitation and public services renewal in the area. (5 components)	Underground passage Colentina & Doamna Ghika	-
	Overpassage Fundeni & Gherghitei	-
	Traffic management system	-
	Bike lanes: Ricinului-Plumbuita Park-Colentina	-
	Car parking places in Colentina	-
4. Usage of photovoltaic cells for night lighting		-
5. Awareness campaign for selective collection and recycling of garbage		-
6. Study for developing new transport lines in Tei Toboc and Plumbuita areas		-
7. The enlargement of water and sewage systems		-
8. The growing number of police officers to ensure citizens' security		-
9. For elevating security	Video-surveillance system	Total value: 919,862.99

and criminality prevention in the area Plumbuita-Steaua Roşie-Petricani.	and informatics management for growing social security and criminality prevention.	Euro EU funding: 418,646.99 Euro PS2 co-financing: 301,216.00 Euro
10. Rehabilitation of a social service centre for old people		-
11. The development of a medical aid service centre within the social service centre		-
12. Program for professional training of Roma population living in the area, which targets the Roma integration within the community life.		-

**Table 3:** The Action – PIDU Plumbuita projects

<sup>i</sup> PIDU, or the master plan for urban regeneration, is a strategy for long-term development of an urban centre or a specific urban action area. It can be designed for the entire city of Bucharest (PIDU Bucureşti 2016) or another city; or it can be designed for a delimited urban area within a city, such as PIDU 'Creangă', 'Baicului', 'Plumbuita' in District 2 of Bucharest. The master plan includes strategies for economic growth and job market creation. Each phase of the PIDU program is meant to be implemented by individual projects. At the national level, PIDU are developed with the support of technical teams of local authorities in urban areas and should be distinguished from PID (Integrated Plan for Development), which are nation-wide projects developed in cooperation by several local authorities in urban and rural areas.

<sup>ii</sup> At the time, the governmental programs were: *Programul privind reabilitarea, modernizarea şi/sau asfaltarea drumurilor de interes judeţean şi de interes local, alimentarea cu apă, canalizarea şi epurarea apelor uzate la sate, precum şi în unităţile administrativ-teritoriale cu resurse turistice* - Hotărârea Guvernului nr. 577/1997.

<sup>iii</sup> ROP, European Fund for Regional Development, Structural Instruments (2007–2013).

<sup>iv</sup> The structure of local authorities of District 2 is composed of the executive body, a directly-elected mayor and a vice-mayor (now from the opposition party), and the deliberative body, the Local Council (LC), which has 27 members from elected parties, a number that corresponds to the share of electoral votes. The LC can dispose of unnecessary commissions and advance local law and regulations, among which include the decision over the local budget, which the Mayor should approve in order to be implemented afterwards by designated departments.

<sup>v</sup> <https://www.hospice.ro/en/about-us/>

<sup>vi</sup> Initially, he was in the main government party, the Socialist Democratic Party (PSD), then he became a member of UNPR in 2010. In 2015, he was accused of fraud and condemned for corruption. He was arrested in 2017 and bailed out in 2018.

<sup>vii</sup> The Local Development Strategy 2016–2025 mentions ethnic Roma as the main population in several administrative units that are considered disadvantaged. However, there are no data divided by ethnicity at the micro-urban level. Thus, the estimation of 80–90% of the Roma population in a disadvantaged area is problematic because it risks stigmatizing even more of the local population

and addressing the issue from the perspective of the National Roma Integration Strategy and less with the tools of local administration.

viii The original writing of the name was Ghika, which today is written as Ghica. For the English reader, the name has been kept 'Ghika'.

ix On Roma slavery in Romania, see Will Guy (2001), Nicolae Gheorghe (1989), Sam Beck (1983) and Viorel Achim (2013).

x The Roma population belongs to mainly two groups: Flower-sellers (ro. *Florari*) and Cocalari. Vasile Burtea (1994) explains that kokkalò in the Romani language means 'bone', thus indicating those who produce objects from bones, such as needles, hooks, combs, clips, buttons, small pots, swords, handles, etc. Horváth and Nastasă (2012) explain that cocalari were traditionally settled and assimilated Roma. In the Plumbuita neighbourhood live Roma flower-sellers, and in Steaua-Roșie live Roma cocalari (denominations upon self-identification). In recent years, other Roma ethnics who do not belong to these two groups also came to the area.

xi See the law 66/17.12.1972 that approves the Decree 307/1971 concerning the rights of residency in big cities. For limited rights to employment, see Law 12/21.10.1971.

xii Ro. Orig. 'chitanță de mână'.

xiii Ro. orig. Așezământul Grigore Ghika Voivod

xiv This institution is now called the AFI, the Real Estate Management Authority, under the direct management of the General Council of PMB. For details see [www.afi.pmb.ro](http://www.afi.pmb.ro).

xv See media articles: RomaniaCurata.ro 2015, stiri.com.ro 2017

xvi To this date, Romania has the biggest number of house owners in the EU. See <https://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/documents/2995521/7086099/3-23112015-AP-EN.pdf/a3cba175-0776-4063-86d4-c475b1c7454c>.

xvii See the project Tei implemented by PS2: <http://parcaventuratei.ro>.

xviii DGASPC is the General Direction for Social Services and Child Protection, a local authority under the management of the district mayor and that works in collaboration with the Ministry of Labour.


xix See the updated version of PUZ:

[http://public.ps2.ro:3012/Urbanism/PUZ%20Sectorul%202/PUZ\\_S2/PUZ\\_S2.jpg](http://public.ps2.ro:3012/Urbanism/PUZ%20Sectorul%202/PUZ_S2/PUZ_S2.jpg)

## The RELOCAL Project

EU Horizon 2020 research project '**Resituating the local in cohesion and territorial development**' –RELOCAL aims to identify factors that condition local accessibility of European policies, local abilities to articulate needs and equality claims and local capacities for exploiting European opportunity structures.

In the past, especially since the economic and financial crisis, the European Social Model has proven to be challenged by the emergence of spatially unjust results. The RELOCAL hypothesis is that **processes of localisation and place-based public policy** can make a positive contribution to spatial justice and democratic empowerment.



The research is based on **33 case studies** in **13 different European** countries that exemplify development challenges in terms of spatial justice. The cases were chosen to allow for a balanced representation of different institutional contexts. Based on case study findings, project partners will draw out the factors that influence the impact of place-based approaches or actions from a comparative perspective. The results are intended to facilitate a greater local orientation of cohesion, territorial development and other EU policies.

The RELOCAL project runs from October 2016 until September 2020.

Read more at <https://relocal.eu>

Project Coordinator:

University of Eastern Finland



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